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There are two paradigms through which to view trade law and
policy within the American constitutional system. One paradigm sees
trade law and policy as quintessentially about domestic economic
policy. Institutionally, under the domestic economics paradigm, trade
law falls within the province of Congress, which has legion Article I
powers over commercial matters. The second paradigm sees trade law
as fundamentally about America’s relationship with foreign countries.
Institutionally, under the foreign affairs paradigm, trade law is the
province of the President, who speaks for the United States in foreign
affairs. While both paradigms have operated throughout American
history, the domestic economics paradigm dominated in the nineteenth
century, and the foreign affairs paradigm from the mid-twentieth
century.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, trade law and policy
have become increasingly divisive and contentious. Trade law and
policy entered a new era of liberalization, characterized by
international organizations (like the WTO) and a shift to mini-lateral
free trade agreements. By 2016, backlash was in full force, with
candidates Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, and Hillary Clinton all
coming out against the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Since taking
office, President Trump has instituted high tariffs on solar panels,
threatened to withdraw from NAFTA, and sparked concern about a
trade war with China.
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This Article makes three contributions. First, we argue that the
current discontent over trade is not just a matter of the distribution of
economic gains and losses but a matter of the distribution of
constitutional powers. We provide a thorough descriptive account of
the two paradigms for trade within our constitutional system and show
that trade has migrated from a domestic to a foreign affairs matter—
and ultimately that it has become unhooked even from specific foreign
affairs objectives. As trade drifted further away from the balance
struck by our separation of powers and became increasingly rooted in
the presidency, agreements liberalizing trade rules became more
viable—but at the cost of the political sustainability that comes with
greater congressional involvement.
Second, we make a normative case for rebalancing trade within
the constitutional structure. We argue that trade shares few
similarities with other foreign affairs and national security areas in
which the President is seen to have a functional advantage, and,
perhaps surprisingly given the conventional wisdom, that the
parochial interests of Congress present strong benefits to trade
policymaking that are widely undervalued.
Finally, we apply this rebalanced framework for trade law and
policy to a variety of contemporary debates, including the role of fasttrack authority in negotiating and approving trade agreements, the
President’s power to declare trade wars, the scope of the President’s
authority to withdraw from trade agreements, the use of unorthodox
international agreements in the commercial context, and the
increasing conflict between trade agreements and state and local
authority, which we term “trade federalism.”
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INTRODUCTION
There are two paradigms through which to view trade law and policy within
the American constitutional system. One paradigm sees trade law and policy as
quintessentially about domestic economic policy. Under this domestic
economics paradigm, tariffs raise revenue to fund government programs,
infrastructure, and social goods. Trade restrictions encourage the development
of infant industries, protect developed industries, and ensure a robust industrial
base, which is essential for homeland security and defense. Trade law can also
guarantee a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and opportunities by
safeguarding the wages and jobs of American workers. Institutionally, under the
domestic economics paradigm, trade law falls within the province of Congress,
which has legion Article I powers, including the powers to regulate foreign
commerce, set tariffs and imposts, and originate revenue bills. Congressional
authority is desirable because domestic economic policy is appropriately pursued
through a participatory and representative process that includes interest group
bargaining, logrolling, and attention to regional diversity.
The second paradigm sees trade law as fundamentally about America’s
relationship with foreign countries. Under the foreign affairs paradigm, tariff
rates should be negotiated as part of agreements with foreign countries to achieve
consensus on barriers to trade. Trade agreements are a tool of diplomacy and
geopolitics: opening markets to countries that will side with democracy and
human rights, asserting American leadership in setting the rules of the road for
global commerce, and punishing those who violate international norms through
sanctions. Trade law also seeks to help American businesses go abroad in search
of new markets and new consumers, while providing American consumers with
access to cheaper goods. Institutionally, under the foreign affairs paradigm, trade
law is the province of the President, who speaks for the United States in foreign
affairs, serves as commander in chief, and has the power under Article II to
appoint and receive ambassadors and to negotiate and make treaties with foreign
nations. Executive power is desirable because the President is best positioned to
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assess geopolitical conditions, negotiate with foreign countries, and represent the
interests of the nation as a whole.
These two constitutional paradigms have coexisted throughout American
history, fading in and out of view as foreign affairs or domestic economic issues
were most salient. But by and large, the domestic economics paradigm defined
trade law from the founding into the early twentieth century, with Congress in
the driver’s seat. Successive tariff acts advanced a variety of goals crucial to the
success of the new nation: generating revenue to fund the government,
developing the West through internal improvements, protecting burgeoning
industries from foreign competition, and safeguarding the interests of laborers
from low-wage foreign workers. Over time, however, the foreign affairs
paradigm came to dominate, with the President wielding greater and greater
power over trade policy. With American manufacturing leading the globe, World
War II leaving foreign countries in ruins, and the contest between democracy
and communism dividing the world, trade was increasingly seen as a matter of
foreign relations.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, trade law and policy have become
increasingly divisive and contentious. Trade law and policy entered a new era of
liberalization, characterized by international organizations, like the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and a shift to mini-lateral free trade agreements. But even
as President Bill Clinton concluded agreements like the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and negotiated China’s entry into the WTO, antitrade advocates from Pat Buchanan to Ross Perot gained substantial followings.
By the 2016 election, the political consensus over trade had broken down.
Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump opposed the pending TransPacific Partnership (TPP), as did Democratic-Socialist Bernie Sanders and even
Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton, who announced her opposition
to the trade agreement despite having supported it as Secretary of State. President
Trump said that he would either renegotiate NAFTA or withdraw from the
agreement, and on September 30, 2018, the Trump administration announced it
had reached terms on a renegotiated NAFTA 2018 (known formally as the
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA).1 He has imposed tariffs
as high as 30 percent on solar panels,2 50 percent on washing machines,3 25

1. Vicki Needham, Trump Says He Will Renegotiate or Withdraw from NAFTA, HILL (June
28, 2016), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/285189-trump-says-he-will-renegotiate-or-withdraw-fromnafta-without-changes [https://perma.cc/AD7H-FVLU]; Executive Office of the President, Joint
Statement from United States Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and Canadian Foreign Minister
Chrystia Freedland, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Sept. 30, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2018/september/joint-statement-united-states
[https://perma.cc/64YX-5TLN].
2. Ana Swanson & Brad Plumer, Trump Slaps Tariffs on Foreign Washing Machines and
Solar Products, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/business/trumptariffs-washing-machines-solar-panels.html [https://perma.cc/S78T-G5KA].
3. Id.
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percent on steel, and 10 percent on aluminum.4 Some commentators have
concluded that the President has started a trade war with China.5
With the potential for significant changes in trade policy on the horizon,
many are scrambling to understand the limits of the President’s powers and the
ability of Congress to block the President if, for instance, he tried to withdraw
from NAFTA or the WTO.6 Perhaps paradoxically, President Trump relies on
expansive presidential power derived from the foreign affairs paradigm, but he
does so to advance domestic economic goals that would traditionally be within
the scope of Congress’s constitutional authority to make economic policy.
We make three contributions in this Article. First, we argue that the current
discontent over trade is not just a matter of the distribution of economic gains
and losses but a matter of the distribution of constitutional powers. We provide
a descriptive account of the two paradigms of trade under the Constitution from
the founding until the present. This account explains the two paradigms and
shows that the domestic paradigm dominated in the long nineteenth century until
it was supplanted in the mid-twentieth century by the foreign affairs paradigm
and the rise of presidential trade powers. We show that one of the fundamental
challenges for contemporary trade law and policy is that over the last few
decades, trade has increasingly become unhooked from either the domestic
economics paradigm or the foreign affairs paradigm. The rise of presidential
trade powers has meant that in the short run, trade liberalization has proceeded
expeditiously, but with little regard for either of these historic aims. And it has
come at a long-term cost to the sustainability of trade policies within domestic
politics. The causes of the current backlash over trade are, therefore, intimately
tied to the distribution of constitutional powers and the statutory frameworks that
implement those powers.
Second, we seek to make a normative case for rebalancing trade law away
from the foreign affairs paradigm, which has all but drowned the domestic
economics paradigm. We do not mean to suggest that trade should be seen as
wholly domestic, subject only to the messy process of congressional horse-

4. Ana Swanson, Trump Administration Proposes Stiff Penalties on Steel and Aluminum
Imports, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/trumpadministration-recommends-stiff-penalties-on-steel-and-aluminum-imports.html
[https://perma.cc/QEM4-ZZPG]; Rachel Layne, President Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs:
Winners and Losers, CBS MONEYWATCH (May 31, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/presidenttrumps-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-winners-and-losers [https://perma.cc/NE56-U352].
5. William Pesak, How Trump’s Trade War is Driving China Nuts, POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/10/16/donald-trump-trade-war-china-221310
[https://perma.cc/V5CP-Q67B].
6. Luis Abad, How Much Power Does President Trump Actually Have Over Trade Deals?,
FORBES (April 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kpmg/2017/04/03/how-much-power-doespresident-trump-actually-have-over-trade-deals/#611e19737a62
[https://perma.cc/U38U-RZN5];
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Can Congress Block Trump if He Pulls Out of NAFTA?, FOREIGN POLICY,
(Oct. 17, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/17/can-congress-block-trump-if-he-pulls-out-of-nafta
[https://perma.cc/VDM3-EZFL].
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trading. Rather, we argue that some of the justifications for expansive
presidential power in this arena are inapplicable and others are far weaker than
conventionally assumed. In this sense, we seek to “normalize” trade within the
constitutional system, rather than seeing it as exceptional simply because it
touches on foreign affairs.7 We argue that many of the features that supposedly
differentiate foreign affairs from domestic affairs do not apply, or do not apply
as strongly, in the case of trade. In addition, we question the oft-repeated claim
that the “nationalist” president is better suited to making trade policy for the
whole country because of the considerable benefits that come from Congress’s
parochial interests. At the same time, we show that the downsides of
congressional capture by interest groups must be compared with the downsides
of presidential capture—and that contrary to the “nationalist” story, the
institutional design of the trade presidency heightens, rather than reduces, the
risk of capture.
One of the implications of rebalancing trade in favor of the domestic
economics paradigm is that many puzzles and problems in contemporary trade
and international economic law can be addressed by reference to “ordinary”
domestic law principles, doctrines, and practices. Our third aim, therefore, is to
illustrate the promise of taking a more balanced constitutional approach to trade
law and policy in a variety of areas. First, we show how fast-track authority
amounts to a cession of congressional power, rather than an exercise of it—
contrary to the conventional scholarly wisdom. Second, we conclude that the
expansion of presidential powers in trade has grown so significant that the
President has considerable power to declare trade wars, in spite of Congress’s
powers under Article I. Congress has simply abdicated the field, without even
putting in place the checks and balances afforded to ordinary regulatory policymaking in the administrative state. Third, we explore the specific conditions
under which the President has the power to withdraw from trade agreements,
such as NAFTA and the WTO. Taking a normalized approach to the role of trade
within the separation of powers requires focusing on specific statutory
authorizations. This places us at odds with scholars who conclude the President
has almost unlimited power in this arena, as well as those who hold the President
has virtually no discretion.8 Finally, we discuss two developments related to
international agreements: the recent trend toward soft law agreements and the
impact of international trade agreements on state and local regulations. With
respect to what we call “unorthodox international agreements,” trade sits
uncomfortably. While these agreements have been concluded in a variety of
areas, including the Iran Nuclear Deal and the Paris Climate Agreement,
Congress’s Article I powers suggest greater caution in the use of such

7. See generally Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (arguing that the “normalization” of foreign affairs law is
generally a desirable outcome).
8. See infra Section III.C.
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agreements on commercial matters. Another pressing issue is that international
trade agreements increasingly threaten the traditional powers of state and local
governments. We call this intersection “trade federalism” and discuss how the
imbalance in the constitutional separation of powers on trade issues undermines
the commitment to trade federalism embedded in the Constitution.
More broadly, we hope to contribute to debates in both constitutional law
and trade law. While constitutional law scholars have occasionally recognized
the Janus-faced nature of trade,9 they normally focus on the role of treaties in the
constitutional system, clumping together trade deals with other kinds of
international agreements in spite of trade’s explicit and unique connections to
Article I powers.10 So strong is the foreign affairs paradigm that some have noted
that the foreign commerce power can get conflated with the Treaty Power.11
International trade scholars, in contrast, pay little attention to the domestic
constitutional law framework. To the extent they focus on domestic
considerations, they emphasize domestic political constraints rather than the
locus of constitutional authority.12 Focusing specifically on trade’s role within
the separation of powers illuminates new issues and contributes to debates in
both arenas.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the two paradigms for
trade within the separation of powers and argues that the trend towards the
foreign affairs paradigm, followed more recently by the movement towards
liberalization, has strained trade law and policy. Part II makes the normative

9. See, e.g., Cory Adkins & David Singh Grewal, Two Views of International Trade in the
Constitutional Order, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (noting two themes in trade policy as American
global leadership and American political autonomy and discussing their interplay); Harold Hongju Koh,
Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking after INS v. Chada, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 1191, 1192–93 (1986) (noting that trade is divided between Congress and the presidency in the
constitutional scheme). For a classic account in this vein, but not one in constitutional law, see Bayless
Manning, The Congress, the Executive, and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF.
309–11 (1977) (identifying trade as an intermestic issue, between international and domestic affairs).
10. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773
(2014) (analyzing trade examples as well as general treaty commitments); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1203–04 (2018)
(considering a variety of international agreements); see generally Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End:
The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236
(2008) (examining congressional-executive agreements such as free trade agreements alongside
treaties); Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119
YALE L.J. 140 (2009) (considering the range of issues over which Presidents exercise independent
authority). For an exception, though one that still focuses on treaties, see John C. Yoo, Laws as
Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 766
(2000).
11. See Scott Sullivan, The Future of the Foreign Commerce Clause, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
1955, 1974 (2015) (describing the conflation of the Commerce Clause and Foreign Commerce Clause
and the Treaty Power).
12. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 AM. J. INT’L
L. 28, 43–46 (2002); Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal
Accession, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 539, 578 (1995) (discussing the interplay of bloc accession to NAFTA
with domestic politics).
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argument against overly emphasizing trade’s relationship to foreign affairs. Part
III discusses implications for a variety of debates in constitutional and statutory
law. A brief conclusion follows.
I.
TRADE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: TWO PARADIGMS
Trade has been a central object of public policy since the founding of the
country. The Constitution speaks directly on questions of trade, rooting
considerable powers in Congress while reserving other powers to the President.
The result is that trade exists in a precarious position in our constitutional system.
From the founding through the early twentieth century, trade was largely seen as
a domestic economic issue, with its constitutional home in Congress. In the midtwentieth century, trade became a foreign affairs issue, and a new paradigm
emerged, with authority shifting to the President. Today both paradigms have
broken down, and trade policy has become increasingly unmoored from either
traditional domestic economic or foreign policy objectives. The result has been
conflict and controversy.
A. Trade as Domestic Economics: The Founding Through the Long
Nineteenth Century
While scholars have recognized that trade law operates at the nexus of both
domestic and foreign affairs, these two approaches to trade within the
constitutional system have been surprisingly underdeveloped. We define the
domestic economics paradigm to include three different components: (1) the
goals of trade policy are focused on domestic economic issues, (2) the
constitutional home for trade policy is within Article I, and (3) the functionally
desirable locus of trade policy is in Congress.
Textually, Article I empowers Congress with a variety of tools to govern
trade policy. The most obvious sources of congressional power are the ability to
“regulate [c]ommerce with foreign [n]ations,” to “lay and collect [t]axes,
[d]uties, [i]mposts, and [e]xcises,” and to make any laws “necessary and proper”
to executing its Article I powers or any other grant of power elsewhere in the
Constitution.13 In addition, the Origination Clause mandates that “[a]ll [b]ills for
raising [r]evenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.”14 Scholars
have argued that if generating revenue is the main purpose of a statute governing
international trade, then the Constitution requires both houses of Congress to be
involved (and, by implication, bars the use of the Treaty Power to accomplish
the same goals).15
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
14. Id. art. I, § 7.
15. See Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 5–
6 (2013) (arguing that the Origination Clause requires House consideration for tax treaties); Yoo, supra
note 10, at 811 n.218 (describing congressional treatment).
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Functionally, bargaining over economic policy has been understood as
appropriately within the domain of Congress. Even at the Founding, the United
States was a country of diverse economic interests, from bankers in New York
to small farmers in New England to plantation owners in South Carolina. Today,
of course, the geographic growth of the United States and the staggering
complexity of the world’s largest economy has amplified that diversity. Congress
reflects this diversity of economic interests in a way that the President, elected
both indirectly and nationally, cannot. Members of Congress have smaller
constituencies, are elected directly by the people, and (in the case of the House
of Representatives) face election at greater frequency. As a result, the legislature
is well-suited to capture the diversity of preferences and interests in a large and
extended republic.
When the legislature directly makes trade policy, this diversity of interests
has often led Congress to protect American markets. In part, this protectionist
bent reflects the deliberately local way that members of Congress interact with
their constituents. Businesses of modest size that suffer from foreign competition
can effectively influence their congressional representatives’ views on trade
policy, even if they cannot reach the more remote executive branch.16 But
Congress’s protectionist tendencies also reflect Congress’s tendency to use trade
policy to achieve domestic economic goals, such as redistribution.17 Of course,
it is not necessarily true that protectionism and the use of trade policy to pursue
domestic economic policy-making goals need be married to congressional
power. We could easily imagine a protectionist President and a laissez-faire
Congress. Indeed, President Trump and the Republican-controlled Congress of
his first two years in office arguably fit this rare configuration. But over two
centuries of American history, congressional power and the domestic goals of
trade policy have largely been in alignment.18
The origins of Congress’s power to collect tariffs and the parallel provision
barring the states from establishing tariffs demonstrates this alignment. Under
the Articles of Confederation, the United States government suffered from a
severe lack of revenue.19 The government needed funds to repay foreign nations
that had supported the insurgent country during the Revolutionary War, to cover
the costs of running the government, to pay veterans, and to fund the army’s
battles against Indians on the western frontier.20 The Confederation Congress,
16. See CHARAN DEVEREAUX, ROBERT LAWRENCE & MICHAEL WATKINS, CASE STUDIES IN
U.S. TRADE NEGOTIATION, VOL. I: MAKING THE RULES 188–191 (2006).
17. Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,
42 INT’L ORG. 427, 433 (1988) (analyzing “the impact of the international economy on domestic politics
and domestic economic policy”); see also PAUL KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INT’L ECONOMICS:
THEORY & POLICY 214–17 (7th ed. 2005) (analyzing the argument against free trade that “imperfections
in the internal functioning of an economy may justify interfering in its external economic relations”).
18. See, e.g., Koh, Congressional Controls, supra note 9, at 1194 (describing the Smoot-Hawley
tariff regime and associating the institutional choice of Congress with protectionist policies).
19. ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC 12 (1993).
20. Id. at 12, 26.
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however, could not establish a nationwide tariff (or “impost”) without the
unanimous consent of the States. Rhode Island (and later New York) balked
because it had its own tariff and feared the loss of state revenue.21 As a result,
the Confederation Congress was left to issue “requisitions,” or requests to the
States to fund the confederation government. The States responded with taxes,
many of which were regressive, on their citizens.22 Coming in the midst of a
severe postwar economic depression, state-imposed taxes led to widespread
revolts across the country. The most famous one was Shays’ Rebellion, but
protests, conflict, and even armed insurrection were common from
Massachusetts to Pennsylvania to Virginia and North Carolina.23 So important
were these economic sources of domestic discontent that Alexander Hamilton
captured the origins of the Philadelphia Convention in three words: “Impost
begat Convention.”24
The tariff clauses of the Constitution were a response to these domestic
challenges. The goal of the tariff clauses was twofold: revenue and redistribution.
On the revenue side, a nationwide tariff would provide a source of revenue to
fund the new government. On the redistribution side, advocates argued that a
tariff would have two effects. First, it would allow the States to reduce or
eliminate their regressive taxes.25 Second, it would redistribute the burdens of
government (and therefore help farmers, artisans, and other lower-class people)
because the tariff would largely fall on luxury and manufactured goods that
wealthier people consumed.26 When the first Congress passed a tariff in 1789
(the tariff was the second act of Congress after a bill establishing the oath of
office), states slashed their tax rates considerably, in some cases by more than
90 percent.27 The tariff’s origins were thus tied to domestic economic questions
of revenue and redistribution, as well as to federalism concerns about whether to
tax at the state or national level.28
Over the course of the nineteenth century, trade law and policy were
virtually coextensive with the tariff.29 The justification for tariffs shifted over
21. Id. at 22–24; see also WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 136 (2007); E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE 152–53, 239–40 (1961).
22. See HOLTON, supra note 21, at 65–66 (describing the methods states used to comply with
requisition); BROWN, supra note 19, at 36–37 (noting “[d]irect taxes levied by the states during the
1780s consisted of a mixture of progressive and regressive taxes”).
23. See HOLTON, supra note 21, at 145–46 (finding widespread rebellion to debt collection). On
Shays’ Rebellion, see generally DAVID P. SATZMARY, SHAYS’ REBELLION (1980).
24. Alexander Hamilton, New York Ratifying Convention Notes for a Second Speech of July
17, in 5 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 173 (Harold Syrett ed., 1962).
25. See GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION 82–87
(2017) (identifying excessive taxation as one of the problems the Constitution solved).
26. Id.
27. See MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT 211–12 (2003).
28. For a discussion of the broader federalism implications of trade policy, see infra Part IV.
29. Of course, there were treaties that also implicated other trade issues, such as the Jay Treaty
of 1795, which, as part of a larger settlement of issues between the United States and Britain, established
that Britain and the United States would trade on a most-favored-nation basis (while at the same time
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time, but the central purposes of tariffs were all tied to domestic economics:
revenue, internal improvements, protection of industry, encouragement of infant
industry, and safeguarding labor. In the early republic, Henry Clay sought to link
the revenue generated by tariffs to funding internal improvements, such as canals
and roads, which would connect the remote western parts of the United States to
the East Coast.30 At the same time, tariffs would benefit the Northeast by
protecting infant manufacturing operations from foreign competition.31 Clay’s
“American System” thus redistributed wealth from the East toward the lessdeveloped West, while still providing a benefit to northeasterners.32 Southerners
opposed Clay’s American System. They sought to decouple internal
improvements from the tariff and advocated for a “tariff for revenue only”
instead of a tariff for the protection of domestic industry.33 On their analysis, the
tariff was largely a tax-and-transfer regime designed to redistribute wealth from
the South to the North and West.34
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the justifications for the tariff
shifted towards industrial and labor protection.35 Industrialization had caused
significant domestic economic disruption, as artisanal labor shifted to factories
and agriculture composed an increasingly smaller share of the economy. To
mitigate the “social dislocations generated by the industrial revolution,” the
Republican Party advocated for tariffs as a way to keep wages high for American
workers.36 In the absence of the tariff, they argued, the American market would
be flooded by cheap goods made by low-wage workers in foreign countries.37 So

restricting American access to markets in Britain’s Caribbean colonies). More generally, treaties of
“friendship, commerce, and navigation” often contained provisions requiring nondiscriminatory
treatment of foreign-merchant vessels and their cargo; however, such treaties did not regularly contain
the more general nondiscrimination rules found in modern trade agreements until the middle of the
twentieth century. See John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the
Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 302, 312 (2013) (“The treaty generally ensures that, upon a treaty
vessel’s arrival at these ports, it shall receive preferential treatment with respect to the payment of
tonnage duties and harbor fees. Many of these treaties also exempt cargo carried on foreign vessels from
discriminatory customs duties levied on such cargo.”).
30. See DOUGLAS IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY 157
(2017) (explaining how the Senate used internal improvements to incentivize tariff votes).
31. See FRANK WILLIAM TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 23 (6th ed.
1913) (describing “protection to young industries”). Earlier, during President Jefferson’s administration,
the Embargo and Non-Intercourse acts had a similar effect, spurring domestic manufacturing. Id. at 16–
17. The War of 1812 made clear the military necessity of domestic manufacturing and the role that a
tariff might play in supporting homegrown industry. Indeed, during this period, even famous skeptics of
the tariff, like John C. Calhoun, supported high tariffs because they were “connected with the security
of the country.” IRWIN, supra note 30, at 130.
32. For an overview, see MAURICE G. BAXTER, HENRY CLAY AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
(1995).
33. IRWIN, supra note 30, at 154–55.
34. Id. at 159–60.
35. See James L. Huston, A Political Response to Industrialism: The Republican Embrace of
Protectionist Labor Doctrines, 70 J. AM. HIST. 35, 36 (1983).
36. Id. at 35.
37. Id. at 45; TAUSSIG, supra note 31, at 65–66.
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strong was the protectionist justification for tariffs that by the 1870s advocates
pushing to reduce tariffs did not argue that Congress should abolish protectionist
tariffs.38 Instead, they pushed to restrict tariffs to only items with protectionist
benefits.39 They succeeded in eliminating a variety of non-protective duties (that
is, revenue-raising duties, such as the tariffs of coffee and tea).40
Throughout this period, often referred to as the long nineteenth century,
Congress exercised direct control over tariff policy, passing laws enumerating in
great detail every item to which a duty applied. The McKinley Tariff of 1890,
for example, had a schedule on “Chemicals, Oils, and Paints,” which included
acetic or pyroligneous acid, boracic acid, chromic acid, citric acid, sulphuric
acid, tannic acid, alcoholic perfumery, alumina, ammonia, blacking of all kinds,
blue vitriol, bone-char, borax, camphor, chalk, and chloroform, among many
other items.41 Interest groups vigorously advocated around tariff determinations,
and members of Congress were deeply involved in the details of tariff rates that
supported constituent industries.
More than just being involved in setting tariffs, Congress also attempted to
assert its constitutional authority over trade-related issues, in particular by
checking the use of the Treaty Power as a way to avoid engaging the House of
Representatives. The worry was that under the Treaty Power, the Senate and the
President could come to an agreement with the force of law (under the
Supremacy Clause) while excluding the House of Representatives from the
process of policy-making. Members of the House asserted their prerogative
under Article I with respect to the domestic effect of such treaties. During an
1815 debate in Congress on crafting a commercial treaty with Great Britain, for
example, Representative Cyrus King of Massachusetts argued that any treaty that
covered a topic related to one of Congress’s Article I powers had to go through
the House of Representatives to take effect.42
The House was particularly protective of its central constitutional role in
taxation. It passed a resolution in 1880 stating that the use of the Treaty Power
to set tariff rates would “be an infraction of the Constitution and an invasion of
one of the highest prerogatives of the House of Representatives.”43 An 1885
House Report resolved that “the President by advice and consent of the Senate,
38. See TAUSSIG, supra note 31, at 188–89.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. McKinley Tariff of 1890, Act of Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567 [hereinafter McKinley Tariff].
42. See Quincy Wright, Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of Powers, 12 AM. J. INT’L
L. 64, 68 (1912); 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 538 (1816) (“[W]henever a treaty or convention does, by any
of its provisions, encroach upon any of the enumerated powers vested by the constitution in the Congress
of the United States, or any of the laws enacted by them in execution of those powers, such treaty or
convention, after being ratified, must be laid before Congress, and such provisions cannot be carried into
effect without an act of Congress.”). Of course, views were not uniform on this point. See, e.g., 2 ASHER
C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 979–80
(1907) (discussing an 1820 debate in the House of Representatives).
43. Wright, supra note 42, at 68.
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cannot negotiate treaties with foreign Governments by which the duties levied
by Congress can be changed or abrogated, and such treaties to be operative as
law must have the sanction of an act of Congress.”44 Indeed, one classic study of
treaties concluded that in every treaty affecting revenue between 1796 and 1913,
the House of Representatives “uniformly insisted upon, [and] the Senate has
acquiesced in, legislation by Congress.”45
Congress also asserted itself with respect to the termination of commercial
treaties. Congressional legislation terminated treaties of amity and commerce
with France in 1798. Years later, Thomas Jefferson wrote that “[t]reaties being
declared, equally with the laws of the U[nited] States, to be the supreme law of
the land . . . an act of the legislature alone can declare them infringed and
rescinded. This was accordingly the process adopted in the case of France in
1798.”46 More than a century later, in 1911, President William Howard Taft
sought to terminate a commercial treaty with Russia. The question was whether
President Taft needed to gain consent from the Senate alone or from both houses
of Congress. At the time, a variety of commentators, Senators, and
Representatives argued that the House of Representatives needed to have a say
in the process.47
This is not to say that all three components of the domestic economics
paradigm—domestic economic goals, a focus on Article I, and a preeminent role
for Congress—were always satisfied in the nineteenth century. Some statutes
during this period did delegate powers to the President to execute laws related to
foreign trade. A 1794 statute, for example, authorized the President “whenever,
in his opinion the public safety shall so require . . . to lay an embargo on all ships
and vessels . . . under such regulations as the circumstances of the case may
require, and to continue to revoke the same, whenever he shall think proper.”48
Passed a year after President George Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation,
which aimed to keep the United States out of the war between France and Britain,
this statute gave the President the power—only when Congress was not in
session—to enforce US neutrality at US ports.49 Similar delegations of power

44. Kysar, supra note 15, at 45 & n.275.
45. SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 195 (2d ed. 1916);
Kysar, supra note 15, at 43.
46. Bradley, supra note 10, at 789.
47. Louis Marshall testified “that the power [to terminate] rests in Congress.” Senator Isidor
Rayner argued that “[a] treaty is the supreme law of the land under the language of the Constitution, and
the supreme law of the land ought not to be set aside except by legislative action of both Houses.”
Representatives Legare and Peters agreed. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 10, at 795 &
nn.113 & 118.
48. Francis B. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 COLUM. L. REV.
751, 759-60 (1939) (citing Act of June 4, 1794, 1 Stat. 372 and listing other early nineteenth century
statutes on point).
49. See Myres McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 248, 252 & n.178
(1945).
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continued through the Quasi-War with France and throughout the Jefferson and
Madison administrations, as part of the policies that ultimately led to the War of
1812.50 But by and large, trade policy was defined by considerations of domestic
economic policy and by congressional exercise of its Article I authorities.
Shifting domestic economic policies and politics in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries weakened both the protectionist and revenue
justifications for the tariff. Critics of the tariff increasingly argued that
protectionist tariffs were no longer encouraging infant industry but instead
protecting established monopolies.51 After the Great Merger Movement of 1895–
1904, which led to massive consolidation across sectors of the American
economy, domestic policy and politics became increasingly focused on the
power of trusts and monopolies.52 This shift had important implications for tariff
policy. Critics argued that tariffs were harming competition by effectively
protecting domestic monopolies from foreign competitors. The tariff, in the
words of some commentators, was “the mother of all trusts.”53 Efforts to regulate
monopolies, they argued, required reducing tariffs.
The revenue justification also became weaker. During the Civil War,
Congress established an income tax to raise revenue in addition to the tariff to
cover the costs of warfighting.54 Two generations later, in 1913, Congress passed
and the States ratified the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, authorizing
Congress to create an income tax. Over time, taxation supplanted the tariff as the
primary source of revenue for the nation. While customs and excise taxes
constituted 90 percent of federal revenues in 1880, that number had dropped to
25 percent by 1930.55 The income tax contributed nothing to the federal fisc in
1880 but made up 59 percent of revenues by 1930.56 This interchangeability of
income taxes and tariffs confirms the role that the tariff played with respect to
revenue and the distribution of economic burdens.57 As the revenue justification
grew weaker, the tariff became less necessary to the exercise of Congress’s other
Article I powers.
Some commentators have argued that the core breaks in American trade
policy were the Civil War (after which protectionism became the dominant

50. See Sayre, supra note 48, at 759–60 (noting the pattern of delegation through the beginning
of the nineteenth century).
51. See TAUSSIG, supra note 31, at 362–63 (describing the hostility to trusts and tariffs); IRWIN,
supra note 30, at 313.
52. NAOMI LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–
1904 (1985).
53. AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATES: LAW, POLITICS,
AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 50 (2013) (quoting a contemporary sugar
magnate’s confession).
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Indeed, the Revenue Act of 1916 included both tax and tariff provisions. IRWIN, supra note
30, at 340.
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rationale for American trade policy) and the New Deal (the end of protectionism
and the shift to presidential power).58 There is some truth in these
characterizations, especially when viewed in terms of the constitutional and
functional home for trade policy. But the shift from the domestic economics
paradigm to the foreign affairs paradigm took place over a longer time frame.
The transition from the tariff to domestic taxes as a source of revenue, for
example, began during the Civil War and leaped forward during the Progressive
Era with the Sixteenth Amendment. And while the central shift from
congressional power to presidential authority was during the presidency of
Franklin Roosevelt, the origins of congressional efforts to delegate power to the
President began prior to the New Deal.59
More importantly, these inflection points tend to focus on the outputs of
trade policy: high versus low trade barriers or protectionism versus liberalization.
They are divorced from the underlying goals of trade policy: domestic economic
objectives or foreign policy objectives. Protectionism is not, however,
synonymous with a trade policy driven by domestic economic policy. Trade
liberalization, too, can be enacted in pursuit of domestic economic objectives, as
in the case of using foreign competition to regulate domestic monopolies. And
protectionism can be a tool of foreign policy. It is the goals of trade policy that
more accurately characterize these eras, and confusion about goals that
characterizes our current trade policy.
B. Trade as Foreign Affairs: The Rise and Rise of Presidential Trade
Powers
As with the domestic economics paradigm, the foreign affairs paradigm
includes three components: (1) the goals of trade policy are focused on the
behavior of or relationships with foreign countries, (2) the constitutional home
for trade policy is within Article II, and (3) the functionally desirable locus of
trade policy is the executive branch.
The foreign affairs aspects of trade law are well understood. A central task
of trade policy is making agreements with foreign countries so that the foreign
country will lower its tariff rates, thereby opening its markets to US exports. But
foreign affairs aims go beyond setting tariff rates. Trade is also a tool for
advancing geopolitical goals; trade agreements can be used to benefit allies,
reward countries who follow American leadership, or sanction those who pursue
actions opposed to US foreign policy objectives.60 Finally, trade agreements are

58. Irwin divides the history this way. See IRWIN, supra note 30. Ackerman & Golove focus on
the New Deal and the end of World War II as constitutional moments. Bruce Ackerman & David
Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995).
59. See, e.g., McKinley Tariff, supra note 41; Ackerman & Golove, supra note 58, at 821–25
(marking the change in the delegation to the executive for this tariff).
60. On trade as geopolitics, see generally JENNIFER M. HARRIS & ROBERT D. BLACKWILL,
WAR BY OTHER MEANS: GEOECONOMICS AND STATECRAFT (2016). On sanctions and international
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a way for the United States to exercise international leadership; agreements can
set the “rules of the road” for countries around the globe to follow.61
The executive branch is traditionally considered functionally superior at
making policy judgments on such issues. Unlike a multibranch and multimember
legislature, the executive branch consists of a singular president.62 A single
president at the head of a relatively unitary executive branch is better able to
negotiate with foreign nations without confusion or cacophony, to access secret
intelligence that might be valuable in making geopolitical assessments, and to
move with alacrity when necessary. As a result, it is preferable for the executive
branch, not the legislature, to exercise foreign affairs powers. Indeed, Article II
gives the President a variety of tools to conduct American foreign affairs. The
President is the Commander in Chief of the military, has the power to appoint
and receive ambassadors, and can recognize foreign governments.63 Congress
has a variety of foreign affairs powers as well,64 but given the strengths of the
President in the realm of foreign policy, Congress has largely acquiesced to the
President’s preeminent role in the field.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the foreign affairs paradigm
became the dominant approach to trade policy. This transformation in trade law
was a function of four different factors. First, Congress believed there were
policy benefits in delegating trade authority and insulating tariff rate-setting from
congressional logrolling.65 Second, the Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth
century transformed the constitutional law of foreign relations, granting
increasingly expansive power to the President. Third, in the post-World War II
economics as a weapon against those opposed to US interests, see, for example, JUAN ZARATE,
TREASURY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL WARFARE (2013).
61. See, e.g., Barack Obama, The TPP would let America, not China, Lead the Way on Global
Trade, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-thetpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae50921721165d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4340d1028fa7 [https://perma.cc/DN49-4LDE]
(“As a Pacific power, the United States has pushed to develop a high-standard Trans-Pacific Partnership,
a trade deal that puts American workers first and makes sure we write the rules of the road for trade in
the 21st century.”).
62. We say “relatively” because the President sits atop a complex bureaucracy, whose members
have considerable power to shape and constrain presidential actions. Commentators have noted that the
presidency is a “they,” not an “it.” See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840 (2013).
63. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084–85 (2015) (holding that the President
has the exclusive right to recognize foreign sovereigns based on the Reception Clause).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (including, among other things, the power to “declare [w]ar”).
65. While trade liberalization might have become more popular among elected officials over
the course of the twentieth century, this alone does not explain the shift in US trade policy over the same
time frame. Rather, the foreign affairs paradigm played a critical role in justifying the delegation of
power to the executive branch and in how the President subsequently exercised those delegated powers.
Indeed, it is not even clear that policy-makers did in fact converge on a pro-trade-liberalization ideology.
See generally Jide O. Nzelibe, The Illusion of the Free-Trade Constitution, 19 LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 1
(2016) (arguing that the decision to delegate power was not a way for Congress to overcome interest
group pressure against trade liberalization, as conventionally understood, but itself a function of interest
group pressure).
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era, the country entered an exceptional period of economic growth, in which
domestic economic issues were less salient and Cold War foreign policy
objectives became more important. Finally, Congress failed to reassert itself as
the President negotiated increasingly broad trade agreements.
Starting in the late nineteenth century, members of Congress grew
concerned that the legislative process was reaching undesirable tariff rates
because of legislative horse-trading and interest group influence. Thus, at first,
delegations to the executive were seen as a way to get better information about
the effects of tariff rates. In 1866, Congress appointed David Wells as Special
Commissioner of the Revenue, charging him with issuing reports to Congress on
tariff and revenue rates.66 In 1882, in response to advocacy from President
Chester A. Arthur, Congress created a Tariff Commission (since renamed the
International Trade Commission, or ITC) to hold hearings and collect testimony
on tariff issues.67
The first delegations of authority to set tariff rates took place in 1890 with
the McKinley Tariff.68 Congress exempted some goods from a tariff, unless the
President determined that the foreign country had imposed unfair tariff rates on
American products. When the tariff was challenged as an unconstitutional
delegation, the Supreme Court sustained the delegation, holding that the
President was simply executing a law passed by Congress.69 Field v. Clark
opened the door to more expansive delegations of tariff-setting authority. The
Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 included a “flexible tariff” provision, which
allowed the President to change tariff rates by as much as 50 percent to account
for differentials in foreign and domestic production costs.70 The idea behind the
flexible tariff provision was that production cost differentials could be
scientifically calculated, thereby insulating tariff rates from the realm of politics.
Economists tasked with calculating those rates thought the enterprise was futile
because of technical difficulties related to estimating foreign and domestic
production costs and because of inevitable judgment calls in analyzing markets.71

66. See IRWIN, supra note 30, at 223–24.
67. Id. at 233–34.
68. See Sayre, supra note 48, at 761 (identifying the sections of the tariff that give the executive
unprecedented power). See generally McKinley Tariff, supra note 41.
69. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892) (upholding the tariff as law); see also Hathaway,
supra note 10, at 1294 (noting the lack of a further congressional-approval requirement).
70. For a discussion, see IRWIN, supra note 30, at 356; see also Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and
Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History, 34 UCLA L. REV. 285, 298 (1986) (describing tariff reform
in the early 1900s); George Bronz, The Tariff Commission as a Regulatory Agency, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
463, 465 (1961) (identifying the limits of presidential tariff power in the Fordney-McCumber Act). In
between, the Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909 created a tariff board to investigate production cost differentials,
but this system ended in 1912. IRWIN, supra note 30, at 326. The 1916 Tariff Act re-created the Tariff
Commission with an advisory power. Tarullo, supra, at 302.
71. See JOHN DAY LARKIN, THE PRESIDENT’S CONTROL OF THE TARIFF 115–31(1936)
(describing issues with defining the principal market in the United States, the principal competing
country, and production areas, and addressing marginal producers, weighted averages, joint costs,

600

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:583

Yet despite experts’ beliefs that the executive could not reach a technocratic
answer, the Supreme Court upheld the flexible tariff delegation.72
Congress’s last experiment with directly setting tariff rates on a major scale
came in 1930, with the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff (Smoot-Hawley). There,
Congress raised the average tariff by approximately 20 percent.73 Politicians and
commentators widely associated Smoot-Hawley with a string of economic
calamities that followed. Over the next two years, the volume of US imports and
exports fell by approximately 40 percent each.74 Blaming Smoot-Hawley, a
number of foreign countries enacted retaliatory tariffs that further dampened
international trade.75
With two blockbuster Supreme Court precedents and the Smoot-Hawley
experience, Congress decided to abandon tariff-making. In 1934, Congress
passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA). In contrast to
congressionally enacted tariff schedules that ran on for pages, the entirety of the
RTAA was only three pages long. It gave the President the power to enter into
trade agreements with other nations that reduced tariff rates by up to 50 percent.
The President implemented the changes through Executive Order, and neither
the international agreement nor the resulting tariff modifications required any
additional input from Congress.76 In addition, the President’s modified rates

similar goods, loss and appreciation, labor expenses, and distribution costs); IRWIN, supra note 30, at
356 (detailing the memorandum proposing the provision).
72. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (finding the
delegation constitutional).
73. Douglas A. Irwin, The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment, 80 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 326, 327 (1998) (noting that, while it is difficult to come up with an average figure across all tariff
lines, one popular estimate of the increase from Smoot-Hawley yields a figure of 17.4 percent).
74. Id. at 326.
75. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WORLD ECON. SURVEY, 1932–33, at 193 (1933) (“[T]he HawleySmoot tariff in the United States was the signal for an outburst of tariff-making activity in other
countries, partly at least by way of reprisals.”). Eichengreen and Irwin argue that the conventional
wisdom that countries universally enacted protectionist measures during the Great Depression is
mistaken. Rather, they find significant variation in the extent to which countries enacted protectionist
measures. Countries that remained on the gold standard could not use monetary policy to respond to the
economic crisis, so they enacted trade restrictions; countries that abandoned the gold standard could
devalue their currency, so they did not enact protectionist policies. See generally Barry Eichengreen &
Douglas A. Irwin, The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?, 70
J. ECON. HISTORY 871 (2010). Likewise, scholars have hotly contested the extent to which SmootHawley contributed to the Great Depression. Empirical studies have found a relatively small effect, with
at least one study suggesting that Smoot-Hawley may have acted as a modest stimulus in the face of a
larger economic contraction that was already underway before Smoot-Hawley was passed. See Barry
Eichengreen, The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, in RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC HISTORY
1, 29 (Roger L. Ransom & Peter H. Lindert eds., 1989). Other studies have suggested that SmootHawley’s impact may have had a larger indirect impact. See, e.g., Allan Meltzer, Monetary and Other
Explanations for the Start of the Great Depression, 2 J. MONETARY ECON. 455 (1976) (arguing that
Smoot-Hawley’s effects worked through its monetary effects); see also Irwin, supra note 73, at 326
(reviewing the literature on Smoot-Hawley’s relationship to the Great Depression).
76. See IRWIN, supra note 30, at 425 (detailing the “sweeping” authority Congress granted
President Roosevelt).
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would remain in place for “three years even if Congress changed the underlying
statute.”77
This delegation of power was remarkably unconstrained. Unlike equivalent
executive agencies, the Tariff Commission was not authorized to make rules to
guide executive discretion, nor did courts take it upon themselves to do so.78
Instead, power was concentrated in the presidency, without procedural or other
mechanisms for participation, transparency, or principles for rate-setting.79 The
only significant constraint was a sunset provision. Some protectionist
Republicans at the time said the bill created a “fascist dictatorship in respect to
tariffs” that gave Roosevelt “extraordinary, tyrannical, dictatorial power over the
life and death of the American economy.”80
The expansive delegation of authority over trade law to the President—and
the Supreme Court’s decisions sustaining such delegations—coincided with a
great transformation in the constitutional law of foreign affairs, in which “foreign
affairs exceptionalism” took hold. Under this approach, foreign affairs issues are
interpreted as categorically different from domestic affairs as a constitutional
matter. In particular, foreign affairs issues are seen as the province of the federal
government, rather than the States; are considered ill-suited to adjudication in
federal court and therefore subject either to the political question doctrine or
expansive deference; and, within the political branches, are the predominant—if
not exclusive—domain of the President.81 The Supreme Court set out some of
these doctrines in a series of important cases during the 1930s and 1940s, in
which it ratified expansive exercises of executive power even absent Article II
textual commitments. In United States v. Belmont and United States v. Pink, the
Court gave preemptive weight to Franklin Roosevelt’s agreement recognizing
the Soviet Union and negotiating claims with the communist country.82 In United
States v. Curtiss-Wright, the Court upheld a delegation to the President in the
foreign affairs context, while announcing “the very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for
its exercise an act of Congress . . . .”83
If congressional delegations and the Supreme Court’s tolerance of them
established the legal framework for the foreign affairs paradigm in trade,
American prosperity in the post-World War II era provided the economic
foundation. During that period, trade became increasingly seen as a geopolitical

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Ackerman & Golove, supra note 58, at 848–49.
Tarullo, supra note 70, at 326–27.
On the constitutionality of the RTAA, see Sayre, supra note 48.
IRWIN, supra note 30, at 428.
For a discussion of foreign affairs exceptionalism, see Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 7.
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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tool to assert American leadership around the world—and in particular to shore
up support for the West during the Cold War.84
Economically, the post-World War II era was exceptional in American
history. It was a period of relative economic equality; a growing economy meant
rising middle class wages for families of all races (despite significant disparities
between races).85 With Western Europe and Japan in ruins from the war, the
United States was the “only major industrial nation with its production capacity
not only intact but enlarged as a result of the conflict.”86 In 1937, the United
States captured 17 percent of global trade in manufactured goods; by 1954, it
captured 26 percent.87 Massive export capacity meant jobs for workers and
higher wages. As a result, even unions supported trade liberalization in the
postwar years.88 Skeptics recognized the unique economic circumstances at the
time. As Senate Finance Committee Chairman Eugene Millikin observed, “In
anything resembling normal times, some of the cuts [to tariffs] would be
catastrophic . . . . Copper, livestock, livestock products such as hides and wool,
numerous metals, agricultural products—all of these things can be produced
cheaper abroad than here.”89
With a strong economy at home, concern shifted to foreign affairs,
particularly with the rise of communism. In 1947, President Harry Truman joined
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), relying on the RTAA’s ex
ante grant of authority to enter into tariff-reducing trade agreements.90 Indeed, in
running for reelection in 1948, President Truman defended the RTAA as one of
the “best assets we can have for peace.”91 In 1949, Secretary of Defense James
Forrestal told Congress that the Pentagon viewed renewing the RTAA as “a step
in the interest of national security.”92 In the same debate, Senator A. Willis
Robertson asked rhetorically, “What is the cold war about? It is over trade.”93
Presidents Dwight E. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy also argued for trade
agreements on the ground that they would help expand freedom against the
ongoing threat from communism.94
84.
85.

IRWIN, supra note 30, at 495.
See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013);
SITARAMAN, supra note 25, at 201–02, 206.
86. IRWIN, supra note 30, at 492.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 493.
89. Id. at 483.
90. Koh, supra note 9, at 1195; IRWIN, supra note 30, at 486.
91. Thomas W. Zeiler, Managing Protectionism: American Trade Policy in the Early Cold War,
22 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 337, 354 (1998) (quoting President Truman).
92. Id. at 356.
93. Id.
94. Eisenhower, for example, called on Congress to support creation of an Organization for
Trade Cooperation (OTC) to administer the GATT in 1955, saying that the failure to do so would “play
directly into the hands of the Communists.” His 1955 State of the Union address declared that “[w]e
must expand international trade and investment and assist friendly nations whose own best efforts are
still insufficient to provide the strength essential to the security of the free world.” Kennedy called trade
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The GATT’s odd origins in the postwar settlement marked a turning point
with respect to the foreign policy objectives inherent in, as well as presidential
control of, US trade policy. At the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the United
States and its allies conceived of three organizations that would regulate
international economic affairs: the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, and the International Trade Organization (ITO).95 Leaders intended these
institutions to preserve peace and security by “putting a break on beggar-thyneighbor protectionist policies” believed to have contributed to World War II.96
While nations negotiated the Charter of the ITO (known as the Havana Charter),
they decided to conclude a provisional agreement that would apply until the ITO
came into existence.97 To that end, eight nations, including the United States,
signed the GATT in October 1947. Negotiations on the Havana Charter wrapped
up the following year.98 However, objections from both protectionist and free
market camps doomed the Charter’s hopes for consent from Congress. In
December 1950, President Truman quietly withdrew the Charter from
congressional consideration.99
Instead, the Truman administration pressed ahead with the GATT as its
framework for an international trade regime. In doing so, Truman got his
multilateral trade agreement despite being unable to secure congressional
approval. Truman’s actions also created the first major post-war test of
Congress’s ability to reassert itself in trade policy. Would Congress reclaim
primacy , or would it continue to let the President lead, even when his leadership
stretched the bounds of his delegated authority?
In the wake of the GATT experience, Congress began experimenting with
limits on the President’s authority over trade negotiations. For instance, in 1948,
immediately after the GATT was signed, Congress inserted a provision into the
RTAA requiring the President to furnish the Tariff Commission with a list of
products deemed eligible for tariff reductions. The Commission would then

agreements “an important new weapon to advance the cause of freedom” against the communists.
IRWIN, supra note 30, at 516, 519, 527.
95. See generally Padideh Ala’i, Transparency and the Expansion of the WTO Mandate, 26 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 1009 (2011); Ngaire Woods, Bretton Woods Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
ON THE UNITED NATIONS (Sam Daws & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 2008).
96. Id. at 1009.
97. John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 251–52 (1967).
98. In addition to the tariff reductions, nondiscrimination rules, and limits on nontariff barriers
contained in the GATT, the ITO would have included rules on investment, competition, and
employment, and established a formal international organization. See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE
MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 31–60 (2009) (discussing post-World
War II efforts to negotiate a multilateral investment regime).
99. Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, and the WTO: An
Essay on the Concept of Rights in International Trade, 1 N.Y.U. J. LAW & BUS. 709, 715 (2005)
(discussing Truman’s decision to withdraw the ITO Charter from Senate consideration due to
protectionist pressures); Zeiler, supra note 91, at 355 (quoting the business community’s view that the
ITO Charter was an “economic Munich.”).
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determine a “peril point” below which rates could not fall without harming
domestic producers.100 Congress also refused to bless the GATT, stating in each
renewal of the RTAA during the 1950s that “[t]he enactment of this Act shall
not be construed to determine or indicate the approval or disapproval by the
Congress of the Executive Agreement known as the [GATT].”101 In another
attempt to create an international organization that would oversee the GATT, the
Eisenhower administration in 1955 submitted a Draft Charter for the
Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC). Congress never acted on the
Charter, and the OTC never came into existence.102 However, even these modest
limitations (which did not alter the fundamental delegation of tariff authority to
the President) ultimately proved too restrictive for the executive branch’s foreign
policy purposes.
Several years later, Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. In
proposing the Act, President Kennedy told Congress that its enactment “could
well affect the unity of the West, the course of the Cold War, and the growth of
our nation for a generation or more to come.”103 The Act substantially expanded
the delegation of authority to the President as the United States approached the
next round of multilateral trade negotiations (known as the Kennedy Round) by
allowing him to reduce tariffs across entire categories of products, rather than on
an item-by-item basis, as the RTAA had required.104 This expansion of authority
allowed considerably deeper cuts in tariffs through negotiations with the
European Economic Community (EEC), which maintained a single external
tariff but lacked the political capacity to negotiate on a line-by-line basis due to
its multi-country composition.105 Although such authority was limited to

100. Zeiler, supra note 91, at 353. After the Democrats took control of Congress in the 1948
elections, they removed the peril point procedure, although it was reinserted into the RTAA in 1951.
Zeiler, supra note 91, at 359.
101. Trade Agreements Extension Act of June 16, 1951, Public L. 82-50, 65 Stat. 72 (1951);
Trade Agreements Extension Act of Aug, 7, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-215 67 Stat. 472 (1953); Trade
Agreements Extension Act of July 1, 1954, Pub. L. No. 883-464, 68 Stat. 360 (1954); Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 86, 69 Stat. 162; Trade Agreements Extension Act of Aug. 20, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-686, 72 Stat. 673 (1958); see also Jackson, supra note 97, at 267.
102. Id. at 265–66.
103. Special Message from President John F. Kennedy to Congress on Foreign Trade Policy 1
(Jan. 25, 1962) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Special Message from Kennedy].
104. Compare “the President may . . . proclaim such modification or continuance of any existing
duty or other import restriction . . . as he determines to be required or appropriate to carry out any such
trade agreement,” Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 201(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(2) (2017) with “the
President . . . is authorized . . . to proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import
restrictions . . . of any article covered by foreign trade agreements.” Reciprocal Tariff Agreements Act
§ 202(a)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (2017).
105. The Act did not permit the President to lower tariff rates to less than 50 percent of their level
in 1962. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 201(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1821(b)(1) (2017). Congress waived
this requirement, though, when “the President determine[d] with respect to [articles in any category] that
the United States and all countries of the [EEC] together accounted for 80 percent or more of the
aggregated world export value.” Id. § 211(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1831(a). See also Special Message from
Kennedy, supra note 103, at 1–2.
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negotiations with the EEC, the most-favored nation clause in the GATT meant
that any concessions made to the EEC were extended to all other GATT
parties.106
With this expansion of negotiating authority, Congress once again took
steps to reign in presidential power. Most significantly, Congress created a
Special Trade Representative within the Executive Office of the President and
empowered the office-holder to conduct trade negotiations.107 Congress’s hope
was to reduce the influence of general foreign policy concerns on trade policy,
in favor of domestic economic policy.108
Congress also declined to give the President authority to enter into
agreements covering nontariff barriers—a catchall term that includes any
governmental measure other than tariffs, such as regulations or trade remedies
designed to combat specific instances of unfair trade. As tariffs fell during the
successive rounds of GATT negotiations, nontariff barriers became relatively
more important impediments to free trade, causing the focus of international
negotiations to shift from tariffs to nontariff barriers. Yet reducing nontariff
barriers also strikes at the heart of domestic economic concerns. Trade remedies,
such as antidumping duties, enable governments to protect specific industries
injured by international trade. Although not a major issue for negotiators in the
1960s, environmental or health regulations could restrict trade to the extent that
product or production standards differed from country to country.
Despite the absence of authority to negotiate on nontariff barriers, President
Johnson did so anyway. The Johnson Administration concluded two such
agreements during the Kennedy Round: an Antidumping Code and reforms to
how the United States calculated customs values. Lacking statutory authority
under the Trade Expansion Act to enter these agreements, the President argued
he could enter the Antidumping Code as a sole executive agreement, furthering
the notion that the President did not need Congress to make trade policy.109 In
retaliation, Congress refused to implement the reforms to the customs valuation
process that the President had negotiated.110 This failure significantly diminished
the administration’s credibility in negotiating nontariff barriers—a problem that
would only become more central in the 1970s.111
The Kennedy Round negotiations laid bare the erratic nature of US trade
policy. For the second time since World War II, the President had aggressively

106. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 251, 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (2017).
107. IRWIN, supra note 30, at 526.
108. See JOHN ROURKE, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICYMAKING
173 (1983).
109. Koh, supra note 9, at 1199 & n.23.
110. Id. at 1199.
111. See Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, U.S. Trade and Policy Series No. 20, The Fast Track
Debate: A Prescription for Pragmatism, 26 INT’L LAW. 183, 195 (1992) (quoting Sam Gibbons, Chair
of the House Subcommittee on International Trade, who said that US negotiators were not trusted after
Congress’s failure to implement these agreements).
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relied on constitutional and ex ante grants of statutory power to enter into
multilateral trade agreements that Congress would not approve, justifying these
agreements with reference to larger foreign policy concerns. Rather than
proactively assert itself, however, Congress tinkered around the margins of the
President’s statutory authority while refusing to grant ex post approval for the
President’s agreements. And while Congress tinkered, international trade
negotiations became increasingly concerned with matters beyond simply the
tariff—the centerpiece of trade policy since the founding of the Republic. But as
discussed below, despite the implications for domestic economic policy,
Congress did not take back control of trade policy.
The Trade Act of 1974, passed at the outset of the next round of multilateral
trade negotiations (the Tokyo Round), established the framework for
contemporary trade policymaking. The 1974 Act included a variety of
mechanisms that many have argued represented a reassertion of congressional
prerogatives in trade.112 Congress had included a consultation and reporting
regime in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,113 but in the 1974 Act significantly
expanded it to include consultations with the private sector and establishment of
associated advisory committees.114 The Act also included a legislative veto
provision that authorized Congress—via a joint resolution of both houses or in
some cases a concurrent resolution of either house—to overturn certain
executive branch actions.115 For instance, the Act permits American producers
to petition the ITC for safeguards—temporary trade barriers imposed to protect
American businesses from import competition.116 Under the statutory scheme,
the Commission makes a recommendation to the President. Pursuant to the
legislative veto provision, if the President modifies the recommendation or
declines to adopt it, a resolution of both houses of Congress would implement
the Commission’s recommendation over the President’s objection.117 Practically
speaking, this legislative veto was a tool to force the executive branch to protect
American producers.118

112. See, e.g., John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the Separation of Powers Under
the United States Constitution, 13 DICK. L. REV. 203 (1995) (arguing that the 1974 Act was a reassertion
of congressional power); Lawrence M. Reich, Foreign Policy or Foreign Commerce? WTO Accessions
and the U.S. Separation of Powers, 86 GEO. L.J. 751, 756 (1998) (arguing that the 1974 Act was a
reassertion of congressional power).
113. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §§ 221–223, 226; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1841–43, 1846 (2017).
114. Trade Act of 1974 § 135, 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (2017).
115. Id. § 152; 19 U.S.C. § 2192.
116. Id. § 201.
117. Id. § 203(c).
118. Another notable use of the legislative veto is in Section 301 of the Act. President Trump has
relied upon this provision to impose tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese imports. Section 301 directs
the president “to take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power to obtain the elimination of”
unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory actions by foreign governments that burden or restrict US
commerce. However, Congress reserved the right to veto the President’s chosen action with respect to
countries other than the one actually imposing the restriction on US commerce. Id. § 302(b).
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However, the 1974 Act also significantly expanded presidential power in
two ways. First, the Act gave the President authority to negotiate agreements
reducing nontariff barriers to trade.119 Second, Congress agreed to approve such
agreements through “fast-track” procedures. Under fast-track, the President
could negotiate a trade agreement and then introduce it to Congress, where it
received expedited consideration and insulation from the usual amendment
process.120
Fast-track authority short-circuited congressional review of trade
agreements on nontariff barriers relative to the normal legislative process, which
applied prior to 1974. As noted above, under the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, the
President did not have authority to negotiate nontariff barriers. Consequently,
the agreements President Johnson negotiated on nontariff barriers required
congressional consent through the ordinary legislative process. Individual
members of Congress could thus assert their constituents’ interests through
amendment procedures. By curtailing that process, fast-track effectively
removed the primary vehicle through which local interests could inject
themselves into the lawmaking process.
In this way, fast-track authority, while ostensibly giving Congress an ex
post say over trade agreements, in fact reduced Congress’s role. Prior to 1974,
Congress already had an ex post say—it needed to pass legislation to consent to
and implement agreements on nontariff barriers. The 1974 Trade Act limited
what would otherwise be—and was after the Kennedy Round—plenary review
of trade agreements on nontariff barriers.121
It is worth dwelling for a moment on how thoroughly Congress failed to
assert itself effectively into trade policy-making during this era. First, Congress
did not attempt to claw back power when courts found expansive presidential
authority in ordinary statutory interpretation cases—even where Congress had
not authorized presidential action. For example, in Dames and Moore v. Regan,
the Supreme Court upheld the President’s authority to settle claims with Iran
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).122 Notably,
119.
120.

Id. § 102.
Id. §§ 102, 151; see also Koh, supra note 9, at 1200–03; Linarelli, supra note 112, at 217–

19.
121. The fast-track procedures were designed to apply to agreements on nontariff barriers, not to
tariff reduction commitments, where Congress continued to play primarily an ex ante role. As in prior
acts, section 101 of the Trade Act authorized the President to enter into tariff commitments, within
defined limits, without any ex post congressional review or approval. Trade Act of 1974 § 101(A)(1),
19 U.S.C. § 2111 (2017) (providing that the President “may enter into trade agreements with foreign
countries or instrumentalities thereof” and modify tariffs accordingly). Section 102 authorized
negotiations on nontariff commitments and subjected the resulting agreements to fast-track procedures.
Id. § 102(d), 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (d) (“Whenever the President enters into a trade agreement under this
section providing for the harmonization, reduction, or elimination of a barrier to (or other distortion of)
international trade, he shall submit such agreement, together with a draft of an implementing bill
(described in Section 151(b))”); see also id. § 151(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2191(c)(1) (“[o]n the day on which
a trade agreement is submitted to the House of Representatives and the Senate under section 102”).
122. Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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the Court found that Congress had not authorized the taking of claims under the
act. Still, the atmospherics of the statute, which delegated expansive authority to
the President over economics in the foreign affairs realm, were sufficient to
authorize presidential action (in spite of Congress’s express Article I power to
regulate foreign commerce). In another case, United States v. Yoshida, the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals found that the Tariff Expansion Act of 1962
neither authorized a presidential proclamation establishing a 10 percent import
duty on all items nor granted the President any constitutional commerce powers.
At the same time, the court found that the Trading with the Enemy Act did
authorize the proclamation because the US balance of payments deficit
constituted a national emergency to which the President was responding.123 In
short, during this era of foreign relations exceptionalism, courts were willing to
find expansive presidential power over foreign affairs in statutory cases, and
Congress was loathe to intervene.
Second, a variety of congressional actions were largely agnostic on the rise
of presidential trade powers—or simply ineffectual in checking that rise. For
example, Congress could have passed legislation to authorize GATT or require
the United States to withdraw from it. Instead, when Congress renewed trade
negotiation authorities in the 1950s, it made an explicit point of noting that it was
not acting in either direction on the multilateral trade regime.124 Similarly,
consultation requirements under the 1974 Trade Act were largely toothless. Not
only did ex ante and ongoing consultations leave the President in the driver’s
seat on substantive negotiations, but the inclusion of fast-track authority left
Congress with no ability to amend the domestic bill implementing the trade
agreement: lawmakers could either accept the President’s deal or reject it
wholesale.
Some commentators have argued that Congress’s most important attempt
to rein in rising presidential power over trade was the use of the legislative
veto.125 As noted above, alongside the significant delegation of power to the
President and the creation of fast-track authority, the 1974 Trade Act included a
legislative veto provision giving Congress a check on some of the President’s
authorities under the Act.126 In INS v. Chadha, however, the Supreme Court

123. United States v. Yoshida, 526 F. 2d 560, 580 (CCPA 1975). For a discussion of this case,
see Theresa Wilson, Who Controls International Trade? Congressional Delegation of the Foreign
Commerce Power, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 141, 157–59 (1998).
124. The provision stated, “[t]he enactment of this Act shall not be construed to determine or
indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the Executive Agreement known as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,” and was included in the 1951, 1953, 1955, and 1958 extensions.
Linarelli, supra note 112, at 214; IRWIN, supra note 30, at 516.
125. Hathaway, supra note 10, at 194 (“In eliminating the legislative veto, the Court eliminated
the single most significant control over ex ante congressional-executive agreements that Congress
possessed.”).
126. Trade Act of 1974 §§ 152, 203(c), 302(b), 402(d), 407, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253(c), 2412(b),
2432, 2437 (2018).
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struck down the legislative veto as unconstitutional.127 In dissent, Justice White
recognized that the Court’s decision would eliminate legislative veto provisions
in trade, emergency powers, and foreign affairs.128 Some have argued that
Chadha left Congress without the most important tool it had to control
presidential actions in the trade context.129
We think this argument does not comport with how trade law intersected
with Chadha. The legislative veto in the 1974 Act was not overarching; it did
not apply to the President’s general delegated tariff-setting powers. Instead it
was far narrower, limited to a few particular powers. The narrowness of this
power suggests that Chadha did not have as extraordinary an impact on shifting
power from Congress to the President as some have thought. Congress’s own
abdication of its powers, not the Court’s decision in Chadha, caused the shift.130
Other commentators have suggested that “Chadha will not seriously
diminish Congress’ influence over trade policymaking” because Congress
reasserted itself vis-à-vis the President in a variety of ways during the 1970s and
1980s.131 Here, too, we disagree. In practice, Congress’s creation of a Trade
Representative, delegation of substantive economic policymaking through the
Tariff Acts, and authorization to regulate tariffs and trade away non-tariff
barriers, concentrated expertise and authority in the President. Moreover, this
assembly of power came without the tools of congressional oversight and
influence that accompany traditional administrative delegations.132 The
President’s negotiating positions were not, for instance, subject to ordinary
notice and comment or judicial review, despite having the force of law once a
trade agreement came into effect.133 Fast-track was the culmination of this trend.
127. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
128. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945, 1003–13 (White, J., dissenting).
129. Hathaway, supra note 10, at 194.
130. Similarly, the legislative veto applied to section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which directed
the president to “take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power to obtain the elimination of”
restrictions “which impair the value of trade commitments made to the United States.” Unlike the GATT
dispute process, which contemplated a multilateral determination that a government was violating its
trade commitments, Section 301 famously authorized the president to make and act upon such
determinations unilaterally and as a matter of federal law. However, the statute did not mandate that the
president take any particular actions, preferring instead to give the president broad discretion to
determine the appropriate actions. 1974 Trade Act § 301(a)–(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)–(b) (The
President . . . may suspend, withdraw, or prevent . . . and may impose duties or other import restrictions)
(emphasis added).
131. Koh, supra note 9, at 1192 (“I conclude that, because the legislative veto was only one of a
broad array of oversight devices developed by Congress to assert and retain influence in the international
trade field, its death in Chadha will not seriously diminish Congress’ influence over trade policymaking.
To the contrary, recent U.S. trade actions . . . strongly suggest . . . an expansion, rather than a
contraction, of congressional involvement in trade matters, particularly in two key areas: negotiating
authority and import relief.”).
132. For an overview of Congress’s normal authorities, see Jack M. Beerman, Congressional
Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006).
133. Beginning with the 1974 Trade Act, however, Congress did subject the President’s
application of domestic trade remedies laws (designed to provide relief from unfair foreign competition
to specific industries or enterprises) to increased judicial review. See Koh, supra note 9, at 1205–06.
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While Congress would have ex ante input into the United States’ negotiating
position, economic policy enacted through trade agreements—unlike ordinary
domestic economic policy—would receive little more than a yes or no from
Congress.134 In other words, the so-called reforms of the 1970s struck a
compromise between active congressional involvement and presidential ability
to efficiently negotiate trade agreements. But the compromise was to reduce
congressional involvement relative to what prevailed prior to 1974, not to expand
it.
Beyond the formulation of trade law, the President also enjoyed
extraordinary freedom from congressional control in the implementation of the
international aspects of trade agreements.135 As previously noted, the failure of
the Havana Charter and the rejection of the Organization for Trade Cooperation
rendered the GATT a treaty without an organization. Over time, though, GATT
member countries created an institutional apparatus to support GATT
implementation. The GATT Council, consisting of member states (represented
by their trade ministries), oversaw GATT implementation and served as a forum
for negotiations among states. Pursuant to Article XXV of the GATT, members
could make “decisions” that at least had the status of soft law and arguably had
the status of binding law.136 Indeed, four agreements that emerged from the
Tokyo Round in 1979, including rules permitting trade preferences for
developing countries, were adopted in this way.137 Because these decisions are
made by an international body—decisions by international bodies have no clear
status in US domestic law—the executive branch could agree to the obligations
without congressional consent.138
The GATT parties also made decisions allowing new members to join, a
process that further expanded presidential power. Only twenty-three nations
initially signed the GATT in 1947.139 By 1975, however, the GATT had eighty134. Adkins & Grewal, supra note 9, at 1511 (noting that fast-track and the inclusion of nontariff barriers in the domestic regulations arena expanded executive power).
135. As noted above, Congress did try to constrain the President’s authority over the application
of domestic trade remedies laws. See Trade Act of 1974 §§ 152, 203(c), 302(b), 402(d), 407, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2253(c), 2412(b), 2432, 2437 (2018); Koh, supra note 9, at 1205–06.
136. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
art. XXV [hereinafter GATT]; Timothy Meyer, From Contract to Legislation: The Logic of Modern
International Lawmaking, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 559, 608 (2014) (arguing that international institutions can
use soft law decisions as an alternative to submitting agreements to ratification); John H. Jackson, JeanVictor Louis & Mitsuo Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing
International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267, 272 (1982) (“The ‘understandings’ of the ‘Group
Framework’ negotiations were adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties as ‘decisions.’ The
relationship of these agreements and decisions to the GATT itself is not a simple subject”).
137. Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, supra note 136, at 272, 276–77 (noting that four
“arrangements” were adopted as “understandings,” rather than as standalone agreements).
138. Cf. Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 735 (2014) (giving examples of executive negotiated international agreements that serve as “soft
law”).
139. The 128 countries that had signed the GATT by 1994, WORLD TRADE ORG.
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm [https://perma.cc/ZKH2-XH7E]; Dale Story,
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two parties.140 As a matter of international law, when a new party joined the
GATT, it was entitled to receive the benefits of all GATT rules, most notably the
tariff rates that the United States (and all other GATT parties) charged every
other GATT party pursuant to the most-favored nation obligation.141 As a result,
expanding GATT membership created new international law limits on US tariffs,
as well as limits on the extent to which the United States could discriminate more
generally against foreign products. Yet, technically, the United States did not
itself make new treaty commitments when new countries joined the GATT.
Instead, it simply extended existing commitments. While Congress had
authorized ex ante this extension of nondiscriminatory treatment,142 it had no
formal role in approving new GATT members accepted by the executive branch.
Dispute resolution under the GATT also kept the President in the driver’s
seat. GATT parties developed the practice of submitting disputes to a panel of
experts, which would issue a report to the GATT Council. That report had no
legal effect unless the GATT parties, acting through the Council, agreed to adopt
it.143 The President, through his agents, represented the United States in the
GATT Council and, significantly, chose which GATT disputes to bring and how
to defend the United States in GATT cases brought against it. Losing a GATT
case created pressure on the United States (or any party) to change its trade
policies. For instance, in 1976 a GATT panel issued a report finding that US tax
legislation creating the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC), a tax
avoidance vehicle for US exporters, violated GATT rules.144 The United States
was prepared to allow (and eventually did allow) the GATT Council to adopt the
ruling against the United States, and hence conceded that the DISC legislation
violated the GATT, even before it knew whether Congress would repeal the
legislation.145 Such a concession could have provided the basis for trade
sanctions against the United States, thereby allowing the executive branch to
enlist (or at least acquiesce in) other countries pressuring Congress to repeal
legislation.
* * *

Trade Politics in the Third World: A Case Study of the Mexican GATT Decision, 36 INT’L ORG. 767,
768 (1982) (noting that twenty-three nations initially signed the GATT).
140. Id.
141. GATT, supra note 136, art. I.
142. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 251, 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (2017); Trade Act of 1974 § 126,
19 U.S.C. § 2136 (2017). In fact, these provisions mandate extending most favored nation treatment to
all countries (GATT parties or not), except most notably communist countries. See Trade Act of 1974
§ 401.
143. GATT, supra note 136, art. XXIII:2; Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication
Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1489 (1988) (“The rulings of GATT
panels are not binding legal interpretations; they are merely reports to the GATT Contracting Parties or
to its agent, the GATT Council, which alone have the power to make authoritative rulings.”).
144. Id. at 1488.
145. Id. at 1488–92.
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By the late twentieth century, the foreign affairs paradigm was largely
dominant. The President exercised expansive power over trade policy with little
meaningful pushback from Congress. At the same time, however, the foreign
affairs paradigm became increasingly disconnected from economic realities on
the ground. As early as the 1960s, Western Europe and Japan had reentered the
export market, and by the 1970s, the “Asian Tigers” were asserting themselves
in international markets.146 In July 1971, a report of the Commission on
International Trade and Investment Policy (Williams Commission) warned that
there was “increasing concern that the foreign economic policy of our
government has given insufficient weight to our economic interests and too much
weight to our foreign policy relations.”147 That same year, the United States ran
its first trade deficit since 1935 and saw rising unemployment numbers.148
Perversely, at the very moment that economic conditions were changing from
the unique moment of the postwar era, the paradigm for trade law and policy
became even less tethered to domestic economics.
C. The Liberalization Era and the Separation of Powers
Beginning in the 1980s and accelerating with the end of the Cold War, the
United States entered a third period marked by domestic economic insecurity
and increasing contestation of the foreign affairs paradigm. In this period, the
chief goal of trade liberalization has been wealth maximization. Freer trade,
proponents argue, increases aggregate national wealth. Although sometimes
framed as a domestic economic concern and sometimes as a foreign policy
concern, this justification makes comparatively little reference both to the
distributional considerations at the core of the domestic economics paradigm
and, for the most part, to the specific foreign policy or national security
objectives central to the foreign affairs paradigm. Indeed, the liberalization
motive was so strong that it might have been a third paradigm for trade and the
separation of powers, had it been coupled with its own approach to the allocation
of constitutional powers.149
The subject matter of trade agreements has also expanded enormously.
Agreements now regulate a host of nontariff issues over which Congress and the
states have primary constitutional authority. Trade policy also diverged into two
tracks: a multilateral track that resulted in the creation of the WTO, and a “mini-

146. Charles Maier, ‘Malaise’: The Crisis of the Capitalism in the 1970s, in THE SHOCK OF THE
GLOBAL: THE 1970S IN PERSPECTIVE 45 (Niall Ferguson et al. eds., 2010); IRWIN, supra note 30, at 509.
147. IRWIN, supra note 30, at 539.
148. Maier, supra note 146, at 45; see also IRWIN, supra note 30, at 539–40.
149. One might argue that it did have such an institutional theory: removal of economic policymaking from domestic politics altogether. Quinn Slobodian, for example, argues that neoliberalism’s
aim was to entrench economic policy-making in international institutions to insulate it from domestic
politics. See QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF
NEOLIBERALISM (2018).

2019]

TRADE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

613

lateral” track that relied on free trade agreements (FTAs) with individual partners
or small groups of nations.
Finally, despite the expansion of trade agreements, the executive branch
has remained the functional home for trade policy. But Congress, responding to
domestic economic insecurity, has increasingly balked at new trade agreements.
By the Obama administration, foreign policy considerations had largely become
a pretext for trade agreements, while domestic economic considerations had
become a roadblock to further trade liberalization—but not a force affirmatively
shaping trade policy.
1. Institution Building at the End of the Cold War
Initially, both the President and Congress seemed pleased with the 1974
Trade Act framework. In 1979, at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of GATT
negotiations, President Carter submitted a series of agreements on nontariff
barriers to Congress. Congress duly approved them in the 1979 Trade
Agreements Act, passed pursuant to the fast-track procedures laid out in the 1974
Trade Act.150 Moreover, the 1979 statute extended the President’s authority to
negotiate agreements reducing nontariff barriers—first granted in the 1974 Act
for only five years—for an additional eight years.151
By the mid-1980s, however, cracks in the foreign affairs paradigm began
to show. The trade surpluses that had allowed elected officials to justify using
trade policy as a foreign policy tool were long gone by the 1980s, and Congress
had become concerned with the global competitiveness of the American
economy.152 In a move that would foreshadow current trade politics, Congress
attempted to push the executive branch to be more aggressive in protecting the
American economy and American workers specifically.153 In 1985, the House of
Representatives began holding hearings, and by 1987 both houses of Congress
passed bills.154 Although largely forgotten today, some of the proposals
considered by Congress, such as mandating presidential concern with trade
deficits, were so extreme that President Ronald Reagan referred to them as the
“Sons of Smoot-Hawley.”155

150. Jackson, Louis, & Matsushita, supra note 136, at 365–73 (describing congressional approval
of the Tokyo Round Agreements). Indeed, negotiations had not quite finished when Congress enacted
the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, yet Congress granted the President authority to enter into the
agreements so long as any subsequent changes to the text of the agreements were minor. See Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 § 2(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(1) (2017).
151. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 1101.
152. Trade surpluses and deficits are regularly invoked by politicians in justifying trade policies,
despite the fact that economists generally argue that these numbers by themselves are not significant.
This may be because politicians use them as a proxy for distributional concerns.
153. David E. Birenbaum, The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988: Trade Law Dialectics, 10 U. PA. J.
INT’L BUS. L. 653, 656 (1989).
154. Id. at 653.
155. Id.
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But if the 1988 Act originated in a Congressional desire to reassert itself,
the final statute fell far short of that aim. Like earlier statutes, the 1988 Act gave
the President authority to enter into tariff agreements and negotiate nontariff
agreements that would receive an up or down vote pursuant to fast-track
procedures.156 The statute did direct the President to negotiate in light of
concerns about American competitiveness, but it did so by authorizing the
President to negotiate the expansion of the GATT into what became the WTO
during the so-called Uruguay Round of negotiations.157
The Uruguay Round had three major objectives. First, it aimed to extend
the reductions in nontariff barriers negotiated in the Tokyo Round. Second, the
United States wished to introduce comprehensive multilateral rules governing
trade in services and intellectual property. Up until that point, GATT rules had
dealt almost exclusively with trade in goods. Third, the United States aimed to
reform the GATT disputes process so that countries, most notably European
nations, could no longer impede the adoption of decisions. In its broad goals, the
Uruguay Round sought to significantly liberalize trade, an objective the United
States pursued within a domestic framework that conferred more power on the
executive.
At the same time, congressional efforts to check these presidential powers
were limited to a series of nudges. The Act, for instance, required a wide range
of new reporting requirements, such as reports on American trade lost to trade
barriers, compliance with subsidies rules, and reports from the Treasury on
exchange rate policies.158 Likewise, Congress toyed with the idea of requiring
the US Trade Representative to retaliate for restrictions on US market access and
violations of trade agreements. Instead, Congress ultimately built in a series of
discretionary mechanisms giving the executive the power to initiate an
investigation into restrictions adversely impacting the United States and to waive
sanctions for violating trade agreements.159
The 1988 Act ultimately provided the domestic legal basis for two of the
most significant—and controversial—trade agreements in American history: the
Marrakech Agreement (creating the WTO) and NAFTA. Coming at the end of
the Cold War, both agreements represented a pivot from Cold War politics to the
international institution building that would characterize the 1990s. Beyond
greatly expanding international trade rules (and in the case of NAFTA providing
the basis for supply chains to disaggregate across North America), these two
agreements also legalized international trade law to a degree previously
unknown in any area of international law. The WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) established a disputes process with an appellate

156. Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 §§ 1102–03, 19 U.S.C. § 2902–
2903 (2018).
157. Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1101, 19 U.S.C. § 2901.
158. Birenbaum, supra note 153, at 656.
159. Id. at 657.
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mechanism and automatic adoption of reports.160 No longer would reluctant
countries or losing parties be able to block the legal effect of adverse rulings. At
the same time, the DSU also removed the ability of nations to act unilaterally in
response to trade violations. Instead, nations must first seek approval from the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).161
The DSU revitalized the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process, which
has emerged as the most successful standing international dispute body ever.162
At the same time, however, it further empowered the President at the expense of
Congress. The President represents the United States in disputes before the WTO
and therefore controls the United States’ litigating position. The ban on unilateral
action also removed the possibility that Congress could directly legislate
retaliation against foreign countries without running afoul of WTO rules. Indeed,
in a case brought by the European Union (EU) shortly after the WTO came into
force, the United States conceded that it would no longer invoke its unilateral
authority to retaliate under Section 301 of the 1974 Act, even though Congress
had not amended the Act’s mandate that the President take action to respond to
violations of trade commitments.163
With relatively little fanfare, Congress passed the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (URAA) in 1994 to implement the WTO agreements. Since
then, WTO members have not completed a major package of trade liberalization
commitments. The so-called Doha Round, which began in 2001, has yielded
little in terms of concrete results and has repeatedly been pronounced dead.
Given this failure, it is perhaps surprising that trade liberalization via the WTO
continued apace through the end of the Clinton administration and into the Bush
administration. The accession of new members to the WTO provided new
markets for US businesses abroad and entitled those nations to the most-favored
nation commitments the United States had already made at the WTO. China’s
accession in 2001 was by far the most important in terms of effects on the US
economy. Recent economic studies have found that China’s accession—and the
related decline in tariffs on Chinese products—has had a considerably more
important effect on the American economy and on the loss of American
manufacturing jobs than joining NAFTA did.164

160. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 1, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401, art. 17 [hereinafter DSU].
161. Id., art. 23.
162. The DSB has entertained over 500 disputes since January 1, 1995, with a high degree of
compliance from nations. See WTO Dispute Settlement Gateway, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm [https://perma.cc/9KGB-J24X]. By
contrast, the International Criminal Court, which came into existence in 2001, has managed to complete
only a handful of trials over approximately the same period.
163. Panel Report, United States—Section 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974, WTO Doc.
WT/DS152/AB (adopted Feb. 28, 2000).
164. See David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Syndrome: Local Labor
Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2121, 2125 (2013)
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Despite the importance of permitting China to join the WTO, Congress had
no formal approval over Chinese accession. Similar to the GATT process,
existing members voted to approve new members, and the executive branch
controlled the United States’ vote. The URAA requires the President to consult
with Congress prior to WTO votes on the adoption of decisions or on the
acceptance of new members if the action in question “would substantially affect
the rights or obligations of the United States . . . or potentially entail[] a change
in Federal or State law.”165 Unlike with new trade agreements, though, Congress
does not need to vote either on accepting new members or on the package of
concessions the executive branch (and other nations) negotiated as the cost of
permitting the new member to join.166 Membership in international organizations
like the WTO is treated as a foreign policy issue subject to the discretion of the
executive branch.167
The result of the 1988 Act and the Uruguay Round was to shift more power
to the executive branch and further unhook trade policy from both the domestic
economic and foreign affairs paradigms that had long characterized trade’s role
within the separation of powers. Rather than accounting for the economic
interests of diverse US constituencies or advancing specific foreign policy and
national security aims, the WTO accession process enabled further liberalization
for its own sake.168

(“We find that local labor markets that are exposed to rising low-income-country imports due to China’s
rising competitiveness experience increased unemployment, decreased labor-force participation, and
increased use of disability and other transfer benefits, as well as lower wages.”); see also Justin R. Pierce
& Peter K. Schott, The Surprisingly Swift Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment, 106 AM. ECON.
REV. 1632 (2016) (linking a drop in US manufacturing jobs after 2000 to limitations on increasing tariffs
against Chinese goods, with industries more exposed to the policy change suffering greater declines in
employment).
165. URAA § 122(b), 19 U.S.C. § 3532 (2017).
166. Congress entertained a number of bills that would have limited the executive branch’s
freedom to support Chinese accession to the WTO, although none of these bills were ever enacted. See
Alan S. Alexandroff, Concluding China’s Accession to the WTO: The U.S. Congress and Permanent
Most Favored Nation Status for China, 3 UCLA J. INT’L & FOREIGN AFF. 23, 34–38 (1998).
167. Congress did have to vote on extending MFN status to China. Prior trade statutes had
withheld that status from Communist countries, and to allow China to join the WTO without MFN status
would have put the United States into breach of its WTO obligations to China. See id; Trade Act of 1974
§ 401 (mandating that the “President shall continue to deny nondiscriminatory treatment to the products
of any country” deemed ineligible). Hence, US law created an odd situation: the president had
unchecked authority (as a matter of federal law) to support Chinese accession and determine the
conditions thereof, but Congress would need to act to avoid the United States becoming subject to trade
sanctions. See Nicholas R. Lardy, Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China, BROOKINGS INST.
(May 10, 2000). In late 2000, Congress did indeed extend MFN status to China without any strings,
although it created a series of monitoring mechanisms to oversee Chinese compliance with its WTO
commitments. Act of Oct. 10, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114 Stat. 880 (2000) (establishing normal
trade relations between the U.S. and China).
168. While there is an argument that further liberalization enhances foreign policy goals or
benefits the domestic economy, our point is that these broad justifications are indirect and disconnected
from legal processes that one might expect, under our constitutional system, to vindicate those goals.
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2. The Turn Toward Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
Although other countries have continued to join the WTO (most notably
Russia in 2012), the WTO in the twenty-first century largely became a dispute
resolution forum.169 As such, trade liberalization commitments through the WTO
have become almost entirely an executive affair. The executive negotiates and
votes on the expansion of the WTO to new members and conducts trade
litigation—which can affect the United States’ obligations—on behalf of the
United States with relatively little activity required by Congress.170 While WTO
expansion can integrate new markets and litigation can develop and clarify
existing rules, the stalemate in the Doha Round means the WTO cannot develop
new rules. Instead, FTAs have replaced the multilateral system as the primary
forum for trade negotiations over new rules. This turn toward FTAs, more than
any other development, has unmoored trade policy from traditional foreign
policy concerns. Although some relatively minor FTAs have been used to reward
allies, the most significant FTAs have been justified on the grounds that they
allow economic integration to proceed faster than the glacial pace truly
multilateral negotiations permit.
To accomplish this integration, FTAs are often far more comprehensive in
scope than WTO agreements, including, for instance, rules on investment and
the digital economy and data.171 Beyond coverage, FTAs usually also liberalize
trade in goods and services beyond what WTO rules require. An exception in
WTO rules to the most-favored nation obligation permits this preferential
treatment, provided that nations eliminate “substantially all” barriers to trade
between them.172 Consequently, FTA parties eliminate a considerably wider
range of trade barriers than WTO rules require.
Many chapters of FTAs themselves contain most-favored nation clauses.
These clauses usually require that members of the FTA be accorded treatment
that is “no less favourable” than that accorded to “any other Party or a nonParty.”173 This means that, as a general matter, the United States must extend any
preferential treatment it provides to a subsequent FTA partner to all existing FTA
partners. For example, if South Korea receives preferential treatment in the
services sector via its FTA with the United States that entered into force in 2012,
Mexico and Canada would be entitled to the same treatment by virtue of the
169. Even that role is in peril as of the time of writing. The Trump administration has blocked
the appointment of new Appellate Body members, causing the Appellate Body’s membership to fall
below the minimum necessary to hear many cases.
170. We discuss the impact of this litigation below. See infra Part III.
171. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) (establishing rules on investment) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Trans-Pacific Partnership ch. 14,
Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-fulltext (establishing rules governing electronic commerce) [hereinafter TPP].
172. See GATT, supra note 136, art. XXIV; General Agreement on Trade in Services, Jan. 1,
1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167, art. V [hereinafter GATS].
173. TPP, supra note 171, art. 10.4 (in the services chapter); NAFTA, supra note 171, art. 1203
(same).
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most-favored nation clause in the services chapter of NAFTA, which entered
into force in 1994. As a result of these clauses, FTAs form a multilateral web of
trade liberalization commitments.
This web undermines the foreign policy rationales for FTAs. If an FTA is
meant to reward an ally for support on issues such as military and geopolitical
support—as opposed to representing an equal trade between parties of market
access concessions—that ally does not necessarily need the protection of a clause
that gives it the benefits from all future US FTAs. Indeed, granting such allies
the benefits of future FTAs risks disrupting the American economy with no
offsetting benefit in the form of meaningful market access concessions to the
United States.174
Ironically, given that many FTAs are largely detached from foreign policy
concerns, the US turn to FTAs came about because of efforts to pursue one of
the United States’ most bipartisan foreign policy objectives: a strong relationship
with Israel. In 1983, President Reagan and Israeli President Yitzhak Shamir
announced their intention to negotiate a free trade agreement.175 That agreement,
entered into in 1985, was the United States’ first comprehensive FTA.176 Given
the modest size of the Israeli economy, the economic effects of the agreement on
the American economy were negligible. Nevertheless, this foreign policyoriented trade agreement laid the groundwork for a US program of negotiating
FTAs.
Today, the United States is party to fourteen FTAs in force with twenty
different countries.177 Additionally, in 2016 the United States signed the twelvenation TPP, a comprehensive FTA that blanketed the Pacific Rim. The United
States has also pursued an FTA with the European Union known as the TransAtlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP).178
The Israeli-US negotiations presented an odd problem. Although the
President continued to have authority to negotiate reductions in nontariff
barriers, Congress had declined in the 1979 Trade Agreements Act to extend his
authority to negotiate tariff reduction commitments.179 As a consequence, the
President could not negotiate an FTA without Congress revisiting his negotiating

174. It is not clear that this approach can be justified on domestic economic grounds either. The
only context in which this approach would be justified is if liberalization is always domestically
beneficial. This point, of course, is contested, particularly on distributional grounds, by many of the
domestic economic interests that supposedly benefit.
175. Koh, supra note 9, at 1211.
176. Id. at 1211 & n.57.
177. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Free Trade Agreements, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/MVC8ZY4R].
178. Id. In 2017, President Trump announced his intention not to proceed with the TPP. Peter
Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3MB-E9AG].
179. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 1101, 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (2018).
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authority. To address this problem, Congress passed the 1984 Trade and Tariff
Act.180 Beyond expressly authorizing the FTA negotiations with Israel, the 1984
Act made two other changes that would have far-reaching consequences.
First, the Act expanded the definition of “international trade” to include
foreign investment.181 The 1974 Act had limited the definition to trade in goods
and services.182 This expanded mandate allowed the President to negotiate
investment chapters in US FTAs, even though the multilateral GATT did not
include rules on investment. The executive branch thus had broader scope to
negotiate economic liberalization.
Second, the 1984 Act established a procedure for the President to negotiate
FTAs with countries other than Israel that would be eligible for modified fasttrack approval.183 Specifically, the Act provided that if a country other than Israel
requested FTA negotiations with the United States, the President must notify the
Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee sixty
days in advance of notifying the full Congress of his intention to enter into the
agreement.184 If either committee disapproved of the negotiations, any resulting
agreement would not be eligible for fast-track procedures.185 The availability of
fast-track procedures for FTAs put bilateral or mini-lateral negotiations on the
same footing as multilateral GATT negotiations.186 At the same time, bilateral
negotiations could be completed much more quickly, precisely because of the
smaller number of parties.
As a result of the President’s expanded authorities and the ease of
negotiating in smaller groups, FTAs quickly became the preferred tool for
negotiating new trade agreements. In 1985, President Reagan notified the Senate
Finance and the House Ways and Means Committees of his intention to negotiate
an FTA with Canada.187 The US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, in turn,

180. See generally Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 573 (providing bilateral trade
negotiating authority with Israel).
181. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 307.
182. Trade Act of 1974 § 102(g), 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (2018).
183. Koh, supra note 9, at 1212–13.
184. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 401(a)(2).
185. Because fast-track procedures are merely legislative procedures, this form of legislative veto
does not violate the letter of Chadha, which focuses on whether a legislative veto alters legal
entitlements. See Koh, supra note 9, at 1216 & n.77; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
186. Although it expanded the president’s authority to negotiate and made FTAs an attractive
alternative to multilateral trade negotiations, the 1984 Act also began divorcing American trade policy
from broader foreign policy concerns. By giving the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means
Committees the ability to deny FTAs fast-track authority, the Act denied oversight authority to the two
congressional committees concerned with foreign policy, the Senate Foreign Relations and House
Foreign Affairs Committees. Koh, supra note 9, at 1215. Moreover, by creating a procedure that could
eliminate fast-track procedures for negotiations of which these two committees disapproved, the Act
also modestly increased Congress’s role in approving trade agreements.
187. Id.
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provided the groundwork for NAFTA negotiations when Mexico requested that
the bilateral agreement be expanded to include it.188
NAFTA’s most important feature was that it allowed duty-free entry of
goods into the United States from Mexico, a country with considerably lower
wages. As a result, many at the time expected a mass migration of American
manufacturing jobs to Mexico, where goods could be manufactured cheaply and
then reimported into the United States without having to pay a tariff. Almost as
important, though, at least for political purposes, NAFTA’s investment chapter
imported a mechanism known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) into a
major trade agreement.189 ISDS allows a private investor to bring an arbitration
claim for monetary damages directly against a foreign government.190 Since
NAFTA came into force, the United States has been the respondent in twentyone arbitration cases brought by Mexican and Canadian investors, though it has
not yet lost a case.191
To be sure, NAFTA did not invent ISDS, a mechanism found in bilateral
investment treaties. NAFTA did, however, establish rules governing investment
between the United States and its only two adjacent neighbors, one of which is a
developed country. Most US bilateral investment treaties are with small
developing countries that have little investment in the United States. These
treaties are therefore unlikely to ever be the basis for an ISDS claim against the
United States. The United States had concluded only a handful of these
agreements prior to NAFTA, with countries such as Panama, making NAFTA
the first major US agreement to involve rules on investment.192
This shift to including investment in trade agreements is important because
rules on how a government treats foreign investment are more invasive than mere
trade rules. Especially in the 1980s, when the United States negotiated these
agreements, trade rules dealt chiefly with barriers at the border.193 After a
product gains entry into the United States, however, the main requirement
imposed by trade rules is that it be treated the same as any other product in the
stream of commerce.194 Investment agreements, like NAFTA chapter 11, contain
188. Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study, 54
INT’L ORG. 519, 522 (2000).
189. NAFTA, supra note 171, ch. 11.
190. Id. art. 1119.
191. Canada and Mexico have not been so lucky. Mexico has been subject to twenty-four claims,
while Canada has been subject to thirty-four claims. Moreover, unlike the United States, both Canada
and Mexico have been on losing end of cases, resulting in judgments worth hundreds of millions of
dollars. For comprehensive information on NAFTA disputes, see Todd Weiler, NAFTAClaims.com
(2015), www.naftaclaims.com/index.html [https://perma.cc/5CV8-UZY5].
192. U.S. Dep’t of State, List of U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties,
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm [https://perma.cc/N87J-RQA4].
193. Indeed, even many of the Tokyo Round agreements on nontariff barriers actually dealt with
border measures such as antidumping and countervailing duties. See Jackson, Louis, & Mitsushita, supra
note 136 (describing the Tokyo Round agreements). Today, trade regulation of nontariff barriers does
involve more regulation of behind-the-border activity.
194. See GATT, supra note 136, art. III.
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nondiscrimination rules too, but they also have rules that establish substantive
standards of treatment (roughly akin to due process in US constitutional law).
These rules—on “fair and equitable treatment,” the minimum standard of
treatment, and expropriation195—potentially make a government liable to a
private investor if it exercises its regulatory power in a way that either falls below
the standard of treatment required by international law or violates the investor’s
reasonable expectations in a way that impairs the value of the investment. 196
Combining these rules with a private international remedy created the concern
that investment agreements would limit the exercise of state regulatory power to
a considerably greater degree than multilateral trade agreements.197
The process of approving NAFTA in Congress showed the extraordinary
strain on the foreign affairs paradigm. The negotiations had largely been
completed in 1992, when President George H.W. Bush was running for
reelection.198 But in 1992, the Cold War was over, and the United States was
emerging from a recession.199 Consequently, domestic economic policy became
a central issue in the campaign. In a precursor of events to come, billionaire Ross
Perot ran for president as a third party anti-trade-liberalization candidate. Perot
made a point of attacking President Bush’s embrace of NAFTA, famously
referring to the “giant sucking sound” that would come as Mexico took American
jobs.200 Then-Arkansas governor Bill Clinton, the Democratic challenger, took a
middle road, calling for NAFTA to proceed only after Mexico and Canada had
agreed on tougher rules for environmental and labor standards.201 When Clinton
won the election and Democrats generally opposed to the agreements retained
control of Congress, it seemed like US trade policy might pivot back towards
domestic economic concerns.

195. NAFTA, supra note 171, arts. 1105 & 1110.
196. As such, these rules are similar in function to the protections afforded by the due process
and takings clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
197. As we discuss below, this potential has been a potent political force in the United States and,
in other countries, has led to regulatory chill, in which governments avoid regulating out of fear of losing
an ISDS case and being forced to pay compensation. Indeed, in NAFTA 2018 the Trump administration
negotiated the elimination of ISDS for all but a narrow range of cases. See United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement ch. 14, Nov. 30, 2018 [hereinafter USMCA].
198. Indeed, President Bush actually signed NAFTA before he left office. See George Bush,
Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (Dec. 17, 1992),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21784 [https://perma.cc/ULN4-VBXP].
199. Steven Greenhouse, The 1992 Campaign: The Economy; Despite Recession’s End, Bush
May Face Unusually Harsh Public Judgment, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 1992),
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/11/us/1992-campaign-economy-despite-recession-s-end-bushmay-face-unusually-harsh.html [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=7093].
200. The 1992 Campaign: Transcript of the 2d Debate between Bush, Clinton, and Perot, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 16, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/16/us/the-1992-campaign-transcript-of-2dtv-debate-between-bush-clinton-and-perot.html [https://perma.cc/7QP4-6JDG].
201. Gwen Ifill, The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats; With Reservations, Clinton Endorses
Free-Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/05/us/1992-campaigndemocrats-with-reservations-clinton-endorses-free-trade-pact.html [https://perma.cc/Q3BL-LYBU].
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Instead, President Clinton did as he promised, negotiating what are known
as the NAFTA Side Agreements on Labor and the Environment (or more
formally, the North American Agreements on Environmental and Labor
Cooperation).202 Congress then passed a bill implementing NAFTA, the NAFTA
Implementation Act. This established an unfortunate, and unstable, precedent on
how to address the distributional effects of trade liberalization. With the end of
the Cold War, domestic economic insecurity had reasserted itself as a political
brake on trade liberalization. American presidents, however, chose not to address
this problem by designing an international trade policy that responded directly
to this insecurity. Instead, their approach reflected two views.
First, the overall benefits to the national economy provided the domestic
economic justification for the agreements.203 Unlike earlier eras of US trade
policy, distributional issues about who in the American economy gained and lost
were not directly part of the administration’s justifications or goals for its
international trade policy.204
Second, to assuage concerns in Congress about the domestic economic
effects of further trade liberalization, in particular the fear that American
manufacturing jobs would move wholesale to Mexico, President Clinton
negotiated the NAFTA Side Agreements, which required NAFTA parties to
enforce their own domestic environmental and labor laws.205 President Clinton
sold these agreements on the premise that they would help alleviate the loss of
jobs to Mexico by counteracting the lower labor costs in Mexico that stemmed,
at least in some part, from less regulation.206 In other words, the Clinton
administration’s approach to domestic labor market concerns raised by trade
agreements was to negotiate international obligations to raise standards in
Mexico—an outwardly focused approach to solving a fundamentally domestic
economic problem.207 Although the content of these labor and environment
obligations became somewhat stricter in subsequent US trade agreements, the
muddled approach of trying to address domestic job losses in the United States
by imposing obligations on foreign countries remained.208 These obligations
202. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, opened for signature Sept.
8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement]; North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAFTA Labor Side
Agreement].
203. Timothy Meyer, Saving the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV.
985, 992–97 (2017).
204. To be sure, the United States carried forward trade adjustment assistance, a domestic
program designed to aid workers displaced by competition with imports. However, trade adjustment
assistance as implemented in the United States has been largely ineffective. Id. at 1008–10.
205. NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 202, art. 5 (“[E]ach Party shall
effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental
action. . . .”); NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, supra note 202, art. 3 (“Each Party shall promote
compliance with and effectively enforce its labor law. . . .”).
206. Meyer, supra note 203, at 1002–04.
207. Id. at 990.
208. Id. at 1004–08.
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have since become standard in US FTAs.209 Not surprisingly, these labor and
environment provisions have not improved the lot of American workers, creating
further cynicism about American trade agreements.210
While President Clinton was ultimately successful in winning
congressional support for NAFTA, he did so at the cost of the President’s
negotiating authority. After extending fast-track to allow for the passage of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Congress let fast-track authority lapse in 1994.
Since that time, Congress has only twice renewed the authority (now called
“trade promotion authority”), once in 2002 for a five-year period and again in
2015 for three years.211
The first of these renewals came at the request of President George W.
Bush. He used the authority to negotiate a series of mostly bilateral FTAs,
alongside the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). With the
exception of the agreement with Korea (the United States-Korea Free Trade
Agreement or “KORUS”), which is the United States’ sixth largest trading
partner,212 these agreements had negligible economic impact on the US economy
as a whole. Instead, these agreements—completed with countries like Colombia,
Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, and Oman—shored up American interests around the
world by rewarding countries that supported the United States during its wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq.213 Most of these agreements received relatively swift
approval from Congress. Those few that did not were approved after Congress
reached a new agreement with the administration, known as the May 10th
consensus. That agreement required the administration to negotiate provisions in
FTAs requiring, among other things, that countries comply with international
labor and environmental provisions and subjecting that commitment to ordinary
dispute resolution and the possibility of trade sanctions.214 While the May 10th
consensus did little formally to alter the balance of power between Congress and
the President, it demonstrated a renewed resolve on Congress’s part to use its

209. Id. at 1003–04.
210. Id. at 1004–08.
211. The three-year period in the 2015 Bipartisan Trade Priorities and Accountability Act can be
extended an additional three years if the President so requests and neither house of Congress passes a
resolution vetoing the extension. Bipartisan Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 § 103, 19
U.S.C. § 4202 (2018).
212. U.S.
Dep’t
of
Commerce,
Top
U.S.
Trade
Partners
2016,
https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.p
df [https://perma.cc/2KH7-K2AX].
213. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade Agreements, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/PX3Z-6GAZ]
(providing full texts and dates of entry into force for U.S. trade agreements).
214. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
TRADE
FACTS:
BIPARTISAN
TRADE
DEAL
(2007),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file127_11319.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9EM9-RHDP]. The agreement also made the “essential security” exception to trade
agreements “self-judging,” meaning that if a country invoked its essential security interests, other nations
could not challenge the exception through dispute resolution.
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authority to force the President to include provisions it deemed important. These
provisions, however, continued to be primarily outwardly focused, aiming to
improve practices abroad to address economic challenges at home.
Demonstrating a continuity across party lines that has characterized
executive trade liberalization efforts since President Truman, President Barack
Obama began his administration by obtaining congressional approval for several
FTAs negotiated under President Bush. In his second term, President Obama
then turned to another Bush-era initiative, the TPP. The TPP would end up being
a twelve-nation pact, including the three NAFTA parties, Australia, Chile, Japan,
Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, New Zealand, and Peru. President
Obama justified the agreement primarily on foreign policy grounds. The
agreement, he claimed, would allow the United States “to write the rules” for the
twenty-first century international economy.215 In particular, the TPP would
encircle China, which had emerged as the second largest national economy in
the world.216 This justification was especially important politically because the
government itself projected that the TPP would have only a modest impact on
the overall growth of the US economy—0.15 percent growth in annual GDP
fifteen years into the life of the agreement.217
The TPP would face two tests in Congress: granting the President authority
to negotiate the agreement and then ultimately approving it. President Obama
sought trade promotion authority to spur the agreement’s acceptance. Congress
gave him that authority in the Bipartisan Trade Priorities and Accountability Act
of 2015. That Act, however, revealed a distrust that had grown between Congress
and the President. Although Congress maintained the basic framework for trade
promotion authority, it limited its effectiveness to three years with a possible
three-year extension if the President so requested and neither house of Congress
passed a resolution vetoing the extension.218 The Act also imposed some of the
strictest notification and consultation requirements to date, mandating, for
instance, that the Trade Representative meet with any member of Congress
“upon request” to discuss the status of negotiations and provide any member of
215. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by President Obama in
Meeting on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/11/18/remarks-president-obama-meeting-trans-pacific-partnership [http://perma.cc/2H74HNTJ].
216. China would be third if one counted the EU as a single country. See Int’l Bank for
Reconstruction
&
Dev.,
GDP
(current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?year_high_desc=true
[https://perma.cc/PE35-2YWK].
217. Press Release, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, USITC Releases Report Concerning the Likely
Impact
of
the
Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Agreement
(May
18,
2016),
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2016/er0518ll597.htm
[https://perma.cc/U8TSAUVK]. This modest growth as a percentage still equaled $42.7 billion and was projected to be the
highest absolute gain among the TPP parties. Peter A. Petri & Michael G. Plummer, The Economic
Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Working Paper 16-2 (January 2016).
218. Bipartisan Trade Priorities and Accountability Act § 103, 19 U.S.C. § 4202 (2018).
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Congress with relevant documents, including classified material.219 The statute
also took modest steps towards increasing Congress’s oversight role once the
agreement entered into force. Specifically, the statute required extensive
consultations with Congress regarding not only the steps US trading partners
would take to comply with the agreement,220 but also any enforcement action the
executive branch intended to take.221 Congress also put some teeth behind the
consultation requirements by providing that both Houses together could revoke
an agreement’s eligibility for fast-track procedures by passing separate
resolutions finding that the President had failed to properly consult.222
Ultimately, these provisions and the congressional skepticism behind them
were never put to the test. Although President Obama signed the TPP on
February 4, 2016, the agreement seemed likely to fail in Congress.223 Before
Congress had the chance to vote the TPP down, however, electoral politics broke
what little remained of the foreign affairs paradigm. Trade was a central issue in
the 2016 presidential campaign. Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders and
Republican nominee Donald Trump both derided free trade agreements as the
cause of an exodus of American manufacturing jobs. This criticism apparently
forced the Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton to disavow a trade agreement
she had supported as Secretary of State.224 Polling data during the election also
revealed a collapsing political consensus in favor of free trade.225 Notably, one
poll found that 67 percent of Trump supporters—and 52 percent of those who
vote Republican, the party most likely to favor free trade—had negative views
of free trade.226
In this environment, an electorate rife with economic insecurity resolved
the tension between the President and Congress in favor of slowing trade
liberalization. Following Trump’s election in November, President Obama

219. Id. § 104(a)(1).
220. Id. § 104(a)(3).
221. Id. § 105(f)(3).
222. Id. § 106(b).
223. Trans Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Signed in Auckland, BBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35480600 [http://perma.cc/FL22-B3XW]; Adam Behsudi, Obama
Puts Congress on Notice: TPP is Coming, POLITICO (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/obama-congress-trade-warning-226952
[https://perma.cc/C7YN-UL2U] (“But the deal is going nowhere until the White House addresses a
number of concerns lawmakers have raised about the trade agreement.”).
224. Max Ehrenfreund, How Hillary Clinton’s Positions Have Changed as She’s Run Against
Bernie
Sanders,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
29,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/29/how-hillary-clintons-positions-havechanged-while-running-against-bernie-sanders/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.25ec32099753.
225. See Meyer, supra note 206, at 997–98.
226. Bruce Stokes, Republicans, Especially Trump Supporters, See Free Trade Deals as Bad for
U.S., PEW RES. CTR.: FACTTANK (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/03/31/republicans-especially-trump-supporters-see-free-trade-deals-as-bad-for-u-s
[https://perma.cc/9RSL-DMHT].
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conceded that Congress would not take up the TPP during his presidency.227
Immediately after taking office, President Trump announced he would “unsign”
the TPP.228 Ironically, President Trump also announced he would use the trade
promotion authority Congress conferred in 2015 to renegotiate NAFTA.229 The
resulting agreement, which has been signed but has not entered into force as of
the time of writing, largely eliminates ISDS except for a few narrow categories
of cases; limits the agreement to a sixteen-year term, subject to review and
renewal (most trade agreements are of indefinite duration); and makes two
changes to the rules determining whether autos qualify for duty free treatment:
(1) the amount of North American content necessary for a vehicle to be eligible
was raised from 62.5 percent to 75 percent, and (2) a minimum percentage of the
vehicle’s content must be made by workers making at least $16 an hour.230
* * *
As a result of the internationalization of trade policy and the shift toward
FTAs, trade became increasingly unhooked from both the domestic economics
and foreign policy justifications that undergird trade’s role in our constitutional
system. The result is not surprising. In the context of a shrinking middle class,
increased economic anxiety, and rising wealth and income inequality, political
support for trade agreements has become fragile at best. Without specific foreign
policy or national security aims to justify such agreements, the case for
liberalization becomes one that relies more on domestic economics. And yet the
distributional effects of these agreements are hotly contested, and the process by
which the agreements are concluded minimizes the role of domestic politics. By
moving beyond the balance of trade powers outlined in the Constitution, trade
policy and politics have created their own crisis.
II.
TRADE’S BOUNDARY PROBLEM
Trade is a classic “intermestic” issue, an area that bridges the international
and domestic spheres. For example, the tariff that serves to encourage infant
industries or raise revenue at home also restricts a foreign country seeking
markets for its exports. Viewed from one side, the domestic economics paradigm
applies; from the other, the foreign affairs paradigm. Technology,

227. Alan Yuhas, Congress Will Abandon Trans-Pacific Partnership, White House Concedes,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/nov/12/tpp-trade-dealcongress-obama [https://perma.cc/U9PG-TKJN].
228. Eric Bradner, Trump to Begin Renegotiating NAFTA with Leaders of Mexico, Canada, CNN
(Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/trump-renegotiate-nafta/index.html
[https://perma.cc/CD5T-APS3].
229. Id.
230. Heather Long, New NAFTA: U.S., Canada and Mexico Just Reached a Sweeping New
NAFTA Deal. Here’s What’s In It, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/01/us-canada-mexico-just-reached-sweepingnew-nafta-deal-heres-whats-it/?utm_term=.dc9305d667d6 [https://perma.cc/4D8S-5XMW].
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communications, and transportation have deepened the two-faced view of tariffs.
Professor Jack Goldsmith has observed, “[A]s the world becomes more
interconnected, domestic law and activity increasingly have foreign
consequences, and vice versa.”231 For example, corporations have increasingly
established global supply chains for their goods, meaning that a single product
might have components sourced from multiple countries, including the final
country-of-sale.232 Global production and distribution chains implicate a variety
of issues beyond tariffs: regulatory compliance, taxation, national security
policy, and data privacy. They even call into question the old saw, “What’s good
for GM is good for America.” If an American company has most of its operations
abroad, wouldn’t directors have an obligation to shareholders to act against
American interests if it improves shareholder value?233 This is trade’s boundary
problem: trade invariably is at once domestic and foreign.
Perhaps the best examples of trade’s boundary problem are nontariff
barriers (NTBs) to trade. NTBs, recall, are domestic laws or regulations that
impede trade, including regulations on issues such as health, safety, and the
environment. Such regulations can be challenged through the WTO, resulting in
potential liability for WTO members. For instance, in 2009 Congress passed the
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. The statute aimed to
reduce youth smoking by eliminating the primary gateway to smoking, flavored
cigarettes.234 The statute, however, carved out an exception for menthol
cigarettes.235 Indonesia successfully challenged the statute at the WTO, arguing
that the exception for menthol cigarettes (produced mostly in the United States)
discriminated against clove cigarettes (produced mostly in Indonesia).236
Similarly, US efforts to implement measures, such as a dolphin-safe labeling
scheme for tuna imported into the United States, have been successfully
challenged before the WTO, leading the United States to change its
requirements.237
Trade’s boundary problem also gives the President the incentive to frame a
wide swath of policies as foreign affairs, rather than domestic economics. When

231. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617,
1672 (1997).
232. For a discussion of global supply chains and new era of rising protectionism, see Justin Rose
& Martin Reeves, Rethinking Your Supply Chain in an Era of Protectionism, BCG HENDERSON INST.
(Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2017/lean-manufacturing-rethinking-supply-chainera-protectionism.aspx [https://perma.cc/7WQ5-BR7M]; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS REVISITED: ANTI-GLOBALIZATION IN THE ERA OF TRUMP 378–79 (2017).
233. For a philosophical discussion this problem, see generally David G. Yosifon, Is Corporate
Patriotism a Virtue?, 14 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 265 (2016).
234. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of
Clove Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB (adopted Apr. 24, 2012).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Import, Marketing and
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB (adopted June 13, 2012).
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viewed through the foreign affairs paradigm, the process for making law
involves presidential leadership, severely restricted interest group involvement,
limited public or congressional knowledge or pressure over the terms of the deal,
and a fast-tracked ratifying vote by Congress. Compared to the traditional
legislative process, the trade agreement approach is far less complex, uncertain,
and costly (in terms of time and political capital) for the President. The result is
that the dominance of the foreign affairs paradigm should lead not only to
expansive presidential power but also to the President increasingly framing
domestic policy in foreign affairs terms.238
Trade’s boundary problem, of course, is not insurmountable. Boundary
problems are pervasive in law.239 The answer is not to slide down the slippery
slope and accept that anything framed broadly as “foreign affairs” is exempt
from the traditional legislative process.240 Below, we argue that despite trade’s
boundary problem, Congress—and by extension domestic economic concerns—
should play the preeminent role in contemporary American trade policy for three
reasons. First, the concerns that animate arguments for foreign affairs
exceptionalism in other contexts do not apply to trade policy. Second, the
Founders gave control of trade policy to a “parochial” Congress beholden to
local constituencies precisely so that local interests could influence trade policy.
Third, the President’s trade policy can be captured by interests just as parochial
as those that capture Congress. Giving the President control of trade policy, as
under the foreign affairs paradigm, neither ensures implementation of a policy
that maximizes national welfare nor comports with the constitutional structure.
A. Normalizing Trade Law
Within the separation of powers, the foreign affairs paradigm places trade
law and policy within the executive branch for a variety of functional reasons,
including expertise, speed, and secrecy. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in
Federalist 70, “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the
proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased,
these qualities will be diminished.”241 Some scholars have recently argued that
238. Cf. Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, National Security Exceptionalism and the Travel
Ban Litigation, LAWFARE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/national-securityexceptionalism-and-travel-ban-litigation [https://perma.cc/8H2S-LD9S] (making the incentive-effects
argument with respect to national security and immigration).
239. For applications in the foreign affairs context, see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal,
Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1257 (2007); Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra
note 7, at 1942–44.
240. See generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985) (explaining
the components and prevalence of “slippery slope” arguments in legal contexts); Eugene Volokh, The
Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003) (describing the general risks posed
by a “slippery slope”).
241. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003); see also
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 201 (5th ed. 1984) (noting “the unity of the office [of the
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foreign affairs should not be treated differently from domestic affairs as a
categorical matter, but rather that these functional justifications for expansive
executive power should be evaluated on a subfield-by-subfield or even issue-byissue basis.242 The reason is that the particular functional justifications for
deference might not apply in some fields but do in others. Taking this more
careful approach to justifying deference, most of the conventional justifications
for expansive deference to the executive are either inapplicable or relatively
weak in the trade context.
1. Expertise
Start with expertise. It is likely true that the executive branch has more
substantive expertise than Congress does with respect to technical information
on international economic issues. Certainly, the executive branch has more
institutional capacity in terms of personnel and resources.243 But it is not clear
why greater expertise or institutional capacity implies that there should be greater
executive power over trade matters. As one of us has argued, “it is equally true
that [members of the executive branch] know more about food and drug policy,
environmental policy, banking regulation, and Medicare reimbursements” than
members of Congress.244 And yet those “domestic” areas are well understood to
be squarely within the purview of the legislative process.
Additionally, while all foreign affairs issues have some domestic impact
and vice versa, trade is more obviously intertwined with domestic economic
policy than many other foreign affairs issues. Whether the issue is tariffs that
encourage infant industry, revenue-raising measures, national security
imperatives, or “non-tariff” regulatory barriers, the bread and butter of trade
agreements are fundamentally different from, say, peace treaties or military
alliances. The latter largely require judgments about the place of the United
States and foreign nations in the larger geopolitical context. The former
implicates jobs, wages, economic competition domestically, and a variety of
other constituent interests. These are precisely the kinds of factors in which
Congress is considered to have superior institutional competence because of its
representative nature. In the Federalist Papers, James Madison argued that
members of the House of Representatives would bring critical knowledge of their

President], its capacity for secrecy and dispatch, and its superior sources of information; to which should
be added the fact that it is always on hand and ready for action, whereas the houses of Congress are in
adjournment much of the time”); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION
119 (1990) (noting that the President’s “decision-making processes can take on degrees of speed,
secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other governmental institution can match”).
242. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 7, at 1935–49.
243. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); Robert Knowles,
American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 128 (2009). Note that
the executive’s comparative expertise is itself a function of a congressional decision to allocate resources
to the executive branch such that it has that expertise.
244. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 7, at 1936.
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constituents’ circumstances to federal policy-making and that biennial elections
would keep members of Congress tethered to the interests of their constituents.245
He even thought they would be particularly well-suited to address trade policy:
“How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws,” he asked in
Federalist 53, “without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the
usages, and the regulations of the different state[s]?”246 The House of
Representatives brings that granular knowledge of the diverse circumstances of
a large nation to the policy-making process.
2. Speed
Now consider speed, or “dispatch” as Hamilton put it. While a variety of
scholars have argued that speed is a “general characteristic of foreign
relations,”247 it is not clear why speed is necessary in the realm of international
trade. Trade agreements often take years to conclude, and they move in fits and
starts as political and economic conditions change around the world. For
example, the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations began in 1986 and only
concluded in 1994 with the signing of the Marrakesh agreement.248 That a trade
agreement can be characterized as “foreign” hardly implies that speed is
essential. In contrast, in some cases, such as financial crises and natural disasters,
purely domestic emergencies might require more timely action. As a result, the
foreign/domestic distinction is poorly tailored to the functional need for
“dispatch.” A far better distinction would be emergency/non-emergency or
crisis/non-crisis.249
3. Secrecy
Finally, secrecy.250 During the Constitutional Convention, there was a
debate on whether the Senate alone or the Senate and the House of

245. FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison), at 301 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003); see also
FEDERALIST NO. 56 (James Madison), at 301 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (explaining why the House of
Representatives will effectively represent diverse interests).
246. FEDERALIST NO. 53 (James Madison), at 301 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
247. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1170, 1217 (2007) (making this point with reference to the appropriate role of the judiciary
in foreign affairs cases). For commentary aligning executive power, speed, and foreign affairs, see
Corwin, supra note 241, at 202; Koh, supra note 241, at 119; John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional
Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1676 (2002) (“[A] unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider policy
choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other
branch.”).
248. I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 54, 219 (4th ed. 2005).
249. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 7, at 1939; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis
Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1613, 1636–39 (2009) (discussing executive action in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and
2008 financial crisis).
250. By this we don’t mean secret treaties, but secrecy in the process of making a treaty. On secret
treaties, see generally Megan Donaldson, The Survival of the Secret Treaty: Publicity, Secrecy, and
Legality in the International Order, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 575 (2017).
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Representatives together would have a role in advising on treaty negotiations.
James Wilson argued that the need for secrecy in treaty negotiations was
“outweighed” by the benefits of “obtaining the Legislative sanction.”251 Roger
Sherman responded that the “necessity of secrecy in the case of treaties forbade
a reference of them to the whole Legislature.” Sherman’s view, relying on the
importance of the small number of Senators (twenty-six at the time), carried the
day.252 John Jay made a similar argument in Federalist 64. “[I]n the negotiation
of treaties,” he noted, “perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes
requisite.”253
The Federal Farmer, however, made the more interesting argument, noting
during the ratification debates that “commercial treaties” were different from
“treaties of peace and alliance” because the “latter generally require secrecy,
[and] it is but very seldom they interfere with the laws and internal police of the
country.” In contrast, commercial treaties “do not generally require secrecy, they
almost always involve in them legislative powers, interfere with the laws and
internal police of the country, and operate immediately on persons and property,
especially in the commercial towns . . . they consist of rules and regulations.”
These were, he argued, the province of Congress under its Article I commerce
powers.254 While Sherman and Jay took a foreign affairs perspective across the
board, the Federal Farmer recognized the distinctive nature of trade agreements.
In contemporary practice, the executive branch keeps draft language from
trade agreements classified up until the entire agreement is finalized.255 This
means that large sections of the text might be finalized among the parties and yet
unavailable to the general public until the entirety of the agreement is concluded.
Functionally, this practice makes little sense. First, as Federal Farmer and
some modern commentators have argued, trade agreements that make regulatory
changes to domestic economic policy issues have no inherent need for secrecy
and might in fact benefit from transparency and the attendant public participation
and feedback.256 Second, the justification for the secrecy of drafts (rather than
the negotiating positions themselves) is extremely weak. By definition the
negotiating parties on the other side of the agreement are aware of the draft
agreement, so there is no secrecy interest in the draft (and particularly in the

251.
252.
253.
254.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 538 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
Id.
FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay), at 390 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
Letter XI from Federal Farmer (Jan. 10, 1788), in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 308–10.
255. Adkins & Grewal, supra note 9, at 1511–12.
256. On the modern side, see John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and
Structural Defense of Non-Self- Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2241 n.85 (1999) (“Even if the
Senate is better disposed to diplomacy than the House, multilateral treaties that impose domestic rules
of conduct do not demand secrecy or speed of action. Only those treaties that have the least domestic
effect, and hence need no implementing legislation, such as military or political alliances, demand
secrecy.”).
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completed sections of a draft) with respect to the foreign country.257 Third, while
it is true that public disclosure of negotiating practices might chill negotiators’
ability to speak freely in the negotiations, commentators calling for greater
transparency in trade agreements have not asked to see negotiators’ notes or
strategies or even to have the negotiations themselves take place in public view.
Rather, they argue for giving the public access to drafts that are shared with all
the parties and with industry advisory groups.258 Indeed, negotiating partners,
including the EU, routinely release their side of trade agreements.259
In sum, the oft-recited functional arguments for expansive foreign affairs
deference to the President—expertise, speed, and secrecy—are all either
inapplicable or significantly weaker in the trade context than in other domains
within foreign relations. Clumping trade with other foreign relations issues and
treating them as exceptional under the separation of powers (and therefore suited
to expansive presidential power) thus makes little sense. A far better approach
would be to “normalize” trade and see it as governed by ordinary separation-ofpowers principles, in which Congress has valuable functional contributions to
make to policy-making, not to mention significant Article I authorities.
B. The Benefits of a Parochial Congress
A common trope in separation-of-powers scholarship is that the President
represents a national constituency, while the Congress represents local
interests.260 In trade law, commentators and lawmakers invoke this argument to
justify the delegation of congressional power to the President.261 The theory is
257. See Senator Elizabeth Warren, Speech in the United States Senate (May 21, 2015)
[hereinafter
Elizabeth
Warren
Speech],
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/05/21/warren_trade_deal_secret_because_if_details_we
re_made_public_now_the_public_would_oppose_it.html [https://perma.cc/J9LY-YHTG].
258. See, e.g., Trade Transparency Act of 2015, S. 1381, 114th Congress (2015); Press Release,
Joe Manchin, Senators Manchin and Warren Introduce ‘Trade Transparency Act’ (May 19, 2015),
https://www.manchin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senators-manchin-and-warren-introducetrade-transparency-act [https://perma.cc/8UMH-YAAC].
259. Margot E. Kaminski, Don’t Keep the Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks Secret, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/opinion/dont-keep-trade-talks-secret.html
[https://perma.cc/7Z7P-CK5J].
260. See, e.g., Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress,
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1217 (2006) (criticizing the view that the president will pursue policies that advance
the aggregate good, while members of Congress will pursue policies that only advance the local good);
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 35
(1995); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2335 (2001) (“[B]ecause
the President has a national constituency, he is likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative
policy on an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general public, rather than merely parochial
interests.”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 105–06 (1994) (“[B]ecause the President has a national constituency—unlike relevant members
of Congress, who oversee independent agencies with often parochial agendas—it appears to operate as
an important counterweight to factional influence over administration.”).
261. See, e.g., DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 16, at 188 (“The president,
whose constituency is the entire nation, is likely in the best position . . . to represent the overall national
interest in open trade.”).
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that by empowering the national President, the parochial Congress ensures that
the institution best able to act in the national interest is the institution setting
American trade policy. Not coincidentally, under this theory the national interest
is synonymous with trade liberalization. Reducing barriers to trade increases
national wealth in the aggregate, which is—regardless of the distribution of that
wealth—deemed in the national interest. Once one defines that national interest
in this way, it follows straightforwardly that the executive is best able to act in
the “national” interest. The President, after all, has historically favored trade
liberalization, while Congress tends to be more protectionist.
In political economy terms, this argument boils down to a claim that
government should pursue economic efficiency—and not concern itself with
distributional considerations—in its choice of trade policy.262 The goal of the
separation of powers is not, however, to produce particular policy outcomes,
such as trade liberalization. Nor, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly
admonished, is political efficiency a value that the Framers of our Constitution
prized especially highly when they designed our system of government.263 As
Justice Brandeis put it,
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of
the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental
powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.264
Put less starkly, the Constitution gives Congress the primary role in establishing
national laws precisely to ensure “a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative
process” that will often be “clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable.”265
Local and “parochial” interests are, by constitutional design, at the core of
this deliberative process.266 Members of Congress have a wide range of
262. Commentators often argue that distributional issues arising from trade policy should not be
ignored, but rather should be resolved through domestic policy. See, e.g., Dan Ikenson, Crucifying Trade
for
the
Sins
of
Domestic
Policy,
FORBES
(March
28,
2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2016/03/28/crucifying-trade-for-the-sins-of-domesticpolicy/#6f72807b70eb [https://perma.cc/DN4Q-PVAC]. The problem with this claim is that trade’s
distributional issues are not, in fact, addressed outside of trade. As a consequence, voters are increasingly
demanding that trade policy itself directly address these distributional issues. See Meyer, supra note 206,
at 988.
263. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (“[T]he Framers ranked other values higher than
efficiency.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629–30 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“All executive power . . . has the outward appearance of efficiency. [But we] cannot decide
this case by determining which branch of government can deal most expeditiously with the present crisis.
The answer must depend on the allocation of powers under the Constitution.”).
264. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 85 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
265. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
266. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Met. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (holding that state
and local interests are protected through local and state election of the members of Congress); Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544–45 (1954) (outlining the historic
and ongoing centrality of states’ interests within a federalist system).
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constituencies. By virtue of local or state election, they are beholden to interests
located in their districts or states. By setting elections up this way—and by later
providing for direct election of senators—the Framers intended that Congress be
the main avenue through which local interests would exert influence over law
and policy.267 Similarly, other interests—such as farmers, labor unions,
environmentalists, and small businesses—have an easier time finding a voice in
the political process through Congress.268 Such interests may have difficulty
attracting the attention of the President or unelected administrative agencies, but
535 members of Congress provide many more opportunities for interaction.
These entry points into the lawmaking process are a feature, not a bug. They
ensure that trade policy, or any policy for that matter, reflects the diverse set of
interests that exist in our nation. In the economic language that often dominates
discussions of trade policy, our constitutional system mandates that trade policy
be made in light of distributional considerations, not efficiency considerations.
Recent legislation introduced by Michigan Senator Gary Peters and North
Carolina Senator Richard Burr illustrates the point. The two senators introduced
a bill that would create a task force within the Commerce Department charged
with initiating trade remedies investigations affecting small and medium-sized
businesses.269 Under existing law, American producers can petition the
government to impose extra duties on goods that are either dumped at unfair
prices into the United States or benefit from illegal subsidies. Doing so, however,
requires hiring expensive law firms, and although the Commerce Department
has authority to self-initiate investigations, it rarely does so.270 Unable to access
trade remedies through the Commerce Department due to legal costs and
difficulties with getting a remote agency in D.C. to take action, these businesses
have turned to Congress for aid. Congress, in other words, provides an avenue
of relief for individuals and institutions that cannot influence government policy
through other channels.
The chief problem with the foreign affairs paradigm is that it systematically
disadvantages the plurality of interests that is core to American democracy and
which the Framers intended Congress to represent. The process by which trade
agreements are negotiated is far less transparent and participatory than the
legislative process because the executive branch is a gatekeeper for determining
267. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550–51 (“[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure
the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.”).
268. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 & n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).
269. Vicki Needham, Senators Introduce Bill to Help Businesses with Trade Complaints, HILL
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/374066-bipartisan-pair-of-senators-introduce-bill-tohelp-smaller-businesses-with [https://perma.cc/XS39-9TLN].
270. See Timothy Meyer, Free Trade, Fair Trade, and Selective Enforcement, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 491, 505 (2018) (describing trade remedies measures such as antidumping and countervailing
duties); Jennifer McCadney, In Rare Move, Trump’s Commerce Secretary Self-Initiates Chinese
Aluminum Trade Remedy Cases, TRADE & MANU. MONITOR (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.ustrademonitor.com/2017/11/in-rare-move-trumps-commerce-secretary-self-initiateschinese-aluminum-trade-remedy-cases [https://perma.cc/9P7D-YFM5].
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which interest groups get access to government during negotiations. While the
1974 Act created industry advisory committees that could participate in trade
negotiations,271 the advisory committee model is not a substitute for the
legislative process, even in an era of “unorthodox lawmaking.”272 The advisory
committees represent a limited number of interests and are heavily stacked in
favor of industry. Of the 566 members of the TPP’s twenty-eight advisory
committees, 85 percent (480 members) were industry lobbyists or corporate
executives.273 Some committees were entirely made up of industry
representatives. The US Trade Representative also uses national security
classification to restrict the availability of negotiation drafts only to the members
of the committee and members of Congress.274 This restricts congressional
involvement and oversight because members of Congress are prohibited from
talking about the agreement in public or reading their staffs into the agreement.275
It also prevents the general public from bringing pressure to bear on the terms of
the agreement. Unless an interested party is afforded the privilege of entry into
one of the industry advisory committees, it has limited power to shape the
agreement’s terms.
Executive-dominated trade lawmaking also effectively allows the President
to increase the costs to Congress of passing domestic laws that address the
distributional issues raised by, or that run afoul of, trade agreements. This
consideration is most prominent in what we might term the “two-step” problem.
As noted above, in the post-Cold War era, economists and commentators who
support trade liberalization as an economic policy have done so on the grounds
that it expands aggregate welfare.276 Such commentators urge policy-makers to
use domestic lawmaking to address trade’s distributional problem, rather than
trade policy.277 But separating trade liberalization from distributional issues
limits the ability of members of Congress to use trade liberalization as leverage
in negotiations to redistribute the gains from trade.278 The constrained
consideration that trade agreements receive in Congress under fast-track only

271.
272.

Trade Act of 1974 § 135, 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (2018).
See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 2011) (describing new and changed legislative processes in
the U.S. Congress in the early and mid-2000s).
273. Elizabeth Warren & Rosa DeLauro, Who is Writing the TPP?, BOS. GLOBE (May 11, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/05/11/elizabeth-warren-and-rosa-delauro-who-writingtpp/2FQZAV6uz9GGQI6pe3cd0K/story.html [https://perma.cc/45KH-LF3A].
274. Adkins & Grewal, supra note 9, at 1511–12.
275. Elizabeth Warren Speech, supra note 257.
276. See supra Part I.C.
277. See, e.g., Ikenson, supra note 262; PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 216 (7th ed. 2005) (“Any proposed trade policy
should always be compared with a purely domestic policy aimed at correcting the same problem. If the
domestic policy appears too costly or has undesirable side effects, the trade policy is almost surely even
less desirable”).
278. See generally Timothy Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors).
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further undermines the ability to link these two policies. In effect, members of
Congress get an up-or-down vote on trade agreements, which limits their ability
to link passage of the agreement to legislation aimed at redistributing the gains
from trade. If members of Congress try to bring up the distributional issues later,
trade liberalization’s advocates have little reason to negotiate, since they already
have their trade agreement.279
Entrenching regulatory policies through trade agreements can also raise the
cost of future legislative change because violating trade agreements has
consequences. Countries that violate an agreement can be subject to retaliatory
trade restrictions unless they either remove the measure or reach a settlement.280
Of course, a later-in-time statute trumps an earlier-in-time statute, and a past
Congress cannot bind a future Congress.281 This rule, which applies equally to
trade legislation, enables Congress to shift policies in light of changed
circumstances, including changes in public preferences. And to be sure,
Congress often seems oblivious to trade rules, regularly passing legislation that
raises WTO problems.282 But at least in principle, trade agreements create costs
that constrain future Congresses.
Entrenchment is not a problem, per se. Most congressional acts are difficult
to change, in part because of the potential economic and political costs of doing
so, and are thus entrenched to some degree. Moreover, international law is
supposed to work in this fashion. It allows countries to make credible
commitments to cooperative policies precisely because it does create future costs
to changing those policies.283
The problem in the trade context, specifically, is that Congress does not go
through its ordinary legislative process in passing legislation implementing the
trade agreements that create the initial entrenchment.284 During the initial
negotiations over trade obligations, when the United States is unburdened by
international obligations, the President dominates lawmaking. Only afterwards,
when international commitments create an incentive not to change domestic
policy, does Congress have the unfettered ability to propose, debate, and amend
legislation. The result is that smaller constituencies and groups that rely on

279. Id.
280. DSU, supra note 160, art. 22 (describing the procedures for suspending trade concessions
in retaliation for breaching trade commitments).
281. Cf. Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (discussing the same relationship between
treaties and statutes under the supremacy clause).
282. See, e.g., Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, EU Finance Ministers Warn U.S. Administration Over
Tax Bill, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/96f4dbda-ac34-3ef6-8627f064563df310 [https://perma.cc/D4E9-62C4] (reporting the EU finance minister’s view that the 2017
U.S. tax reform “contravenes” WTO rules).
283. See generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY (2008) (laying out a theory of how international law creates costs for violations).
284. Even the Art. II treaty making process, which requires a supermajority of the Senate to
consent to an international agreement, would involve more deliberation than the fast-track procedures
used for trade agreements.
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Congress to advance their interests are disadvantaged. They cannot provide
meaningful input into the initial formulation of trade law because they cannot
influence the executive branch, and Congress only gets an up-or-down vote on
the measure. Later, when Congress can consider legislation unfettered, it also
has to consider the negative consequences of breaching trade agreements—
something it would not have had to consider at the initial negotiation stage.
In addition, the process of presidential negotiation and a take-it-or-leave-it
fast-track approval regime means that the President has agenda-setting power
domestically, which allows him to resolve conflicts among competing
constituencies in Congress. If, for example, we imagine that Congress suffers
from problems of cycling in policy preferences, as the Arrow Theorem suggests,
then the President effectively ends up as the decider. By shifting the resolution
of competing preferences outside of Congress, presidential agenda-setting
disadvantages interests in Congress that are not necessarily aligned with the
executive branch. This shift might be appealing from a political efficiency point
of view, but it nonetheless undermines Congress’s representative function.
Moreover, Congress does appear responsive to the possibility of trade
liability when considering legislation, at least in some circumstances. In 2017,
House Speaker Paul Ryan and Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin
Brady proposed a “border adjustment tax.”285 The proposal would have
addressed a long-running concern that the US tax system disadvantages US
companies vis-à-vis most other countries that have a value-added tax (VAT).286
VATs are refunded at the border on exports and are, by agreement, permitted
under WTO rules.287 Since the United States does not have a VAT, US
companies do not receive a similar refund when they export goods, but they do
have to pay VAT in other countries. The Ryan-Brady plan would have moved
the United States very close to a VAT system, but the kinds of deductions the
plan allowed US exporters to claim raised WTO concerns.288 These concerns
were high-profile and contributed to the decision not to go forward with the
border-adjustment tax.

285. Veronique de Rugy, Phasing in the Border-Adjustment Tax Won’t Solve Its Problems, NAT.
REV. (June 15, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/border-adjustment-tax-tax-reform-paulryan-kevin-brady-still-committed [https://perma.cc/3284-JXS3].
286. See Press Release, House Ways and Means Comm., Ending the ‘Made in America’ Tax:
Three Major Wins for the American People (Dec. 21, 2016), https://waysandmeans.house.gov/endingmade-america-tax-three-major-wins-american-people [https://perma.cc/9ZPD-UQWX].
287. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex I (g)–(h) & nn. 58–60,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures] (providing that valueadded taxes may be refunded on export so long as the remitted taxes do not exceed the taxes levied on
products destined for domestic consumption).
288. Shawn Donnan, Barney Jopson, & Paul McLean, EU and Others Gear Up for WTO
Challenge to US Border Tax, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/cdaa0b76-f20d11e6-8758-6876151821a6 [https://perma.cc/PPZ8-M69Y].
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C. The Captured Trade Presidency
Finally, the notion that the President formulates trade policy pursuant to the
general national interest defies everything we know about politics. Proponents
of the view that the President represents the national interest generally cite the
fact that the President is nationally elected.289 The President does not, however,
need to win the votes of the entire nation—or even a majority of voters—to be
elected. As in many elections, presidents must assemble a coalition of 51 percent
to be elected. In the case of presidents, this means 51 percent of electoral college
voters, not of all voters, meaning that presidents, such as President George W.
Bush and President Trump, can be elected with a minority of the popular vote.
Much research in political science suggests that elected officials cater policy to
their winning coalitions.290 Indeed, they have an incentive not to expand their
coalition because attracting support beyond the minimum necessary to win an
election is costly.291 Given these realities, the mere fact that presidents are
elected nationally tells us little about whether they will actually pursue a trade
policy in the national interest.
Presidential administrations are also subject to capture in the same way that
congressional leaders are. Lobbyists work hard to influence administrations’
positions on trade negotiations. Indeed, through the US Trade Representative’s
Advisory Committees, interest groups, especially industry, are given a seat at the
table. What makes lobbying of presidential administrations different from
lobbying members of Congress, though, is that there is only one president. The
singular president means that influencing the administration’s position is more
difficult and expensive, precisely because many more groups are vying for
presidential attention. If a decision is made in Congress, interest groups can seek
influence through any of the 535 members.292 If decisions are made in the
executive branch, the channels for influence are narrower.
The allocation of authority over trade policy within the executive branch
compounds the effect of a narrow channel of influence. The executive branch is,
of course, a “they” and not an “it.”293 Hence, it is possible to lobby different

289. See, e.g., DEVEREAUX, LAWRENCE & WATKINS, supra note 16, at 188.
290. See generally, WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962); JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); see also Robert Aumann
& Mordecai Kurz, Power and Taxes, 45 ECONOMETRICA 1137 (1977) (describing how officials’
constituencies and winning coalitions shape tax policies).
291. RIKER, supra note 290; but see Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on
Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 245 (1979) (critiquing the prediction that “majorities
will be of the barest possible size, since [a minimum winning coalition] maximizes the per capita gains
for the winners.”). Weingast goes on to note that, as applied to legislative negotiations, the prediction of
a minimum winning coalition has limited empirical support, although there is reason to believe this
could change in the modern era of hyper-polarization. Id.
292. We do not mean to suggest that Congress does not have power structures that make some
members more powerful than others.
293. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (“[W]e
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agencies that work on the same issue. However, the dominance of the US Trade
Representative in trade negotiations even limits these other avenues of influence.
When the State Department ran trade negotiations, up until the 1960s, foreign
policy experts and groups with connections to the Department played a dominant
role in formulating trade policy. If the Commerce Department led trade
negotiations, the domestic economic considerations that are that Department’s
bread-and-butter might play a more outsized role. But a separate US Trade
Representative, which is housed in the Executive Office of the President cuts
down on—although by no means eliminates—these other avenues of influence.
Thus, even though the executive branch is a “they,” for all intents and purposes,
trade policy can be won at the White House.
Recent trade negotiations bear out the prediction that the executive branch
is subject to capture and that the nature of the groups able to capture the
administration’s positions are narrow. Consider the TPP. President Obama
touted the TPP as part of a “‘[p]ivot’ to Asia.”294 Most of the provisions in TPP,
however, were lifted from earlier US trade agreements.295 There was, in other
words, nothing distinctly Asian about most of the TPP. Labor and environment
groups had some success in pushing for stronger provisions.296 But although the
TPP’s labor and environment provisions were the most stringent ever included
in a trade agreement, most labor and environmental groups remained cynical that
they would have any effect.297
The Obama administration’s negotiating position, however, was
thoroughly captured by industry groups. At the level of process, the
administration allowed industry groups privileged access to negotiating drafts
that were otherwise kept secret, including from other interest groups and the
public. Hence, representatives from the businesses that would benefit from the
TPP had a hand in negotiations, while, for instance, labor groups whose

demonstrate that scholars may have underestimated the complexity of White House involvement.
Presidential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”).
294. Mike Green, The Legacy of Obama’s “Pivot” to Asia, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 3, 2016),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/03/the-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia
[https://perma.cc/W5CB7QPN] (listing TPP as among the policy initiatives associated with Obama’s Asia policy).
295. Todd Allee & Andrew Lang, Who Wrote the Rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, RES.
& POL. 1, 1 (July–Sept. 2016); see also Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 YALE
J. INT’L L. 315 & n.4 (2018) (discussing studies showing “copy-paste” across agreements).
296. See Meyer, supra note 206, at 1005 (describing the labor and environment chapters of the
TPP and the novel “consistency plans” that aimed to raise standards in countries like Vietnam).
297. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, As Pacific Trade Negotiators Haggle, U.S. Officials Remain
Hopeful, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/us-and-11-nationsclose-to-accord-on-trade-pact.html
[https://perma.cc/CKT4-RWMG]
(noting
that
Obama
Administration officials said the labor and environmental provisions were the “strongest ever”); Q&A:
The
Trans-Pacific
Partnership,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(Jan.
12,
2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/12/qa-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/MQ2D-SQRB]
(“Human Rights Watch and others have expressed concerns that the agreement’s labor chapter and
associated bilateral agreements will not adequately safeguard labor rights in TPP countries with poor
labor rights records, notably Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei.”).
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constituents stood to be adversely impacted by the negotiations, were held at
arms-length.
Not shockingly, this privileged access translated into privileged outcomes.
The TPP broke new ground by creating rules on digital trade and e-commerce
and data protections for pharmaceutical companies. The TPP also preserved
investor-state dispute settlement, a procedure that US companies strongly
favored, over the objection of groups within the United States and other TPP
members, such as Australia.298 To be sure, these companies did not get
everything they wanted. Pharmaceutical companies, for instance, wanted a
longer data exclusivity period during which generic manufacturers of drugs
could not piggyback on existing clinical trials to prove a generic drug’s safety.299
But the real innovations in the TPP came in the form of the Obama
administration’s willingness to allow corporate groups access to negotiations and
draft texts that even some members of Congress and their staffs had difficulty
accessing.300
Given the ability of major economic players to capture the President’s
position on trade, the President can hardly be said to represent the national
interest. Rather, like all elected officials, the President represents his supporters
and those to whom he chooses to listen. Ironically, President Trump’s election
has driven this home for commentators who have long championed the
“national” president in trade policy as a vehicle for championing aggressive trade

298. See Jurgen Kurtz, The Australian Trade Policy Statement on Investor-State Dispute
Settlement,
15
ASIL
INSIGHTS
(Aug.
22,
2011),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/22/australian-trade-policy-statement-investor-statedispute-settlement [https://perma.cc/9YRH-ACDH] (discussing Australia’s “opposition to investorstate dispute settlement provisions in future Australian trade agreements”); TPP, supra note 171, arts.
9.19–9.30.
299. Alex Philippidis, Biopharma Industry Blasts TPP Exclusivity Compromise, GEN: GENETIC
ENGINEERING & BIOTECH. NEWS (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.genengnews.com/gen-newshighlights/biopharma-industry-blasts-tpp-exclusivity-compromise/81251827 [https://perma.cc/78VBBRWU] (quoting John Castellani, President and CEO of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, as saying “[w]e are disappointed that the Ministers failed to secure 12 years
of data protection for biologic medicines . . . This term was not a random number, but the result of a
long debate in Congress, which determined that this period of time captured the appropriate balance that
stimulated research but gave access to biosimilars in a timely manner.”).
300. See George Zornick, Congress is Sick of the Secrecy Around the TPP, NATION (Aug. 20,
2015),
https://www.thenation.com/article/congress-is-sick-of-the-secrecy-around-tpp
[https://perma.cc/ZTS8-8VCS] (noting that “close to 600 corporate executive and lobbyists enjoy wideranging access and input to the draft text”); Press Release, Sherrod Brown, Senator for Ohio, Brown to
President Obama: Access to Text of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Must Come Before Intent to
Sign (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-to-presidentobama-access-to-text-of-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-must-come-before-intent-to-sign
[https://perma.cc/L3DA-CYJ2] (“Access to the text has been inadequate throughout the TPP
negotiations. A copy of the agreement was not readily available for Members of Congress until we
demanded it. And even after the text was deposited in the secure reading rooms in the House and Senate,
Members had to ask USTR for TPP annexes and other related documents to be made available. In
addition, despite repeated requests, congressional staff with the necessary security clearance are still
prohibited from seeing the text on their own.”).
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liberalization. In response to his supporters, which include blue collar workers
in states like Michigan and Ohio as well as companies struggling to compete
with cheap imports, President Trump has acted aggressively to raise trade
barriers. He “unsigned” the TPP;301 renegotiated NAFTA (an endeavor popular
with his political base but unpopular in the business community);302 imposed
tariffs on solar imports that seem likely to benefit a few companies at the expense
of the broader US solar industry;303 and adopted trade restrictions on steel and
aluminum imports.304
None of this should be surprising. The President is an elected official,
subject to similar pressures as other elected officials. But it should caution
against paradigms of trade policy-making that pretend the President is not subject
to these pressures. In shifting power to the President, the foreign affairs paradigm
has ultimately empowered those special interests with access to the President.
They can use trade policy to set domestic economic policy that is neither
necessarily in the national interest nor a product of the institution—Congress—
responsible for such policy.
III.
IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In this Part, we explore the implications of approaching trade from a
balanced perspective within the separation of powers. This “normalized”
approach to trade law and policy has a variety of consequences for contemporary
legal and policy debates. First, we argue that the role of fast track, or trade
promotion authority, has been misunderstood in the legal literature, and suggest
that the delegation of power to the executive under this authority may be
indirectly responsible for the recent backlash to trade agreements.
Second, we show that the shift toward the foreign affairs paradigm has had
the consequence of giving the President considerable power to declare trade
wars, even though such executive actions are tantamount to making national
economic policy and have significant economic consequences. This power is of
particular interest, given President Trump’s use of these authorities to engage in
trade conflicts with both diplomatic adversaries like China and traditional US
allies like Canada, Mexico, and the EU.
Third, we discuss the question of whether the President can withdraw from
trade agreements without congressional participation or approval—a question
that has received increased attention since President Trump’s assertion that he
has this power.

301.
302.

See generally Baker, supra note 178.
See generally Needham, supra note 1; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note

303.
304.

See generally Swanson & Plumer, supra note 3.
See generally Swanson, supra note 4; Layne, supra note 3.
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Fourth, we consider the increasingly common practice of the executive
branch concluding “unorthodox international agreements,” and we argue that
Congress’s Article I powers suggest that these agreements need to be far more
carefully (and narrowly) considered in the trade context.
Finally, we identify and discuss the problem of what we call “trade
federalism,” the fact that trade agreements increasingly threaten longstanding
and core state police powers. Throughout, we compare trade policy to other areas
of foreign affairs to illustrate why the case for greater congressional participation
in trade policy is especially strong in trade.
A. Fast Track and Congressional Oversight
To read the legal commentary, the path from the Smoot-Hawley Tariff to
the creation of fast-track authority in 1974 is the path from ridiculousness to
rationality. Congress and the President came together to find a way to liberalize
trade while maintaining congressional oversight. Fast-track authority, on this
view, is a novel innovation that allows the government to achieve both
institutional separation-of-powers goals and make good policy at the same
time—a rare combination.
The view outside of the legal academy is quite different. Each time fasttrack authority (now rebranded as trade promotion authority) comes up for
renewal, it is met with vehement opposition. For instance, Public Citizen, a
liberal advocacy group, argues that “Fast Track empowers executive branch
officials advised by large corporations to skirt Congress and the public” in
making trade policies that affect a wide range of trade (i.e., employment) and
non-trade (i.e., environment and public health) issues.305 When fast-track
authority was last renewed in 2015, more than two thousand groups, including
dozens of labor unions, environmental groups, and human rights organizations
signed a letter urging Congress not to pass fast track. In their words, the thenpending bill “does virtually nothing to increase congressional oversight over
trade policymaking.”306
These very different views stem in part from baseline problems and in part
from divergent views about the relative importance of preserving constitutional
roles versus achieving particular policy goals. With respect to baselines, many
commentators have argued that the creation of fast-track authority in 1974
represented the reassertion of congressional oversight over executive trade
policy-making.307 As we explained above, however, this view is based on a
305. Fast Track: An Undemocratic Path to Unfair “Trade”, PUB. CITIZEN,
https://www.citizen.org/our-work/globalization-and-trade/alternatives-corporate-globalization/fasttrack-presidential-trade [https://perma.cc/9UUV-LWGU].
306. Letter from Citizens Trade Campaign to U.S. Representatives and Senators, Re: Please
Oppose “The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act” (Apr. 27, 2015),
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/fasttrackoppositionltr_042715_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EF2L-GVBG].
307. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 9, at 1204.
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misunderstanding of Congress’s role in approving trade agreements before 1974.
In granting the President authority to negotiate trade agreements, Congress has
always distinguished between tariff and nontariff barriers. Up to and including
the 2015 Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act,
Congress has granted the President ex ante authority to enter into reciprocal
tariff-reducing agreements and to proclaim tariffs on the basis of such
agreements.308
Nontariff barriers have an entirely different history. Prior to 1974, and
notably in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress did not grant the President
any special authority to negotiate or conclude agreements on nontariff barriers.
Such agreements still had to be approved by Congress through the ordinary
legislative process, open to amendment and debate in committee and on the floor.
Thus, when President Johnson negotiated agreements on nontariff barriers in the
Kennedy Round, he had to submit them to Congress just as he would submit any
other legislation.309 In other words, congressional oversight of trade agreements
on nontariff barriers was at its maximum prior to 1974, and in particular at the
end of the Kennedy Round.310
Viewed against this backdrop, the fast-track procedures created by the 1974
Trade Act clearly circumscribe congressional oversight and allow the United
States to more easily enter into trade agreements. Congress could not implement
trade agreements as easily if members had the opportunity to introduce
amendments and delay votes. So, Congress gave the President ex ante authority
to conclude tariff agreements without ex post congressional approval and
circumscribed its own ex post review of agreements on nontariff barriers. In
other words, members of Congress lashed themselves to the mast of trade
liberalization through delegations to the President. Fast-track is the culmination
of this trend, not a reversal of it.
Whether this hand-tying by Congress is desirable turns, in part, on one’s
view of trade liberalization. Polls consistently find that those with higher levels
of education are also more likely to support trade liberalization.311 It is thus
perhaps not surprising that academic commentary has tended to view fast track
as benign and even beneficial. Indeed, in other contexts, such as federalism,

308. See Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 § 103(a), 19
U.S.C. § 4202(a) (2018); supra Part I.
309. See supra Part I.
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., Bradley Jones, Support for Free Trade Agreements Rebounds Modestly, but Wide
Partisan Differences Remain, PEW RES. CTR.: FACTTANK (Apr. 25, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/25/support-for-free-trade-agreements-reboundsmodestly-but-wide-partisan-differences-remain [https://perma.cc/NJ6S-5NKQ] (documenting that as
education levels rise, so too does support for free trade).
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scholars have suggested that people invoke institutional arguments as pretexts to
advance their preferred substantive outcomes.312
Where fast-track is concerned, though, commentators cannot have their
cake and eat it too. Fast-track authority enables greater trade liberalization, but
at the expense of separation-of-powers values. Moreover, as discussed above,
the separation-of-powers values here reflect substantive concerns about
distributional issues.313 Circumscribing congressional review of trade
agreements also circumscribes the number of access points that local economic
interests have to the policy-making process. In this sense, we agree that invoking
institutional arguments is indeed about substantive policy preferences. It is not,
however, solely or even necessarily about trade liberalization versus
protectionism. Rather, by circumscribing congressional review of trade
agreements, fast track modifies which views have weight in formulating trade
policy. The fast-track process gives extra weight to the views of proliberalization industry advocates who participate in the US Trade
Representative’s industry advisory committees.314 Pushing trade agreements
through the ordinary congressional process, in contrast, requires broad
democratic support for the agreements. As a result, the compromise struck by
fast-track legislation makes more trade agreements possible, but at the cost of
reducing the political support for those agreements.
While that compromise may allow more trade agreements in the short-run,
in the long-run, the lack of political buy-in for trade agreements may leave trade
agreements exposed when political fortunes turn. Indeed, that appears to have
been exactly what happened when political sentiment turned against trade
liberalization in the United States and elsewhere in 2016.315 In other words,
Congress’s failure to exercise its oversight role in the short-run (in hopes of
advancing trade liberalization) may in the long-run undermine trade
liberalization.
B. The Power to Declare Trade Wars
The institutional home of the power to make war has been one of the most
hotly contested constitutional issues of the last century. On the one hand, the
President is the commander in chief of the armed forces and can respond the
most quickly and decisively to a threat to American national security.316 On the
other hand, the Constitution commits to Congress the legal power to declare war,
appropriate money, and make regulations governing the armed forces.317
312. See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131, 137
(2004) (“Elected officials invoke federalism when it comports with their substantive policy preferences,
but they otherwise do not care about the federal-state balance.”).
313. See supra Part II.C.
314. Id.
315. See Meyer, supra note 206.
316. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
317. Id. art. I, § 8.
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Scholars and policy-makers alike have struggled to understand how these powers
should work in combination with each other in specific conflicts.
A similar problem occurs in the case of trade wars. The Constitution gives
Congress broad powers over foreign commerce and tariffs.318 Yet Congress has
largely delegated those powers to the President, who is already constitutionally
imbued with the power to act as the nation’s chief diplomat.319 Moreover, those
tools that Congress previously used to constrain the executive branch’s exercise
of authority over trade, such as the legislative veto, have been held
unconstitutional or otherwise eroded.320 Consequently, the President and the
executive branch generally wield enormous power over the initiation of trade
conflicts with other nations. And they do so without a widely accepted normative
paradigm—foreign affairs or domestic economic policy—to guide their choices.
A trade war occurs “when a state threatens to inflict economic harm or
actually inflicts it in order to persuade the target state to agree to terms of trade
more favorable to the coercing state.”321 In international economic disputes,
trade wars typically involve raising trade barriers against other states in order to
induce them to change their policies. For instance, in January 2018, President
Trump imposed so-called “safeguards” in the form of exceptional tariffs on solar
cells as part of a strategy to combat the influx of Chinese-subsidized solar cells
into the US market.322 In March 2018, President Trump invoked a Cold War-era
law granting the President authority to impose unlimited trade restrictions on
products that he determines threaten national security. Under this law, President
Trump imposed a 25 percent tariff on imported steel and a 10 percent tariff on
imported aluminum.323 In May and July 2018, the Trump administration also
announced investigations under the same law into autos, auto parts, and

318. Id. art. I § 8.
319. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2099 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Upon taking office, President Washington assumed the role of chief
diplomat.”).
320. See supra Part I.
321. Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT’L SEC. 90, 94 (1997).
322. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Exec. Office of the President,
President Trump Approves Relief for U.S. Washing Machine and Solar Cell Manufacturers (Jan. 22,
2018) [hereinafter USTR Press Release, Relief for Manufacturers], https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2018/january/president-trump-approves-relief-us
[https://perma.cc/5HD3-LF8D].
323. Doug Palmer & Andrew Restuccia, Trump Imposes Steel and Aluminum Tariffs with Few
Exceptions, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/08/trumps-tariff-detailsdebated-765614 [https://perma.cc/XF8A-X64P]. The President initially granted some American allies
exemptions from the tariffs while he attempted to negotiate alternative trade restrictions. By the end of
May 2018, however, the President imposed the tariffs on all but four countries, three of whom faced
quotas rather than tariffs. David J. Lynch, Josh Dawsey & Damian Paletta, Trump Imposes Steel and
Aluminum Tariffs on E.U., Canada, and Mexico, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-imposes-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-onthe-european-union-canada-and-mexico/2018/05/31/891bb452-64d3-11e8-a69cb944de66d9e7_story.html?utm_term=.77c0f3cf8e6b [https://perma.cc/XF8A-X64P].
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uranium.324 In public statements about these “national security” tariffs, President
Trump has made plain that he views the tariffs as creating leverage in trade
negotiations with partners such as the EU, Canada, and Mexico.325 In July 2018,
President Trump imposed tariffs on $34 billion worth of Chinese products.326 As
of August 2018, President Trump was mulling imposing up to a 25 percent tariff
on an additional $200 billion worth of Chinese products. These moves are part
of a strategy to induce China to further liberalize its economy and, in particular,
to reduce pervasive government subsidies.327
Like real wars, trade wars are costly for countries that engage in them, even
if they prevail. Imposing trade barriers, the primary tool of a trade war, creates
real costs for the protected economy. Domestic prices of imported goods rise in
response to the trade barriers, which can hurt end-use consumers and companies
that rely on imported goods for their businesses. For instance, US automakers
immediately reported a hit to their earnings as a result of higher steel prices in
the wake of President Trump’s steel tariffs.328 The steel tariffs have been a drag
on other steel-reliant industries, including the oil and gas industries, which use
steel for pipe.329 Economists have also worried that President Trump’s
imposition of 30 percent tariffs on solar panels will increase the cost of solar
energy in the United States, hurting American businesses that invest in largescale solar farms and American consumers who purchase solar power.330
Industry groups have estimated that the US-imposed tariffs could cost as many

324. Ana Swanson, Trump Initiates Trade Inquiry that could Lead to Tariffs on Foreign Cars,
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/business/trump-tariffs-foreignautos.html [https://perma.cc/CT5N-R7XX]; Ana Swanson & Brad Plumer, U.S. Opens Investigations
into Uranium Imports in Sign that Trade War is Spreading, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/us/politics/trump-uranium-import-probe-tariffs.html
[https://perma.cc/W3CX-JEDF].
325. Jacob M. Schlesinger, Trump Cites Car-Tariff Threat as Biggest Trade Leverage, WALL
ST. J. (July 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-cites-car-tariff-threat-as-biggest-tradeleverage-1530466455 [https://perma.cc/Y3PU-7M9A].
326. Ana Swanson, Trump’s Trade War with China is Officially Underway, N.Y. TIMES (July 5,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html
[https://perma.cc/5XAE-ZDVZ].
327. Ana Swanson & Keith Bradsher, Chinese Goods May Face 25% Tariffs, Not 10%, as
Trump’s
Anger
Grows,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
1,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/business/china-tariffs-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/5EFC7MDE].
328. Matthew DeBord, It Didn’t Take Long for Trump’s Tariffs to Become Headache for the
Auto Industry, BUS. INSIDER (July 25, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-tariffs-becomeheadache-for-auto-industry-2018-7 [https://perma.cc/8Y2Q-QKLB].
329. Chris Tomlinson, President Donald Trump’s Steel Tariffs Holding Back Oil and Gas
Industry
Growth,
HOUSTON
CHRON.
(July
23,
2018),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/columnists/tomlinson/article/President-Donald-Trump-ssteel-tariffs-holding-13092692.php [https://perma.cc/F86D-6ZYF].
330. Ana Swanson & Brad Plumer, Trump Slaps Steep Tariffs on Foreign Washing Machines
and Solar Products, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/business/trumptariffs-washing-machines-solar-panels.html [https://perma.cc/4C79-RKFR].
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as twenty-three thousand jobs in the United States.331 This estimate is broadly
consistent with the net job loss associated with past efforts to protect the US
economy.332 Apart from these direct effects of US-imposed trade barriers, other
countries may respond with retaliatory trade barriers on US exports, as numerous
countries have done in response to President Trump’s tariffs.333 These increased
trade barriers depress prices for US exporters.334
Given the significant economic costs associated with trade wars, it would
make sense for Congress—the constitutional repository for authority over the
economy—to wield primary responsibility for initiating trade wars. In fact, our
current statutory framework allocates that power principally to the executive
branch. The executive wields at least two sets of powers that are largely free of
congressional oversight. First, as discussed above, the President controls the
United States’ actions at the WTO and within other international trade
agreements.335 As a consequence, the President, acting through the US Trade
Representative, determines what kinds of trade cases to bring against our trading
partners. These cases often form the basis for trade wars. For instance, if the
United States is successful in a WTO case and the other party does not comply
with the WTO’s ruling, the United States can lawfully raise its trade barriers.336
The President exercises this authority as a matter of domestic law. Indeed, in
passing the URAA, Congress concerned itself primarily with cases in which the
United States was a respondent, i.e., a defendant.337 In those cases, the President
was required to consult with Congress and any affected states.338 But Congress
imposed no limits on the President’s use of offensive authorities in the URAA,
leaving the President with considerable authority to initiate trade wars through
the WTO mechanism.339
Second, the President, and the executive branch more generally,
administers and to a large extent controls the nation’s trade remedies and
331. Oliver Milman, Trump’s Tariffs on Panels Will Cost US Solar Industry Thousands of Jobs,
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/23/donaldtrump-tariffs-solar-panels [https://perma.cc/3XDZ-M62Q] (quoting the Solar Energy Industries
Association’s figure for potential job loss).
332. See, e.g., Gary C. Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Steel Policy: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 24, 25 (Philip King et al.
eds., 4th ed. 2005) (estimating that the 2002 US steel tariffs cost $400,000 annually per steel job saved
and resulted in net job losses within the United States).
333. Alix Langone, These U.S. Exporters will be Hardest Hit by Retaliatory Tariffs: Here Is a
List of Everyday U.S. Exports That Could Cost More Because of Trump’s Trade War, TIME MONEY
(June 13, 2018), http://time.com/money/5304493/us-exports-tariffs-list [https://perma.cc/B2TBGB5D].
334. See, e.g., Jeff Daniels, Fall in Soybean Prices Leave Farmers Struggling, CNBC (July 12,
2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/12/fall-in-soybean-prices-from-china-trade-spat-leavesfarmers-struggling.html [https://perma.cc/YSY2-WY95].
335. See supra Part I.
336. DSU, supra note 160, art. 22.
337. See URAA §§ 121–130, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3531–3540 (2018).
338. Id.
339. Id.
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enforcement laws. For separation-of-powers purposes, such laws can be usefully
divided into two groups: (1) antidumping and countervailing duty investigations,
and (2) safeguards (Section 201 investigations),340 national security
investigations (Section 232 investigations),341 and retaliatory trade sanctions
investigations (Section 301 investigations).342 Antidumping duties are tariffs on
products that are being sold at below fair market value; countervailing duties are
tariffs imposed on goods that benefit from certain foreign government
subsidies.343 Nations regularly use antidumping or countervailing duties on a titfor-tat basis to induce each other to grant greater market access or to protect their
own sensitive domestic industries.344 But antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations do not raise significant separation-of-powers issues. Congress has
prescribed how and when the executive may impose such duties and subjected
their imposition to judicial review.345 Furthermore, private parties normally
initiate antidumping and countervailing duty investigations.346 The executive
branch does, however, have the statutory authority to “self-initiate” such
investigations.347 Although the executive rarely uses this authority, doing so is
tantamount to declaring a trade war, because initiating investigations will likely
lead to the imposition of duties that American business itself did not seek. Once
again, President Trump made use of this authority by self-initiating
investigations into Chinese aluminum.348 The last time the US government selfinitiated an investigation was in 1985, when the US targeted Japanese
semiconductors during a period of trade tensions between the two countries.349
The second category of trade laws involves much more expansive
delegations of authority to the President, with far fewer checks. Under each of
these laws, the President has significant discretion as to what kind and level of

340. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (2018).
341. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2018).
342. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
343. Wentong Zhang, Reforming Trade Remedies, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 151, 153 (2012).
344. See Chad P. Bown, Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement:
Why Are So Few Challenged?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 524 (2005) (describing the use of trade remedies
as “vigilante justice”).
345. In other countries, antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are more under the
thumb of the government. See Wee, infra note 356 (noting that the Chinese government had “teed up”
the sorghum antidumping and countervailing duty investigations).
346. Jennifer McCadney, In Rare Move, Trump’s Commerce Secretary Self-Initiates Chinese
Aluminum Trade Remedy Cases, TRADE & MANU. MONITOR (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://www.ustrademonitor.com/2017/11/in-rare-move-trumps-commerce-secretary-self-initiateschinese-aluminum-trade-remedy-cases [https://perma.cc/Z4B7-XV5V].
347. Shawn Donnan, US Initiates Anti-dumping Investigation into Chinese Aluminum Sheeting
Imports, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/6d986086-3928-3678-943f938179b35a94 [https://perma.cc/KN9A-KX7N].
348. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Self-Initiates
Historic Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations on Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet
From China (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/11/us-departmentcommerce-self-initiates-historic-antidumping-and [https://perma.cc/VN8C-3M55].
349. Donnan, supra note 347.
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trade barrier to impose, on which products, from which countries, and for how
long. Moreover, the President’s exercise of discretion under these laws is subject
to limited judicial review at best.350 The safeguards process, for example, does
not provide a meaningful check on presidential discretion. Safeguards are
“restrictions on imports imposed in the event of import surges to allow domestic
industries of the importing country to make positive adjustments to import
competition.”351 Following a domestic investigation, the ITC must determine
that safeguards are warranted, then recommend the form those safeguards should
take. The President, however, need not follow the ITC’s recommendation.
President Trump’s recent imposition of tariffs on solar panels illustrates the
point. After making the requisite findings of injury, the ITC suggested three
possible remedies: tariffs, quotas, and import licensing fees.352 Industries that
benefit from cheap solar imports (including solar installers and their customers)
lobbied the White House aggressively in an effort to get the President to reject
the ITC’s recommendations.353 Instead, the President imposed tariffs on solar
panels and, in a separate investigation, on washing machines.354 He did so despite
opposition from the governors of a number of states and multiple members of
Congress, who wrote to express opposition to the safeguards.355 In a surprise to
no one, China—the primary target of the solar tariffs—responded by initiating
an investigation into American sorghum, a grain used in food and in the

350. Neither Section 201 nor Section 232 nor Section 301 expressly provides for judicial review.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the President is not an “agency” within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), meaning that the APA is not available as an avenue for judicial
review of the President’s final decision. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994); Franklin v. Mass.,
505 U.S. 788 (1992). However, the APA might be available to review any necessary determinations
made by administrative agencies like the Commerce Department. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
177–78 (1997) (holding that agency action is “final” and hence reviewable for APA purposes if, inter
alia, it merely “alter[s] the legal regime” pursuant to which subsequent government action takes place).
Some have argued that courts should infer the power to review whenever the President has at least acted
within the statutory criteria, even if more searching APA review of the President’s exercise of discretion
is unavailable. See Erwin P. Eichmann & Gary N. Horlick, Political Questions in International Trade:
Judicial Review of Section 301? 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 735, 743 (1989) (“Even though Congress did not
specify that Section 301 was intended to be subject to judicial review, the courts may legitimately infer
such a requirement.”).
351. Zhang, supra note 343, at 153.
352. Krysti Shallenberger, ITC Proposes 3 Solar Trade Case Remedies with Tariffs, Quotas and
Capped Imports, UTILITY DIVE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/itc-proposes-3solar-trade-case-remedies-with-tariffs-quotas-and-capped-im/508596 [https://perma.cc/2368-XCQ6].
353. Lacey Johnson, Industry Leaders Make Last-Ditch Effort to Steer Trump White House Away
From
Solar
Tariffs,
GREENTECH
MEDIA
(Jan.
12,
2018),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/solar-industry-makes-last-ditch-lobbying-against-solartariffs [https://perma.cc/W9RB-C658].
354. USTR Press Release, Relief for Manufacturers, supra note 322.
355. Lacey Johnson & Julia Pyper, Solar Tariff Case Advances as ITC Finds ‘Injury’,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/solar-trade-caseadvances-as-itc-finds-injury [https://perma.cc/X96N-ZZL5].
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production of syrup.356 China’s investigation targeted an agricultural product that
is important to President Trump’s political base and is primarily exported to
China.357
Likewise, under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, Congress has
authorized the President to “suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of . . .
benefits of trade agreement[s]” with any country that, in the President’s view,
maintains “unjustifiable or unreasonable” trade barriers.358 The legislative veto
was designed to limit the President’s discretion to deviate from the ITC’s
recommendations in the case of safeguards investigations or to override the
President’s decisions in Section 301 investigations. However, after Chadha, the
legislative veto can no longer check the President.359
As of August 2018, President Trump had used that authority to impose a
25 percent tariff on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports, causing China to
impose a reciprocal 25 percent on $50 billion worth of US exports.360 Initially,
President Trump considered using the same Section 301 authority to impose
restrictions on Chinese investment in the United States. However, the
administration ultimately decided to delay investment restrictions until Congress
passed new legislation expanding the authority of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to impose such measures.361
The broadest grant of authority comes from Section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. This Act provides the basis for the President’s 25 percent
tariff on steel and 10 percent tariff on aluminum, as well as for investigations
into autos, auto parts, and uranium. The Act permits the President “to take action
to adjust imports of an article” that the Secretary of Commerce has determined
presents a threat to national security.362 The President’s discretion under Section
232 is virtually unlimited. The statute does not restrict the kind of trade barrier
the President may choose, as trade remedies laws do, nor does it impose limits
on the duration of the trade restriction. In principle, the law requires the President
to act only when necessary to curb the threat to national security.363 But the law’s
definition of national security includes

356. Sui-Lee Wee, China’s Trade Investigation Takes Aim at Trump’s Voter Base, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
5,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/business/china-us-trade-sorghum.html
[https://perma.cc/ZD78-EDFZ] (“It is already a partial trade war.”).
357. Id.
358. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2018).
359. See supra Part I.
360. Bob Bryan, Round 2: US, China Announce Newest Round of Tariffs as Trump’s Trade War
Shows
No
Sign
of
Slowing
Down,
BUS.
INSIDER
(AUG.
8,
2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-tariffs-china-trade-war-chinese-goods-2018-8
[https://perma.cc/9WVV-2X5D].
361. Shawn Donnan, Trump Drops New Restrictions on China Investments, FIN. TIMES (June
27,
2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/a819ec8a-79f4-11e8-8e67-1e1a0846c475
[https://perma.cc/UNL9-BFB4].
362. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232(c)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(B) (2018).
363. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232(c)(1)(A)(ii), 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii).
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the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual
domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in
revenues of government, loss of skills or investment, or other serious
effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products by
excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other
factors. (emphasis added).364
In other words, the Secretary of Commerce and ultimately the President may
consider virtually any factor as part of “national security.” Indeed, after imposing
global tariffs on steel and aluminum under Section 232, President Trump
summarily announced that he would double the “national security” tariffs on
Turkey alone—in part to secure the release of a detained American pastor.365
Because presidents have control over what type of WTO cases to bring, as
well as overwhelming influence over domestic trade laws, they can launch a
trade war without congressional consent. Whether this state of affairs is desirable
is a normative question that parallels the analysis of the war powers question in
many respects. But there are at least two important differences. First, trade
conflicts rarely involve the kinds of immediate risks to national security that may
necessitate presidential action in the context of shooting wars. Second, the
President’s authority to initiate trade wars is more clearly established than the
authority to initiate shooting wars. Still, as with the debate about shooting wars,
ceding authority to the President has reduced the number of veto points involved
in starting a conflict. This increases the likelihood of decision-making based on
systematic errors of judgment, makes it easier to become involved in conflicts,
and reduces the degree of democratic participation in the decision.366
Whether this results in better policy outcomes likely depends on how one
feels about the trade war in question and the extent to which any given
administration is susceptible to systematic biases. Our chief point, however, is
that Congress’s delegation of power to the executive branch in the trade context
changes the kinds of policy outcomes we would expect when compared to the
separation of powers baseline. Congress is subject to a wider variety of pressures
than the President, who, once elected, has a freer hand to privilege certain
constituencies at the expense of others.367
Indeed, in recognition of this fact, members of Congress have introduced a
number of bills that would return to Congress the ultimate decision to raise trade
barriers.368 These bills would, in effect, shift the burden of initiating trade wars
364. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d).
365. Thomas Franck, Trump Increases Pressure on Turkey Amid Currency Crisis, Authorizes
Doubling of Metals Tariffs, CNBC (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/10/trump.html
[https://perma.cc/WRC4-GXA9].
366. On how executive power might lead to systematic biases and errors of judgment in the war
powers context, see Ganesh Sitaraman & David Zionts, Behavioral War Powers, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
516 (2015).
367. See supra Part II.
368. Kathleen Claussen, Trade War Battles: Congress Reconsiders its Role, LAWFARE (Aug. 5,
2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/trade-war-battles-congress-reconsiders-its-role
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to Congress. Under the current framework, the President can take action without
congressional consent, and Congress must affirmatively act through the
legislative process to override the President’s decision. Because the President
would presumably veto any override bill, an override vote would require a twothirds majority in each house. Under proposed legislation, however, a simple
majority of Congress could impose trade barriers and block the adoption of new
trade barriers. Such a proposal would greatly expand Congress’s role in
determining when and how to start a trade war.
For instance, under a bill proposed by Republican Senator Bob Corker, the
President’s determination of what action to take under Section 232 in response
to a national security threat posed by imports would take the form of a proposal
to Congress.369 Congress’s decision on the President’s proposal would be subject
to fast-track procedures, guaranteeing the President an up-or-down vote. Unlike
the original introduction of fast-track procedures in 1974, which circumscribed
congressional review of trade agreements on nontariff barriers, Senator Corker’s
proposal would expand congressional review. Moreover, this expansion takes
into account the necessity of speedy action from Congress, informed by guidance
from the executive branch, in a true national security situation.
C. Withdrawing from Trade Agreements
Since President Donald Trump took office in January 2017, the question of
whether the President can unilaterally withdraw from trade agreements has
garnered considerable attention. The President has at various times claimed that
he will terminate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the
United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) unless they are
renegotiated on more favorable terms for Americans.370 He has also reportedly
indicated that he would like to withdraw from the World Trade Organization
(WTO),371 which his US Trade Representative has criticized as departing from
the bargain struck by the WTO contracting parties.372
[https://perma.cc/J4VZ-2VQ7] (describing various bills pending in Congress to rein in the President’s
authority to raise trade barriers).
369. See S. 3013, 115th Cong. (2018).
370. Ken Thomas, Trump, Trudeau Meet at the White House Amid New NAFTA Talks, WASH.
POST (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-10-11/trump-trudeau-meetat-the-white-house-amid-new-nafta-talks [https://perma.cc/2J9B-YLNK]; Damian Paletta, Trump
Preparing Withdrawal from South Korea Trade Deal, a Move Opposed by Top Aides, WASH. POST
(Sept.
2,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/02/trump-planswithdrawal-from-south-korea-trade-deal/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.37cd6ec85892
[https://perma.cc/DW39-XVZV].
371. Doina Chiacu & Jeff Mason, Trump Threatens Action on WTO after Reports He Wants to
Withdraw, REUTERS (July 2, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto-ross/trumpthreatens-action-on-wto-after-reports-he-wants-to-withdraw-idUSKBN1JS194
[https://perma.cc/32U7-NPQE].
372. See DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY, WORLD TRADE ORG., DRAFT ANNUAL REPORT ¶ 2.2
(2017) (noting concerns by WTO members with “linking the discussion of the systemic issues raised by
the
United
States
to
the
Appellate
Body
selection
process.”),
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Foreign relations scholars, however, have come to different conclusions on
this question. Some argue that the President cannot terminate agreements
unilaterally. They cite the silence of the constitutional text and point to historical
practices of the early republic, in which Congress played a much larger role in
treaty termination.373 They also analogize treaties to statutes, which are
terminated through the same process by which they are created.374 Others argue
that the President can terminate treaties unilaterally. They argue that Article II
of the Constitution grants the President broad executive and foreign affairs
powers, and that more recent practice supports this authority.375 Still others have
suggested a middle way, postulating that termination powers might depend on
the subject matter of the treaty at hand.376
In our view, the allocation of the power to terminate the United States’
international obligations depends both on the constitutional allocation of
authority among the branches and on how that authority has actually been
exercised. We therefore think the most productive way to determine whether the
President can withdraw from an international agreement (trade or otherwise) is
first to ask whether Congress could constitutionally restrict the President’s
ability to withdraw. That answer, we contend, depends on the constitutional
allocation of authority over the relevant subject matter. As we explain below,
Congress could restrict the President’s authority to withdraw from trade
agreements, although perhaps not his ability to withdraw from other kinds of
agreements that implicate specific Article II powers.
The question of withdrawal is of critical importance because it implicates
the balance of power between Congress and the President. If the President can
withdraw from trade agreements without congressional consent, then Congress’s

https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=239436,239419,239440,239442,239441,239443,239413,239
407,239408,239412&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=5&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=T
rue&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True [https://perma.cc/58QN-7F8F].
373. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Power to Terminate U.S. Trade Agreements: The
Presidential Dormant Commerce Clause Versus a Constitutional Gloss Half Empty 20–22 (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015981 [https://perma.cc/K6BB47JW].
374. DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES 250
(1986) (arguing that the Goldwater v. Carter Court “should have held that a treaty can be terminated
only by the treaty-making power, to wit, the President and the Senate”); see also Raoul Berger, The
President’s Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 577 (1980); Michael J.
Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 257, 262 n.36 (1983) (describing
this position).
375. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Review Essay, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 873–74 (2001) (“[M]ost
commentators, courts, and government entities believe that the President may terminate a treaty
unilaterally. The President retains this authority due to his leadership in foreign affairs . . . and his
structural superiority in conducting international relations.”).
376. For a discussion of this position and a helpful overview of other positions in the debate, see
Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 247, 256
n.32 (2013).
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role in trade policy is further minimized. In the current political climate, this
would significantly impair Congress’s ability to protect trade agreements. More
generally, having no role in withdrawal would limit Congress’s leverage over
the President in renegotiating trade agreements. The President would have the
ability to present Congress with a revised trade agreement that was, in
Congress’s view, worse than the existing agreement but better than nothing at
all. If the President’s threat to terminate the existing agreement were credible,
Congress would be forced to accept what it viewed as an even worse trade
agreement. With the ability to veto a withdrawal, though, Congress would only
accept agreements which it viewed as superior to the existing agreement.
1. Restricting Presidential Power to Withdraw
Consider first whether Congress can restrict the President’s power to
withdraw from trade agreements. One can easily imagine Congress, in the
process of implementing a trade agreement, writing into legislation that the
President cannot withdraw from international obligations barring certain
triggering conditions, or that the President cannot withdraw from the agreement
under any circumstances.
Given the absence of express constitutional text as to how the United States
should withdraw from its international commitments, courts would evaluate
claims about the allocation of such authority under Justice Jackson’s famous
typology from Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer.377 In the trade context,
congressionally imposed restrictions on the President’s ability to withdraw
would fall into Youngstown category three, in which the President can only
triumph over Congress if the President’s power is exclusive or preclusive. 378
Such cases are comparatively easy.379 The text of Article I expressly grants
Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign Nations.” Historical
practice from the early republic also indicates congressional involvement in
treaty withdrawal and termination.380 In comparison with the express textual
grant and early historical evidence supporting congressional authority, the case
for a preclusive presidential power rooted in either “the executive power” or
“foreign affairs” power seems extremely weak. Notably, the text of Article II
does not specify that these powers belong to the executive.
Indeed, from a foreign relations law perspective, trade agreements are all
congressional-executive agreements (CEAs), rather than Article II treaties.
Congress uses the ordinary legislative process to consent to international
377. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
378. Id. at 637–38.
379. Other substantive areas might be more difficult. For instance, the President would have a
much stronger case that Congress could not prevent him from withdrawing from agreements regarding
military bases or agreements contingent on recognizing a foreign state, since these are core Article II
powers. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2076.
380. Bradley, supra note 10.
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commitments via CEAs. That is, congressional consent to international
obligations created through CEAs rests on Congress’s enumerated powers under
Article I, §8. Congress can therefore use those same powers to impose
restrictions on the President’s ability to withdraw from the international
commitments to which it consents.381
Functional arguments also suggest that Congress should have the power to
constrain withdrawal from trade agreements. Traditionally, functionalists have
justified expansive presidential power based on the uniqueness of foreign affairs
with respect to expertise, secrecy, subject matter, error cost, speed, and
flexibility. As we have demonstrated, however, most of these arguments are
comparatively unpersuasive in the trade agreement context. Trade agreements
deal with economic and regulatory subjects. Such matters are commonly
understood as within Congress’s purview and, indeed, are constitutionally
committed to Congress in Article I. Given the way the government is set up, the
executive branch will have greater expertise in virtually all areas of policymaking. And in general, treaty withdrawal will not raise any issues that require
secrecy.
Speed and flexibility provide relatively stronger grounds for a preclusive
presidential power. Conditions might change after the agreement is adopted. For
example, the outbreak of war between two trading partners might force the
United States to choose sides by breaking trade relations with one country. In
such a case, speed and flexibility favor presidential decision. But for these
functional arguments to override an express statutory provision that Congress
deliberated upon and passed (and that the President likely signed, absent a veto
override), courts would have to find the speed and flexibility justifications so
persuasive as to amount to a preclusive or exclusive executive power to
withdraw. Given the subject matter of trade agreements and the textual
commitment of authority to Congress in Article I, this seems unlikely.382
2. Implicit and Explicit Authorizations to Withdraw
On the other end of the spectrum are cases in which Congress has
authorized the President to withdraw from trade agreements. Authorizations
come in two forms: explicit and implicit. Explicit authorizations involve
Congress affirmatively granting the President power to withdraw from a trade
agreement. Trade acts in the middle of the twentieth century included a provision
requiring the President to include a withdrawal or termination clause in trade
381. At least arguably, Congress’s power to use its Article I powers to restrict withdrawal from
Article II treaties—consented to by the Senate and more firmly rooted in the President’s constitutional
role as the nation’s chief diplomat—might be more limited.
382. One exception, however, might be trade agreements terminated pursuant to a recognized
Article II power, such as the President’s recognition power. In Zivotofsky, the Court held that the
President has a preclusive recognition power. As a result, it may be that Congress’s power to limit the
President’s ability to withdraw from a trade agreement is itself limited in the narrow context of a case in
which the President de-recognizes a foreign country and the withdrawal is incidental to de-recognition.
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agreements that reduced tariffs.383 Moreover, these provisions authorized the
President to withdraw tariff proclamations made pursuant to such agreements,
effectively giving the President the power to withdraw from any tariff-reduction
agreement.384
Implicit authorizations do not expressly grant withdrawal powers. Rather,
implicit authorizations flow from ordinary statutory interpretation tools applied
to the implementing legislation Congress passes to approve trade agreements. At
first glance, such provisions seem unproblematic. Congressional authorization to
withdraw from a trade agreement is a Youngstown category one case: the
President has all the power Congress can delegate (including, in such a case, the
Article I foreign commerce power) in addition to Article II executive powers.
However, implicit authorizations can create a variety of problems and
paradoxes. Consider, for instance, the sunset provisions that Congress has
included in all implementing legislation for trade agreements since NAFTA.385
Congress generally provides that the implementing legislation “will cease to
have effect” when the United States ceases to be a party to the agreement.386
These sunset provisions are best read to grant implicit withdrawal authority
to the President. The trade agreements in question each include a provision
permitting a party to withdraw after six months’ written notice.387 The
Constitution and courts presume that Congress knows the contents of the
international agreements it approves. Yet Congress’s implementing legislation

383. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 255(a); 19 U.S.C. § 1884(a) (2018).
384. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 255(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1884(b).
385. NAFTA’s equivalent provision, Section 109 of the NAFTA Implementation Act, is less
clear. It provides: “During any period in which a country ceases to be a NAFTA country, sections 101
through 106 shall cease to have effect with respect to such country.” This provision at least arguably
does not apply to a US withdrawal, since it would not make sense to talk about the NAFTA
Implementation Act ceasing to have effect with respect to the United States. The provision also does not
expressly sunset the entire Implementation Act, as subsequent implementation acts do. However,
Section 101 contains Congress’s consent to the agreement entering into force. Section 109 thus operates
to withdraw congressional consent to applying the treaty to parties that have withdrawn. Arguably, this
could include application of the Implementation Act in its entirety. More generally, in NAFTA, as in all
subsequent trade implementation acts, Congress legislated knowing (a) the United States had the option
to withdraw under the treaty, and (b) that the President had in recent times exercised such options
unilaterally.
386. United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 107(c), Publ. L. No. 11241, 125 Stat. 432 (2011) [hereinafter KORUS]; see also Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Implementation Act § 107(d), Publ. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 466 (2005). To be sure,
these sunset provisions cover situations in which other parties withdraw. However, they also apply to
withdrawals by the United States. Section 107(d) of the CAFTA Implementation Act, for example,
explicitly states that the Act shall sunset when the Agreement ceases to be in force for the United States.
A different provision, Section 107(c), provides that the legislation ceases to have effect for other parties
that withdraw. The KORUS Implementation Act provides that the legislation sunsets when KORUS
itself “terminates.” KORUS supra. Since KORUS is a bilateral treaty, the treaty terminates whenever
either party withdraws. Id. Had Congress intended for the sunset only to apply to a Korean withdrawal,
it could easily have written Section 107(c) to make that clear. See id.
387. See, e.g., Central American Free Trade Agreement art. 22.7, Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514
(2004).
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makes no provision for how the United States may exercise an exit option; it
further provides that if the United States ceases to be a party, the implementing
legislation shall automatically cease to have effect. If Congress did not think the
President could terminate the United States’ international obligations
unilaterally, then it would be unnecessary for the statutory implementation
provisions to sunset. Congressional authorization to withdraw would supersede
the sunset provision.
Hence, it appears that the President has statutory authority to withdraw
from most modern trade agreements. For reasons we note above, this authority
further minimizes the role of Congress in formulating trade policy, and therefore
in making significant policy choices that affect the domestic economy. For
instance, if President Trump can terminate NAFTA without Congressional
consent, he can modify the economic rules under which major sectors of the
American economy, including the auto and agricultural industries, operate and
upon which they rely.
However, these sunset provisions also raise constitutional concerns. In
Clinton v. New York, the Supreme Court held the line-item veto unconstitutional
under the Presentment Clause because a line-item veto gave the President the
power to unilaterally repeal or amend portions of a statute.388 The sunset
provisions contained in trade agreements potentially suffer from the same
problem. If the President can unilaterally withdraw from an international
agreement, and the unilateral withdrawal effects a repeal of a domestic statute
(the implementing legislation), then Congress may have impermissibly
delegated to the President the power to repeal a statute. In this sense, the
delegation of withdrawal authority runs up against the outer constitutional limits
of Congress’s ability to delegate trade lawmaking to the President. As long as
Congress continues to pass legislation to implement trade agreements, the
Constitution will not allow Congress to give the President the power to cancel
those agreements.
There are, however, at least two potential distinctions between the sunset
clauses in these statutes and the Line Item Veto Act at issue in Clinton v. New
York. First, courts may treat delegations of authority to the President differently
when the delegated power implicates foreign affairs.389 Moreover, as Professor
Ed Swaine noted, courts have generally treated assimilative delegations—where
a predicate act by an entity other than Congress alters the application of a federal

388. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
389. For example, even Justice Sutherland and the four horsemen upheld the international
delegation in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Note,
however, that Curtiss-Wright dealt with the application of the nondelegation doctrine to an international
delegation, while Clinton v. New York found that the delegated authority violated the Presentment
Clause, rather than the nondelegation doctrine. Looked at this way, trade agreements resemble the
Presentment Clause issue in Clinton v. New York more than they resemble the traditional nondelegation
issues at issue in Curtiss-Wright.
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law—as unproblematic.390 Second, the line-item veto involved the repeal of only
a portion of the statute, whereas withdrawal tied to a sunset clause repeals the
entire statute. On the one hand, this might suggest the legitimacy of the sunset
clause because the legislative bargain isn’t broken in a piecemeal fashion. On the
other hand, sunset clauses allow the President to unilaterally repeal a statute
altogether, which goes against the formal understanding of bicameralism and
presentment underlying the decision in Clinton v. New York.
Perhaps paradoxically, the very statutory provision that implicitly grants
the President authority to withdraw from an international agreement also
unconstitutionally repeals a domestic statute. It is not clear what to make of this.
The provision could be constitutional as applied to granting the President power
to withdraw from the international commitments, because Congress intended the
President to have that power, but unconstitutional as applied to the statutory
repeal. This would leave the domestic obligations of the United States in place,
while the President could still terminate the international obligations.
The upshot would be that, absent an affirmative congressional repeal, the
President would still be responsible for implementing a trade agreement to which
the United States would no longer be party.391 This result is perhaps most likely
in the case of the WTO. Unlike the implementing legislation for free trade
agreements, the URAA does not contain a clause sunsetting the legislation upon
a withdrawal.392 In many if not most contexts, this situation would still alter how
the executive could legally behave. Implementing legislation does not simply
direct the President to comply with the terms of the agreement, nor does it
directly enact the agreement into the US Code. For instance, Section 125 of the
Trade Act of 1974, which applies to subsequent trade agreements, provides that
the President may immediately raise tariffs to the level they would otherwise be
at after withdrawing from a trade agreement.393 Consequently, the President
could arguably raise tariffs to WTO levels after withdrawing from a free trade
agreement such as NAFTA.
A second possibility, suggested by Professor Joel Trachtman, is that
constitutional avoidance dictates reading the sunset provision as requiring
affirmative congressional consent to withdraw from NAFTA.394 In other words,
390. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1492, 1519 (2004).
391. In fact, such a situation is not so odd. The United States frequently adheres to international
instruments that are not legally binding on it, including through statutes that reference nonbinding
instruments. Examples include SALT II, the Basel Accords on Capital Adequacy, and the Kimberly
Process on conflict diamonds.
392. Indeed, far from authorizing presidential withdrawal, section 125 of the URAA arguably
establishes a procedure by which Congress can direct the president to withdraw. URAA § 125(b), 19
U.S.C. § 3535(b) (2018) (establishing a procedure by which Congress expresses its disapproval of the
WTO).
393. Trade Act of 1974 § 125(e), 19 U.S.C. § 2135 (2018).
394. Trachtman, supra note 373, at 20–22 (“implementing statutes that provide for termination
of the statute upon termination of the agreement are even more difficult to interpret as implicitly
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the sunset provision would not be unconstitutional under Clinton v. New York if
Congress had to authorize the President to withdraw from NAFTA first.
Congress’s authorization would be the effective act repealing the
implementation act. This argument has at least two difficulties. First, from a
formalist point of view, the President’s withdrawal is still the act that effects the
repeal. Second, and more problematically, on this reading the sunset provision
operates like an affirmative restriction on the President’s ability to withdraw.
This runs contrary to Congress’s apparent intent to allow the legislation to sunset
without further congressional action. Were it not for the sunset provision, the
President could arguably withdraw from the agreement without automatically
(and unconstitutionally) effecting the repeal of a statute. The avoidance canon
does not make any interpretation of a provision available, and a reading that
appears flatly contradicted by the provision in question seems out of bounds.
3. No Authorization to Withdraw
Yet a third possibility is that the provision is unconstitutional and therefore
should simply be ignored. Assuming the provision is severable, that raises the
question of what happens when there is no indication one way or another of
whether Congress authorized withdrawal.
There are cases in which trade implementing legislation has neither
affirmative authorization to withdraw nor affirmative authorization to restrict
withdrawal. NAFTA is the best example. Unlike subsequent implementation
acts, NAFTA’s sunset provision arguably applies only to withdrawal by other
parties to the agreement, not to withdrawal by the United States.395 In these cases,
two questions arise: what power does the President have to withdraw from the
agreement, and what power does the President have to terminate the statute
implementing such obligations?
The statutory question is easier. Under ordinary principles of constitutional
law, supported by INS v. Chadha and Clinton v. New York, the President does
not have the power to unilaterally repeal a domestic statute passed by both houses
of Congress. Hence, as a practical matter, the President cannot remove his
domestic obligation to implement a trade agreement in accordance with
implementing legislation (again, barring a constitutional sunset provision).
The international obligations, however, present a harder case, and we can
imagine five ways to approach the constitutional question. Which of these five
approaches dominates depends on one’s preferred substantive and
methodological approach to addressing constitutional questions.
First, unilateral withdrawal is permitted, but only if pursuant to an Article
II power, such as the recognition power. This was Justice Brennan’s position in

authorizing Presidential power to terminate than implementing statutes, like the URAA and NAFTA
acts, that do not”).
395. See discussion supra note 385.
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Goldwater v. Carter.396 In dissent, Brennan argued that the “[a]brogation of the
defense treaty with Taiwan was a necessary incident” to the recognition of China,
and that this power to recognize or derecognize foreign governments was
committed to the President alone.397 Brennan cited a variety of cases for support,
including Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino398 and United States v. Pink.399
Zivotofsky v. Kerry could provide additional support for this view.400
Second, unilateral withdrawal is permitted because of historical practice.
As Professor Curtis Bradley has shown, historical practice around treaty
termination has migrated as a general matter from congressional involvement to
presidential control.401 Those who use historical practice to interpret the
Constitution might therefore consider presidential withdrawal from international
obligations to be constitutional.
Third, unilateral withdrawal is permitted due to foreign relations
exceptionalism. Supporters of the dicta in Curtiss-Wright or advocates for
expansive presidential power under the unspecified “foreign affairs” or
“executive” powers might think that withdrawal authority is rooted in these
doctrines.402
Fourth, unilateral withdrawal is permitted in light of international law
background principles. Traditional principles of statutory interpretation hold that
Congress legislates with international law as an assumed set of background
conditions.403 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, heads of
state “are considered as representing their State” for purposes of expressing
consent to be bound by a treaty.404 Accordingly, heads of state can effectively
remove such consent under international law. As a result, when Congress passes
legislation implementing trade agreements, it understands that international law
permits the President to exercise any withdrawal options contained in the
agreement. The President therefore has the withdrawal power as a default rule in
the absence of any express or implied congressional provision to the contrary.
This approach also has the virtue of supporting the existence of sunset clauses in
implementing legislation that do not expressly grant withdrawal power to the
President with respect to international obligations. The power to withdraw from
the international obligations is assumed from the background rules of
international law.
396. 444 U.S. 996, 1066 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
397. Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
398. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
399. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
400. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
401. Bradley, supra note 10.
402. For a discussion of foreign relations exceptionalism, see Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 7.
403. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (“[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority
for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority to detain for the duration of the
relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles.”) (O’Connor,
J.) (plurality opinion).
404. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 7.2(a) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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Fifth, unilateral withdrawal is impermissible. Given the unspecified nature
of Article II powers, the explicit grant of Article I foreign commerce powers, the
early historical practice around termination, and the twin nature of a statute’s
passage and termination, presidential termination of international trade
obligations might be deemed unconstitutional.
Our own view is that presidential powers to terminate the United States’
international obligations from a trade agreement, and the consequences of such
termination, should depend on ordinary approaches to constitutional and
statutory law and interpretation. In particular, the balance of powers between
Article I and Article II, Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework, and ordinary
principles of interpretation provide a helpful framework for seeing the scope of
the President’s powers in this arena. In the most challenging cases—the zone of
twilight where congressional silence is at issue—decisions will most likely
depend on one’s preferred approach to interpretation.
In this zone, the confusion about whether trade should be viewed as a
foreign affairs issue or a domestic economic issue takes on outsized importance.
In Youngstown itself, the Supreme Court was confronted with a fundamentally
domestic economic issue: resolving a labor dispute. The case had foreign
relations implications only because President Truman claimed that he needed the
steel factories to resume work to support the war effort in Korea.405 A majority
of the Court was ultimately unpersuaded that the foreign affairs implications
overrode the domestic economic nature of a labor stoppage.406
In our view, the same is true of trade legislation. While the President might
well claim authority to terminate trade agreements absent a congressional
prohibition on doing so, his international actions cannot overturn domestic
statutes, including ones that implement international agreements. Congress
passed such implementing legislation pursuant to its Article I powers over the
economy, which do not disappear simply because Congress directed the
President to regulate based on internationally-agreed standards. Lacking his own
constitutional authority over the domestic economy, the President can only
regulate pursuant to authority delegated by Congress.
D. Unorthodox International Lawmaking: Soft Law and Executive
Agreements+
In recent years, scholars have observed that the process of making
international agreements has expanded beyond the conventional “triptych” of

405. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (“The indispensability of steel
as a component of substantially all weapons and other war materials led the President to believe that the
proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize our national defense . . . .”).
406. Id. at 643–44 (“There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute [the president] also Commander-in-Chief
of the country, its industries and its inhabitants.”) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements.407
Rather, a “whole host of less crystalline, more nuanced forms of international
legal engagement and cooperation” is now emerging.408 These unorthodox forms
of international lawmaking share a common feature, namely that neither the
Senate nor Congress as a whole has expressly consented to their creation.
Commentators analyzing these forms of unorthodox international lawmaking409
have largely focused on soft law and executive agreements+ (EA+). They have
mostly shied away from assessing whether the constitutionality of these forms
of international norm-creation might be different in trade than in other areas of
international cooperation, given trade’s constitutional pedigree under Article
I.410 In our view, assessing the constitutionality of these nontraditional forms of
international cooperation—in particular, soft law and EA+—requires careful
attention to the constitutional allocation of authority over the substantive matters
at issue.
Soft law refers to “those [international] nonbinding rules or instruments that
interpret or inform our understanding of binding legal rules or represent promises
that in turn create expectations about future conduct.”411 One of the best
examples of soft law is the Basel Accords.412 The Basel Accords seek to
harmonize bank regulations and practices internationally, with the most recent
Basel III Accords setting capital and liquidity requirements for banks after the
2008 financial crisis. These regulations, in effect, seek to set a level playing field

407. Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century
International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J.F. 338, 349 (2017).
408. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks: Twenty-First-Century
International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J. 725, 726, 733 (2013); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 10; David Kaye, Stealth Multilateralism: U.S. Foreign Policy Without Treaties—or the Senate, 92
FOREIGN AFF. 113, 122 (2013) (“[N]onbinding arrangements may now be the executive branch’s
preferred way of doing business.”).
409. Cf. SINCLAIR, supra note 272; Abbe Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po,
Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015).
410. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, “Political” Commitments and the
Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507 (2009); Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign
Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (2014); David Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive
Agreements+, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (2016). Bodansky and Spiro carefully note that claims
settlement agreements have extremely weak Article II foundations given Congress’s foreign commerce
power. Id. at 904.
411. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
171, 174 (2010); see also Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 410, at 739–40 (defining soft law as
“agreements between executive branch actors in two or more countries that do not create legal
obligations but which nonetheless contain substantive commitments that the parties are expected to take
seriously”). Some authors prefer the term “political commitment” or “pledge” to describe nonbinding
commitments by executive branch officials. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1218 (“at
bottom a political commitment is like diplomatic speech backed by a personal pledge of the Executive
official who made it”); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L
L. 581, 587 (2005) (using the term “pledge” in preference to the term “soft law”).
412. For an overview of the accords, see Basel Regulatory Framework, BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/LV86-FLB6].
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(with reciprocal and equivalent standards) in the international trade of financial
services. But the Basel Accords are not treaties (in the constitutional sense) or
congressional-executive agreements. Rather, the Federal Reserve negotiates the
agreements with foreign regulators and then implements the internationally
agreed-upon standards via notice-and-comment rulemaking.413 Indeed, the
executive branch regularly relies on normal agency authorities that are subject to
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) to give unorthodox international
commitments domestic legal effect.414 More recently, President Obama entered
into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a nuclear agreement with
Iran that was nonbinding internationally and operationalized at the domestic
level pursuant to the President’s statutory authority to waive economic
sanctions.415 Note that the imposition or lifting of economic sanctions, although
usually framed as a national security issue in the Iran nuclear context, is also a
classic case of regulating the terms of foreign trade and commerce.
EA+ “fall somewhere in between” congressional-executive agreements and
sole executive agreements.416 Unlike sole executive agreements, they are not
grounded in the President’s Article II powers alone; unlike congressionalexecutive agreements, they are not explicitly authorized by legislation.417 Rather,
they are “consistent with, and complement, related congressional activity.”418 As
an example, consider the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). In the
Pro-IP Act, Congress called on the executive branch to work with foreign
countries to increase the enforcement of intellectual property rights.419 The
Obama Administration relied on this authority to negotiate the ACTA. Congress
charged that the executive had no power to “enter into a binding international
agreement covering issues delegated by the Constitution to Congress, absent
congressional approval.”420 In response, the administration argued that while the
statutory provision did not authorize the administration to make an ex ante
congressional-executive agreement, it did authorize the administration to act
internationally to accomplish the statute’s charge.421 Ultimately, the US did not

413. Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 410, at 785.
414. Id.
415. See generally KENNETH KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS, CONG. RES. SERV. (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5F2-842X].
416. Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 410, at 887.
417. Id. at 893.
418. Id. at 887–88.
419. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 § 8113(a).
420. Letter from Senator Ron Wyden to President Barack Obama (Oct. 12, 2011),
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/letter-to-president-obama-asking-why-congress-doesnthave-to-ratify-acta [https://perma.cc/AE68-ZSC6]. See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 410, at 908 n.128.
421. See Letter from Harold Koh to Senator Ron Wyden (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/84365507-State-Department-Response-to-Wydenon-ACTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/P462-LKWT ] [hereinafter Letter from Harold Koh] (“The ACTA was
negotiated in response to express Congressional calls for international cooperation to enhance
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Congress has passed legislation explicitly calling for the
Executive Branch to work with other countries to enhance enforcement of intellectual property
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join ACTA due to domestic political opposition, but it has made a number of
other EA+.422
Although commentators have analyzed soft law and EA+ in depth, they
have not assessed the constitutional authority for these forms of unorthodox
international lawmaking from the perspective of a substantive area of law. We
think that is a mistake. The strength of the constitutional underpinnings of
unorthodox international lawmaking shifts based on the substantive area at issue.
For example, in the context of military operations, the President’s Article II
authorities as commander in chief suggest greater constitutional footing for
making unorthodox international agreements. In contrast, the location of trade at
the nexus of foreign affairs and domestic economics suggests a more limited
purview for unorthodox international agreements, given Congress’s express
Article I powers to regulate foreign commerce, set tariffs, raise revenues, and
take necessary and proper actions to implement those powers.
This distinction is critical for evaluating the executive’s authority to
conclude such agreements, the process by which agencies should consider such
agreements, and the reviewability of such agreements in court. Professors Jean
Galbraith and David Zaring, for example, have argued that soft law agreements
should be seen through the prism of foreign relations law. In their view, soft law
agreements should be afforded significant deference in their creation,
implementation, and reviewability because of the deference frequently afforded
the President in national security and foreign affairs.423 They root this general
deference in the “unique figure of the President, who is Commander in Chief of
the armed forces, the appointer of ambassadors, and vested with the executive
power of the United States—and therefore is the traditional focal point for
foreign affairs powers.”424 But while the President undoubtedly has some
constitutional powers in foreign affairs, Congress has far more powers in the
realm of trade—and its powers are explicitly granted. As a result, we think a
better approach would be to evaluate unorthodox international agreements based
on the balance of powers afforded the President or Congress under the
Constitution.425 The degree to which the creation of an agreement or judicial
deference is warranted will depend on the underlying constellation of
constitutional powers.
Practically speaking, unorthodox international agreements are likely to be
implemented by (if not concluded by) administrative agencies. One of the
important questions is what authority agencies should have to conclude such
rights. . . . The ACTA helps to answer that legislative call [and] . . . is part of a long line of trade
agreements that were similarly concluded by successive Administrations.”). See Bodansky & Spiro,
supra note 410, at 909.
422. See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 410, at 910.
423. Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 410, at 741–42.
424. Id. at 743.
425. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 1264 (“[C]ourts are more willing to find implicit
statutory authorization in areas in which the President has independent constitutional authority.”).
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agreements and what deference they should receive for regulations made in
conjunction with those agreements. Galbraith and Zaring argue that in
concluding such agreements, agencies should be constrained when Congress has
spoken to the issue and forbidden international cooperation, but that when
Congress is silent, “the inherent foreign affairs powers located in the executive
branch suggest that agencies still should be presumed to have the right to pursue
their objectives through soft law.”426
The inquiry seems to us more complicated. In most cases of unorthodox
lawmaking, the executive branch can claim some statutory authorization. For
instance, in the case of the ACTA, Congress had indeed directed the executive
branch to engage with other countries to boost enforcement of intellectual
property laws.427 But Congress had not expressly authorized, either ex ante or ex
post, the conclusion of an international agreement.428 If Congress has not
delegated such authority to the executive branch and the President does not have
an independent Article II power, then any agency action is governed by ordinary
administrative law procedures under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).
One of the APA’s central purposes is to ensure that administrative action is
democratically accountable.429 Since administrative agencies do not stand for
election, the APA achieves this goal by establishing procedures, such as noticeand-comment rulemaking, that allow interested members of the public to
participate in an agency’s rulemaking processes.430
When an agency undertakes international negotiations upon which it bases
a subsequent rulemaking, however, the agency makes a policy determination
prior to a fair consideration of the views of domestic interests.431 It effectively
decides what it will do and renders the notice-and-comment process little more
than window dressing. Indeed, this approach privileges the views of other
governments over those of ordinary American parties. Where Congress has
authorized international negotiations or an international agreement, this
privileged access presents no constitutional problems. But where Congress has
not authorized this access, the agency arguably acts contrary to the APA’s

426. Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 410, at 764.
427. See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 § 8113(a);
Letter from Harold Koh, supra note 421.
428. If Congress has expressly authorized the United States to participate in negotiations or an
intergovernmental body, or to conclude an agreement, the President would be acting with the combined
powers of both the executive and Congress, and hence his actions would be presumptively
constitutional. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
429. See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY
OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2007).
430. Id. at 118–6.
431. In such cases, we do not think it matters whether the international agreement is binding or
nonbinding. In either case, the agency is seeking the outcome reflected in the international agreement,
which was reached without accounting for domestic interests through the normal APA process.
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strictures and “in excess of statutory . . . authority.”432 Given the primacy of
Congress over foreign commerce and economic concerns generally, courts
reviewing regulations based on international standards should carefully
scrutinize agency claims of implicit consent or atmospheric acquiescence to the
use of unorthodox international agreements as an input into the domestic
regulatory process.433
Relatedly, administrative agencies should not be given leeway to evade
traditional administrative law requirements under the APA. For example,
agencies are required to respond to commentators during the notice-andcomment process, or they risk a court finding their final rule arbitrary and
capricious because the agency failed to engage in reasoned decision-making.434
During the course of the first Basel Accords, the Federal Reserve explained away
some commenters’ opinions because they “would be inconsistent with the
framework agreed upon by the G-10 countries.”435 This justification seems
problematic to us. If Congress did not authorize international negotiations, then
the Federal Reserve should not be able to use the international negotiations as a
shield in subsequent rulemaking. To do so further elevates the importance of
foreign governments’ concerns over the concerns that Congress has directed the
agency to consider in the APA. In this case, the Federal Reserve should have had
to follow all of the ordinary administrative law requirements and principles that
Congress and the courts have established for rulemaking—including providing
a reasoned explanation for its actions that responds meaningfully on the merits
to commenters. If an agency cannot offer a justification for internationally
agreed-upon standards that is meritorious in relation to the principles by which
Congress has directed it to regulate, it should not be able to incorporate those
standards into domestic law simply because other governments favor them.
E. Trade Federalism
The President’s control of trade policy also has important implications for
the allocation and exercise of economic power between the federal government
and the States. We refer to this relationship (insofar as it implicates international
trade) as “trade federalism.” Like other international agreements, trade
agreements present a challenge to the US model of vertically separated powers.

432. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2017).
433. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has not uniformly found in favor of the executive
branch on claims of atmospheric acquiescence. While proponents of unorthodox international
agreements often cite Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), as an example of judicial
acceptance of an EA+ that even the Court recognized was not explicitly authorized in legislation, in both
Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and FDA v. Brown and Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (2000), the
Supreme Court found that legislative atmosphere did not authorize executive branch action.
434. See Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 108, 115–16 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(finding that, while agencies need not respond to all comments, the “arbitrary and capricious” standard
requires them to respond to significant challenges to the reasonableness of the proposed rule).
435. See Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 410, at 760.
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Under the international law of state responsibility, the United States is strictly
liable for violations committed by state and local governments, even if the
federal government is constitutionally prohibited from preempting the state
action.436 This liability creates tensions between the President and Congress over
how to ensure the compatibility of US law, including state and local law, with
international trade agreements. In these situations, the President often supports
the compliance with trade agreements, while Congress often stands up for state
and local rules.
The challenge of trade federalism goes beyond compliance with
international legal obligations. Under our constitutional system, trade federalism
operates in an uncomfortable limbo. The foreign affairs paradigm suggests that
international trade should operate under principles of foreign relations
exceptionalism, in which the political branches determine policy, and local and
state interests give way to national interests. The domestic economics paradigm
recognizes the important role that Congress plays in making economic policy for
an extended and diverse republic. What makes trade federalism so complex and
scrambled is that Congress makes policy at the national level in part for reasons
of uniformity, and in the foreign relations context, the Supreme Court has
recognized the traditional importance of state and local governments under our
constitutional system.437
These tensions are particularly important in the current historical moment.
Today, states and cities are increasingly regulating matters of international
concern. For example, cities have come together to form their own climate
change pact,438 while states like California (which by itself would be one of the
ten largest national economies in the world) have begun aggressively regulating
greenhouse gases.439 States and localities have also been active in debates about
immigration, pronouncing themselves “sanctuaries” for undocumented
immigrants.440 Other states, such as Massachusetts, have passed laws targeting

436. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 36, 40–41 (2001) [hereinafter “Draft Articles on State Responsibility”]; see
also Timothy Meyer, Local Liability in International Economic Law, 95 N.C. L. REV. 261, 272 (2017)
[hereinafter “Meyer, Local Liability”] (describing the Draft Articles rule as one of “strict vicarious
liability” for subnational government action).
437. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, Normalization, supra note 7, at 1903–30.
438. GLOBAL
COVENANT
OF
MAYORS
FOR
CLIMATE
AND
ENERGY,
https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org [https://perma.cc/UUK5-JTBR]; see also Aamer Madhani,
Forget Paris: U.S. Mayors Sign Pact to Carry Out Paris Agreement, USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/12/04/u-s-mayors-sign-pact-track-progress-parisagreement/920305001 [https://perma.cc/SY3H-PS6M] (describing the Chicago Charter, an agreement
among U.S. mayors to implement the Paris Agreement on climate change’s emissions reduction goals).
439. California plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 40% by 2030, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
AGENCY, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34792 [https://perma.cc/5NTW-AZJY].
440. Jasmine C. Lee, Rudy Omri & Julia Preston, What are Sanctuary Cities?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuary-cities.html
[https://perma.cc/F9PM-YWCU].
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human rights abuses overseas.441 Given the increased prominence of state and
local governments in tackling international problems, the potential for the
President’s trade agenda to severely impair trade federalism raises serious
concerns.
As discussed in Part I, tariffs were the principal concern of trade
negotiations for decades. Setting tariff rates, and controlling foreign commerce
more generally, are plenary powers of Congress.442 Consequently, trade
negotiations that focused on tariffs and import/export procedures raised few
federalism issues. Even the GATT, however, imposed rules that applied behind
the border. Chief among these rules was the national treatment rule, which
prohibited a GATT party from treating foreign products less favorably than like
domestic products.443 The national treatment rule prohibited a wide variety of
discriminatory policies that state and local governments might have enacted,
such as local content requirements.444 Despite the formal application of the
GATT to subnational policies, however, subnational government action was not
a primary focus of the GATT parties.
As the GATT parties shifted their attention from tariffs to nontariff barriers,
however, the policies of subnational governments became more and more
important. The WTO Agreements have created a host of new rules limiting how
governments regulate behind the border, including rules governing laws that
affect public health, food safety, product safety, and environmental protection.
Such laws can be considered nontariff barriers to trade when they have the effect
of stymying the cross-border flow of goods, services or capital. Most notably,
the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement applies to regulations governing
product standards,445 and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement applies to,
inter alia, food safety regulations.446 Additionally, the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures imposes limits on the kinds of subsidies
governments can offer,447 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
imposes limits on government regulation of service providers.448

441. See Crosby v. Nat. Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
442. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
443. GATT, supra note 136, art. III.
444. “Local content requirements are laws, regulations, or governmental measures that condition
a benefit on the use of a certain percentage of inputs from the local jurisdiction.” Timothy Meyer, How
Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods, 95 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1937, 1945 (2015)
[hereinafter “Meyer, Local Discrimination”]; see also Holger P. Hestermeyer & Laura Nielsen, The
Legality of Local Content Measures Under WTO Law, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 553, 554 (2014).
445. See generally Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
446. See generally Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S.
493.
447. See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 287.
448. See generally GATS, supra note 172.
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Unlike tariffs and other border measures, these trade rules governing
nontariff barriers implicate longstanding, core powers of state and local
governments. State and local governments regularly pass product and food safety
rules, license service providers, and regulate to protect the environment. Our
constitutional system values the power and independence of state and local
governments. But the default rule under the international law of state
responsibility is that the national government is strictly liable for its own actions,
as well as for the actions of any subnational governments.449 Indeed, the nation
remains liable even if, as a political or constitutional matter, the national
government cannot control the actions of the subnational government.450
The combination of international law’s rules on liability for subnational
governments and trade law’s expansion into nontariff barriers that implicate state
police powers creates a situation in which state and local governments can open
the United States up to retaliation from other countries for breaching trade
agreements. Indeed, state rules have figured prominently in a number of WTO
disputes. For instance, the EU successfully challenged subsidies that the State of
Washington provided to Boeing under the WTO’s Subsidies and Countervailing
Agreement.451 Additionally, a WTO panel ruled that the United States
unlawfully discriminated against Antigua because US laws ban online gambling
with companies based outside of the United States, even though state laws in
virtually every state permit gambling of some kind with businesses located
within the state.452 The trend towards applying international trade agreements to
state and local action holds outside of the WTO context as well. Over 40 percent
of the investor-state claims brought under NAFTA, and a quarter of such claims
brought against the United States, challenge state and local action.453
The potential for liability highlights a tension between the roles that
Congress and the executive play. The President, who must defend the United
States in claims brought against it and who is often thought to prefer to liberalize
trade in any event, may wish to preempt the unlawful state or local action to
avoid retaliation against the United States. Indeed, Congress has given the
President, but not private parties, the power to sue state and local governments

449. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 436, at 8440–41; see also Meyer, supra
note 436, at 272 (describing the Draft Articles rule as one of “strict vicarious liability” for subnational
government action).
450. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 436, at 36.
451. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft—
(Second Complaint), ¶ 1350, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted Mar. 23, 2012) (holding that
subsidies granted to Boeing by the State of Washington and the City of Wichita, Kansas, violated the
WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures).
452. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 5, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005) (finding that
US and local laws prohibiting internet gambling while permitting in-person gambling violate the
General Agreement on Trade in Services).
453. Meyer, Local Liability, supra note 436, at 277.
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to seek a judgment that a subnational measure violates the WTO agreements.454
However, as far as we are aware the United States has never brought such an
action.
This puzzling lack of challenges is perhaps explained by congressional
resistance. To be sure, the URAA requires that the President consult with the
States to try to make state law uniform with the United States’ trade
commitments.455 The URAA also requires the US Trade Representative to
establish an office to facilitate this consultation process.456 The US Trade
Representative must consult with the States whenever a state law is challenged
in a WTO case and must allow the State an opportunity to help formulate the
United States’ position.457 The US Trade Representative is also required to report
to Congress both any legal suits the United States takes to preempt WTOinconsistent state laws458 and any WTO cases brought by other members
challenging state laws as WTO-inconsistent.459
But what Congress has not done is give the executive the authority to
preempt WTO-inconsistent state laws through regulation. Federal regulations do
preempt inconsistent state laws. Congress therefore could have given the
President the power to harmonize state law with WTO obligations through
administrative rulemaking. But Congress instead chose to impose consultation
requirements on the President and delegate the authority to make a determination
of WTO-inconsistency to the courts. This suggests that Congress might have
been concerned with preserving the role of the States. Indeed, even if the United
States did initiate a suit to preempt state laws, the URAA makes clear both that
the United States bears the burden of proving the inconsistency and that the
courts should accord no deference to the WTO’s own decision regarding the state
law.460 These provisions further suggest that Congress is acting to protect the
interests of the States.461
The resulting system of trade federalism can be justified neither by the
foreign affairs paradigm nor by the domestic economics paradigm. State and
local governments have limited control over their own borders and may behave

454. URAA § 102(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3501 (2017) (“No State law, or the application of
such a State law, may be declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the
provision or application is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, except in an action
brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.”).
455. Id. § 102(b)(1)(A).
456. Id. § 102(b)(1)(B).
457. Id. § 102(b)(1)(C).
458. Id. § 102(b)(2)(C).
459. Id. § 124.
460. Id. § 102(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (“[A] report of a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body
convened under the Dispute Settlement Understanding regarding the State law, or the law of any political
subdivision thereof, shall not be considered as binding or otherwise accorded deference.”).
461. Cf. Wechsler, supra note 266.
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in a protectionist fashion behind their borders.462 That Congress would defend
the interests of the States protecting their interests is logical. Members of
Congress are, after all, elected at the state or local level.463 But Congress’s
position in the URAA represents an awkward compromise between state and
national interests. Congress has not required that the executive negotiate trade
agreements in a way that minimizes the interference with common state law
schemes. Nor has Congress itself taken steps to determine which state laws
should be preempted. Instead, Congress has left the President a largely free hand
to negotiate trade agreements that increasingly implicate core state and local
government powers—but has given the President little ability to address the
results of such agreements.464
As a result, our trade federalism is at best in disarray and at worst at risk of
collapsing into trade nationalism. Claims challenging state and local action,
including in areas in which those governments are attempting to address other
matters of international concern, can be expected to rise. In 2016, for instance,
India initiated a case against the United States challenging a number of state and
local measures that provide financial support for renewable energy.465 The
dysfunction that this state of affairs creates harms both economic and foreign
policy considerations. On the one hand, the executive branch cannot tailor
international trade law to the wide variation of local concerns found throughout
the United States. On the other hand, state and local governments lack incentives
to reconcile their economic regulation with foreign policy. In sum, Congress’s
embrace of the foreign affairs paradigm and its concomitant delegation of powers
to the executive to negotiate trade agreements with nontariff barriers pose an
ongoing and increasingly significant threat to trade federalism.
CONCLUSION
Trade and security are the two policies most central to every nation’s wellbeing and most critical to every government’s functioning. The United States
replaced the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution in large part to give
the nation control over trade policy. The world’s other great federation, the

462. Meyer, Local Discrimination, supra note 444, at 1942 (“[D]iscriminatory conditions are
more likely at smaller scales of government.”).
463. See Wechsler, supra note 266, at 544–47.
464. In recent free trade agreements, such as the TPP, the United States responded to state and
local interests by inserting some limited exemptions for state and local programs. These exemptions—
similar to so-called “federalism declarations” attached to other treaties to make clear that the United
States does not accept international responsibility for the actions of its state and local governments—
apply only to the nondiscrimination rules in the services and investment chapters of the agreements. As
such, they are fairly narrow in scope. Moreover, such clauses cannot easily be introduced to the WTO,
where existing agreements are difficult to amend, and other countries would have little reason to agree
to reduce the United States’ incentives to pressure its state to comply with trade rules. See generally
Meyer, Local Liability, supra note 436.
465. Request for Consultations, United States—Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable
Energy Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS510/1 (Sept. 9, 2016).
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European Union, used trade integration to rebuild itself after two catastrophic
world wars.
The twenty-first century has been dominated by security considerations
since the attacks of September 11 turned the Bush presidency into a wartime
presidency. The 2016 presidential election marked a turning point. As both the
Republican and Democratic parties pursue policies aimed at addressing voters’
economic insecurity, trade policy is once again taking center stage. At this
moment, understanding how our trade constitution came to be is critical to
understanding how our trade policy can and will be made going forward. The
country’s rightful concern about a host of global challenges—climate change,
rogue regimes like North Korea, the rise of China as a global power—make it
tempting to revert to a trade policy dominated by foreign policy considerations.
Yet as President Obama’s ill-fated efforts to negotiate the TPP and justify
it on foreign policy grounds shows, foreign policy considerations simply cannot
carry the weight of a domestic economic policy that so many Americans of both
parties feel no longer benefits them. Trade liberalization for its own sake—the
utilitarian idea that we should maximize aggregate national welfare through our
trade policy without concern for the distribution of the gains from that policy—
is an idea whose time is past. Going forward, concerns about economic
opportunity, equality, and the distribution of the gains from our trade policies
will dominate our politics. How those concerns will shape that policy remains to
be seen. Protectionist policies like punitive tariffs and subsidies (for
manufacturers and displaced labor) redistribute wealth, although they have very
different trade implications.
A trade policy dominated by the President is unable to deal
comprehensively with domestic concerns. Only if Congress participates as a full
constitutional partner will the United States have a sustainable trade
liberalization policy that enjoys broad public support. Nothing legally or
functionally prevents Congress from reasserting its constitutional role. Whether
it will do so remains to be seen.

